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ABSTRACT
The macOS operating system is increasingly targeted by malware. Software written
for macOS, both benign and malicious, is in the Mach-O executable format. Malware authors
may frustrate analysts through obfuscation methods such as packing. The field of malware
research on Windows is well-established but is less so on the macOS platform. Thus far, no
research has been identified that studies how machine learning can be used to detected packed
Mach-O malware. This research applies supervised machine learning techniques to the
classification of packed Mach-O malware. This research will answer three research questions.
First, whether machine learning can classify packed Mach-O binaries. Second, whether
machine learning can classify packed Mach-O malware. Third, whether machine learning can
classify the family that a malware sample belongs to. A design science methodology is used
to develop an artifact and apply it against the target problem. Both malware and benignware
samples are collected and processed to extract useful information. This information is
enriched and parsed into a feature vector. Machine learning models are trained against the
three problems identified by the research questions. The model hyperparameters are tuned and
relevant features are selected. The results of the experiments show that machine learning can
classify packed Mach-O binaries with 100% F1 and can classify packed Mach-O malware
with 94.61% F1. However, machine learning can only perform multiclass classification of
packed malware family with 69.1% F1.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the background of this dissertation research, the context of the
problem in which the problem is found, and the motivation for conducting the research. The
background is established by describing the threat posed by malicious software in the
cyberspace domain. Next, key concepts are presented, terminology is defined, and an
overview of the Apple macOS operating system and malicious software are provided. A
history of malicious software is provided to demonstrate the evolution of the malicious
software threat over time. There are challenges in defending against malicious software,
including efforts to defeat analysis such as packing, which are described. Finally, machine
learning is introduced to ground the research through the lens of automated learning
algorithms. This chapter ultimately frames the problem of a lack of research into packed
malware that targets macOS.

Background of the Problem
The reliance of the modern world on computing makes the threat of malicious activity
against digital devices an important topic of study. These threats take several forms including
fraud, unauthorized access to information or systems, and even military actions. Another
threat is malicious software, or malware, which is software that threatens computer
information systems and the data those systems process. The European Union Agency for
Cybersecurity (ENISA) in 2020 released a Threat Landscape report which for the second year
in a row named malware as the top cyber threat (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity,
2020). As the top threat, malware should be of primary concern to the over 50% of the world's
population that uses the Internet (The World Bank, n.d.).
The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology also lists malware
as a top threat, adding that "today's malware is often harder to detect, more damaging, and
harder to remove" (Souppaya & Scarfone, 2013). The danger of malware has led to the
development of an industry to fight it. Various companies have developed antivirus software,
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designed to detect and prevent malware. Cyber threat intelligence, a capability espoused by
ENISA, provides organizations with the ability proactively understand the threats and
capabilities of attackers (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, 2017). Other companies
offer incident response to mitigate the effects of a successful intrusion, digital forensics to
understand what malware did and how it did so, and penetration testers that help to illuminate
avenues of attack that can be used to spread malware.
Malware can be used against both end user systems such as desktops or laptops and
server systems which host applications. Server systems usually have the benefit of a security
team or some other investment in defense against malware attacks, whereas end users are
typically left to their own devices. Microsoft Windows and Apple macOS are the two primary
desktop operating systems used by end users. Windows has been the dominant operating
system but its lead has eroded over the past decade. Over the time period 2013 to 2020, the
Windows market share fell from 90.96% to 76.56% while the macOS market share rose from
7.95% to 17.1% (Liu, 2021). Previously, Apple had claimed through its marketing that Macs
did not get viruses (Manning, 2012). However, there are malicious software that targets Mac
systems and the number of attacks against Macs is rising (Haslam, 2021; Reed, 2019).
This paper is organized into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic of
malicious software as the problem to be studied and provides context to the problem. The
second chapter consists of a literature review which illuminates previous research. The third
chapter provides the methodology of research that will be applied to this problem. The fourth
chapter will provide the results of the research and a discussion of using the research in
addressing the problem. The fifth chapter will provide concluding remarks and suggest
avenues of future research.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. First, a common vocabulary and
understanding will be established by defining terms and concepts for cyberspace, the Apple
macOS operating system, and malicious software. Second, a history of malicious software is
provided to demonstrate the evolution of this threat over time. Third, challenges to the
defense against malicious software will be reviewed to illuminate the need for continued
research. Finally, machine learning is introduced to ground the research through the lens of
automated learning algorithms.

3
Cyberspace Key Concepts
Cyberspace is the “global domain within the information environment consisting of
the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data”
(DoD). Cyberspace includes the computers, routers, and telephony systems which enable the
exchange of data and ideas. Computers range from general purpose devices such as laptops
and desktops used by end users, to Internet of Things (IoT) devices which add compute and
network to other products such as refrigerators, video recording devices, and routers. Routers
connect different networks together, enabling the Internet to function in the exchange of
information. Telephony systems include the private branch exchanges, switches, transceivers,
and other equipment necessary for traditional voice telecommunications as well as the
contemporary smartphone devices that account for most of the Internet access globally.
The Internet is a global interconnection of networks that "facilitates data
communication services such as remote login, file transfer, electronic mail, the World Wide
Web, and newsgroups" (Webster, 2003). The Internet and cyberspace are often used
interchangeably, although cyberspace applies to those systems which are disconnected from
the Internet. For example, computers can be air-gapped, "where there is no physical
connection between the internal network and the Internet" (Guri, Monitz, & Elovici, 2016).
While the Internet is commonly used for the exchange of information between witting parties,
it can also be used to facilitate malicious activity.
Computers are commonly instructed in what to do through software applications. Most
computers run an operating system which acts as the main program and orchestrates
interactions between software applications and the hardware of the computer (Webster, 2003).
There are many different operating systems such as Microsoft's Windows and the open-source
GNU/Linux. Computers made by Apple run the macOS operating system (OS). The Apple
Lisa computer ran the first version of the Macintosh OS, System 1 (Levy, 2021). Over the
next few decades, Apple iterated its OS multiple times, culminating with System 9. During
this time period the Apple founder Steve Jobs was removed from his position as Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) and he subsequently founded the company NeXT (Levy, 2021). In
1996 Apple acquired NeXT in order to iterate its OS past System 9 and Steve Jobs was reinstituted as CEO. Apple incorporated NeXTSTEP technologies into subsequent releases of
its OS, known as Mac OS X, and later simply macOS. The macOS serves as the foundational
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OS for each of Apple’s products, with branches of the OS forming iOS used on iPhones,
iPadOS on the iPad, watchOS on the Apple Watch, and tvOS on the Apple TV and HomePod.
Certain features of macOS are thus present on all of those devices; however, the focus will
remain on macOS itself for the purposes of this research.
The current macOS is available for the Intel x86_64 and ARM64 instruction set
architectures (ISA). With its move to the ARM64 ISA, it is possible for applications
originally created for an iPhone or iPad to execute on a macOS computer (Brookes, 2020),
opening new avenues of malicious activity. As with most general-purpose operating systems,
macOS is dual mode, meaning that there is a kernel mode and user mode (Silberschatz,
Galvin, & Gagne, 2012). Kernel mode refers to operations running at the highest privilege
level, typically with direct access to control various hardware components. User mode refers
to operations occurring at a lower privilege level and interacts with hardware by performing
system calls to functionality within the kernel. The kernel in macOS, XNU, is descended from
the Mach kernel originally developed at Carnegie Mellon University (Silberschatz, Galvin, &
Gagne, 2012) along with code from Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) released as
FreeBSD and customizations made by engineers at NeXT. The XNU kernel provides multiple
interfaces for applications to interact with each other, but the kernel is optimized for message
passing and does so through the XPC protocol (Levin, 2020). The user components of macOS
include utilities from FreeBSD as well as proprietary Apple utilities (Apple, 2011). The opensource components of macOS are collectively known as Darwin and the ability to view the
source code of these components provides the most detailed view of how macOS works.
While the kernel is an important part of the OS, this research will focus on user-mode
software.
Each operating system defines a structure for executable program code. The Microsoft
Windows OS uses the Portable Executable (also seen as PE, PE32) file format, among others,
as its executable file format (Choi et al., 2008). These executable file formats provide
structure to data which allows the operating system's loader to load the executable file from a
storage resource such as a hard drive into memory and transfer processor execution to the
loaded application. An executable file is generated when a compiler, provided with source
code, preprocesses the source code, compiles the source code into the appropriate instruction
set architecture's assembly language, assembles the assembly language code into machine
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code, and finally links the assembled code together to link together different object files
potentially with OS provided libraries (Luks, 2015). On macOS, the specified executable file
format is Mach-O (Apple Inc, 2007). Malicious software in the PE format is well studied,
with 198 results returned for a search "PE malware" in the Ex Libris library system and over
six million results in Google; malicious Mach-o software is lacking that scrutiny with only
one result in Ex Libris for "Mach-O malware" and only 692,000 results in Google.

A Brief History of Malware
Malicious software or malware is "software designed to interfere with a computer's
normal functioning" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.), although that definition only vaguely captures
the impact that malware can have. The Apple (n.d.) definition of malware is more
comprehensive, stating:
Malware is malicious software that includes viruses, worms, trojan horses, and other
programs that can harm your Mac or your privacy. Malware can unintentionally be
installed when you open attachments in email messages and download items from
websites. Some malware is simply annoying. More often, its intent is to control your
Mac to collect personal and financial information, host illegal content, send spam, or
harm other computers on the network.
The first documented malicious software, the self-replicating worm known as
Creeper, was developed in 1971 (Chen & Robert, 2004). As a worm, this malware was
capable of self-propagation over a network; in this case that network was the ARPANET, the
precursor to the Internet. The first malware on an Apple system was Elk Cloner created for
the Apple II in 1982 (Botezatu, 2016). This malware was a virus, so-called because the
malware infected a legitimate program, the Apple Disk Operating System.
The first malware for a Microsoft system was the Brain virus of 1986 which the boot
sector of hard drives running MS-DOS (Leyden, 2006). The first malware to propagate over
email was the CHRISTMAexec program in 1987 (Tipton & Nozaki, 2016). In 1988 the first
virus to target the Macintosh OS was created, the Scores virus (Bocij, 2006). The Morris
worm was also released in 1988 and it rapidly spread across the ARPANET and caused an
exhaustion of resources leading to a denial of service against many computers. Due to the
impact of this worm, the Software Engineering Institute was tasked by the Defense Advanced
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Research Projects Agency to create a coordination mechanism for computer security, leading
to the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which now functions as a coordination
center between various CERTs around the world (Druffle, 2017).
Malware continued to be created throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Interconnectivity
between computers increased as household end users were able to access the Internet. This
increased penetration of network services provided additional targets for attack. The Melissa
virus operated as a macro instead of compiled code (Tipton & Nozaki, 2016); being a script
lowered the technical bar for an attacker to launch malware while maintaining effectiveness in
spreading. While many malwares spread through user interaction, open network resources, or
viral infections of other software, the rise of connected network services opened other
avenues of attack by leveraging weaknesses in application logic. The Code Red worm used a
buffer overflow in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS), a Hyper Text Transport
Protocol (HTTP) server, and rapidly spread to over 250,000 computers (Indiana University,
2018). The ever-expanding number of devices connected to the Internet combined with
increased democratization of knowledge in offensive security such as Aleph One's Smashing
the Stack for Fun and Profit (Aleph One, 1996) allowed large scale attacks to continue.
Since at least the middle of the 21st century, nation states have committed cyberattacks against various targets. These attackers are known as Advanced Persistent Threats
(APT) and the first exposed APT was attributed to Chinese military units by the security
company Mandiant (Mandiant, 2013). Where many attacks were previously perpetuated for
criminal or ideological reasons, these nation state attacks were performed to conduct
espionage or otherwise advance a nation's objectives. An attack attributed to the United States
and Israel known as Stuxnet (De Falco, 2012) combined technologies previously employed in
worms, buffer overflows, and defense evasion in a highly sophisticated attack believed to
target Iranian nuclear enrichment equipment (De Falco). This attack was the first to
demonstrate the ability of an attack carried out in cyberspace having an effect in the physical
world. Further events including the Russian Black Energy attacks against the Ukraine power
grid continued to show the ability of malicious software to create physical effects in the real
world (Greenberg, 2019). Defending computer systems against malware is thus a challenge of
modern economies and societies.

7
Challenges to Defending Cyberspace
In 2019, global retail sales over the Internet were over $4 trillion United States Dollars
(Sabanoglu, 2020). This statistic discounts the role that the Internet plays in facilitating
business outside of e-commerce, such as increases in productivity. Researchers have summed
the costs of malicious cyber activity into several billion dollars, with a single instance, the
WannaCry worm, as costing up to $2 billion (Anderson et al, 2019). While malware is not the
only threat to the security of computer systems, the size and scope of the threat requires
continuous improvement on the behalf of cyber defenders. However, the vast number of
interconnected devices is one challenge in defending cyberspace from attack. Corporations
may be able to devote resources such as time, money, and human power to countering the
threat of malware, but individual end users who bring computing devices into their house may
not. This threat was demonstrated by the Mirai botnet, an attack that co-opted those very IoT
devices such as routers and Internet Protocol (IP) cameras. By using the default credentials
that manufacturers place on those devices, the attackers could load malware which performed
a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack famous for generating the largest level of
network traffic seen at that point (Krebs, 2016).
As described in the section A Brief History of Malware, there have been many
instances of malware developed. The examples of malware provided barely begins to
enumerate the full catalog of malware. The independent security institute AV-Test reports
over 350,000 new malware or Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA) are detected every
day (av-test.org, 2021). Where a malware is known to be malicious, a PUA, sometimes called
a Potentially Unwanted Program (PUP), may not be malicious; that is, malware perpetuates a
crime whereas a PUA or PUP does not necessarily affect a user negatively, but the software
was not intentionally installed by the user. Attacks against Mac systems have been rising in
particular with malicious software detections per device being more than twice that found on
Windows systems (Reed, 2019). In order to counter this high quantity of malware, it is logical
that more malware analysts are needed, or automated malware analysis systems must be
employed.
Compounding the threat of malicious cyber activity is the cyber security workforce
gap or skills shortage. Research by the International Information Systems Security
Certification Consortium, or (ISC)2, suggests that there is a global shortage of 3.1 million
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cyber security positions (ISC2, 2020). While that gap has decreased from a shortage of 4.07
million compared to the previous year (ISC2, 2019), that is still a large number of unfilled
positions to defend systems in cyberspace. The Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report
tracked 3,950 breaches or confirmed disclosure, and over 157,000 incidents, or compromised
assets in 2020 (Verizon, 2020). In comparison, 2019 saw 2,013 breaches and 41,686 incidents
(Widup, 2019). While the gap in cybersecurity skills decreased, the number of attacks
increased, and simply increasing the number of people performing cyber defense may not be
enough to effectively address the increase in attacks.
The cognitive load placed on cybersecurity professionals can be another contributing
challenge in the defense of cyberspace. The human brain is limited in its ability to process
complex information (Baddeley, 2010) and the analysis of malware can be a complex and
complicated process. Cyberspace defense requires a broad set of knowledge, skills, and
abilities. As an example, the US Air Force's Career Field Education and Training Plan lists 15
categories that someone must demonstrate varying levels of proficiency in to be considered
effective, including the fundamentals of how computers work, cryptology, networking, risk
management, and organizational responsibilities, to say nothing of cyber security itself
(Department of the Air Force, 2018). In addition to malware analysis being a complex task,
there are also external factors affecting the malware analyst which can include deadlines and
tasks competing for attention. The pressure of time can negatively impact a person's decisionmaking ability and influence their cyber security behavior (Chowdhury et al., 2019).
Malware authors can take efforts to frustrate malware analysts. A variety of techniques are
used to obfuscate malicious code such as encoding, polymorphism, metamorphism, and
packing (O’Kane, Sezer, & McLaughlin, 2011). Packing consists of compressing or
encrypting an executable file and applying a stub unpacking code at the entry point of the
executable (Singh & Singh, 2018) and has a legitimate use in reducing the file size of
distributed software. When the operating system loader copies the program into memory and
provides execution to the packed program, the stub code unpacks the rest of the executable
code from a data section, resolves any symbol imports, and then jumps to the unpacked code
(Sikorski, Honig, & Ebrary, 2012). This process is depicted in Figure 1Error! Reference
source not found.. Packed software can be detected by analyzing indicators such as:
calculating the entropy or apparent randomness of executable file; identifying few imports;
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disassembly revealing a small amount of code; abnormal section sizes; and section names
known to be associated with packers (e.g., UPX0) (Sikorski, Honig, & Ebrary, 2012). The
macOS malware deployed by the OceanLotus threat group employed UPX packing but did
not contain the usual tell-tale signs (Dumont, 2019). Dumont (2019) further observes that
signatures for packed Mach-O software are less common and not regularly updated like the
signatures for Windows may be.

Figure 1: The software packing process.
Packed software prevents static malware analysis techniques since the true file
contents are obfuscated and this can delay effective analysis and contribute to the cognitive
load of the analyst. Exact statistics for the percentage of malware that employs packing is
hard to determine, but some estimates range from 30% to 58% and actions to combat packed
malware consume up to 60% of malware analyst's efforts (Mantovani, Aonzo, UgartePedrero, Merlo, & Balzarotti, 2020; O’Kane, Sezer, & McLaughlin, 2011; Rahbarinia,
Balduzzi, & Perdisci, 2017). If malware is packed, the type of packer that was used needs to
be identified. If the packer cannot be identified, a malware analyst cannot unpack it, as the
specific sequence of actions that the packer performed needs to be undone. (O'Kane, Sezer, &
McLaughlin, 2011).

Machine Learning
Machine learning (ML) "refers to the automated detection of meaningful patterns in
data" (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014). Machine learning is broadly separated into two
categories: supervised and unsupervised. Supervised machine learning algorithms are applied
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to labeled data, which indicates the desired classification of data, whereas unsupervised
learning algorithms act upon unlabeled data and infers relationships (Maglogiannis, 2007).
ML algorithms operate on features which are characteristics of some data, usually in
numerical format. Features must be generated and selected as part of processing of data, such
as by calculating the entropy of a file. Feature engineering is "the task of improving predictive
modelling performance on a dataset by transforming its feature space" (Nargesian,
Samulowitz, Khurana, Khalil, & Turaga, 2017) and is an important concept for ML
applications. A transformation may need to be applied to data to change categorical into
numerical or to lessen the impact of outlying data points, as just two examples.
Supervised learning algorithms are commonly used for classification or regression
problems (Google, 2021). A classification problem is used to predict the category of some
data, such as whether an executable file is packed or not. A regression problem is used to
predict a numerical value, such as the expected price of a house. Decision Trees are one
supervised learning method for classification and regression that predicts a value by learning
decision rules inferred from data features (scikit-learn, n.d.). The Decision Tree consists of a
root node that splits down a particular path based on branches determined by the more
impactful feature at each branch node. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is another
supervised learning method for classification and regression and additionally outlier detection
that fits a hyperplane with maximum margin between the possible classes (scikit-learn, n.d.).
Naive bayes models used Bayes' theorem on the effect of prior knowledge on probability with
the assumption that all features are independent in order to predict a classification (scikitlearn, n.d.).
Unsupervised learning algorithms are commonly used for clustering (Google, 2021).
A clustering problem is demonstrated by finding similar groups of data, such as software
packed by the same packing program. The k-Nearest Neighbors algorithm is used for
unsupervised learning which finds the points with smallest distance to the sample (scikitlearn, n.d.). The k value determines the number of points selected to calculate the distance
from and serves as the clustering mechanism. Distance is measured by squared Euclidean
distance, ∑#!$%(#! − %! )" . Association rules find relationships between entities as joint values
of the variables (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2004). For observation i and variable j, '!& is
set to 1 if both are present or 0 if both are not. Commonly used for purchase transaction
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datamining, this technique could also be applied to determining whether certain system calls
are found together.
Like humans, ML applications need to be trained for them to perform optimally. ML
applications are trained splitting a dataset into different subsets, at least "training" and
"testing" and potentially "validation" (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2004). Exact
percentages of how data should be split may depend on dataset size, but common frameworks
have default values, such as scikit-learn's 75% to training and 25% to testing (scikit-learn,
n.d.). The ML model is trained by observing outcomes and feature values to predict new
values from those features (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2004). Not all features provide
meaningful information for developing the ML model and reducing the dimensionality of the
feature set can reduce memory or compute requirements. Information Gain is one algorithm
which selects the relevant features by measuring the difference in entropy between results
(Azhagusundari & Selvadoss Thanamani, 2013). Another algorithm that is commonly used in
Principal Component Analysis, which is used to describe variability within data through linear
algebra (Shlens, 2014).
A machine learning model's performance can be assessed by the following metrics,
which are calculated using the values of True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), True
Negative (TN), and False Negative (FN) counted in the output of the model's prediction
(Shaukat, Luo, Varadharajan, Hameed, & Xu, 2020):
•

Precision: measures the ratio of true positives to all positives and is calculated
!"

by '()*(
•

Recall: measures the true positives predicted to all positives and is calculated
'(

by '()*+
•

Accuracy: measures the correctly classified predictions against all samples and
'()'+

is calculated by '()'+)*()*+
•

F1-Score: calculates the accuracy by using precision and recall and is
calculated by

" × (./0!1!2# × 3/0455
(./0!1!2#)3/0455
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Statement of the problem
There is a large volume of malware developed each year and there is a deficit of
people trained to prevent and analyze that malware. Malware analysis can be a complicated
and/or complex undertaking and manual analysis can be too slow to keep pace with the
volume and velocity of malware production. Machine learning is capable of classifying data
using automated means which can reduce the burden of humans during malware analysis.
There is less research and fewer resources to counter malware designed for macOS than there
is for Windows. In particular, there has not been research into detecting and classifying
packed Mach-O binaries, as will be shown in Chapter Two.

Objectives of the project
In order to address the previously identified problem, this research seeks to answer the
following research questions:
1. Can software designed for macOS be correctly identified as packed software using
a machine learning algorithm?
2. Can software designed for macOS that is packed be correctly grouped with other
samples using the same packing algorithm using a machine learning algorithm?
3. Can a machine learning model ascertain the family that malware belongs to and
thus the potential impact that it can have?
By answering these questions, this research will advance the state of malware analysis
on macOS systems. The first research question will help to reduce the burden on malware
analysts by enabling those analysts to quickly determine whether software is packed prior to
any analysis steps. This will allow the analysts to triage software and determine if they can or
should unpack the software prior to devoting significant time or resources to analysis. The
second research question will help the analysts determine if they have the capability of
unpacking a particular piece of software and to provide an ability to link different samples of
malware using the same packing techniques which can link different campaigns together.
The major deliverables of this research will be:
1. A research artifact that is a machine learning model to classify packed Mach-O
binaries.
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2. A research artifact that is a machine learning model to categorize like packed
Mach-O binaries.
3. Source code for the above research artifacts.
4. A dissertation paper describing the literature, methodology, findings, and future
work.

Summary
This chapter began by describing the threat posed by malicious software in the
cyberspace domain. A common vocabulary and understanding were established by defining
terms and concepts for cyberspace, the Apple macOS operating system, and malicious
software. A history of malicious software was provided to demonstrate the evolution of this
threat over time. Challenges to the defense against malicious software were reviewed in order
to illuminate the need for continued research. Finally, machine learning was introduced to
ground the research through the lens of automated learning algorithms.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a review of the literature surrounding the topics of malware on
macOS and machine learning in its application to malware analysis. This chapter is organized
as follows. First, the concept of applications on macOS and the structure of Mach-O binaries
is reviewed. Second is a review of packing software that is available of Mach-O binaries.
Third is a survey of malware analysis techniques used against macOS malware. Fourth, the
literature of machine learning as applied to malware analysis packer identification is
reviewed.

macOS Applications
This section reviews the literature on the structure of Mach-O files and how those files
are used on macOS (and by extension to iOS). Later in this chapter, the literature regarding
malware analysis is reviewed and will show that features related to the internals of an
executable file format are commonly used to determine whether an application is malicious or
not. Therefore, this research must start by understanding the internal file format of Mach-O
files, the executable file format that is used by macOS.
Applications on macOS
Applications on macOS can be distributed in several different ways. The traditional
method of distributing applications is via a Disk Image, denoted by a file that ends in the .dmg
extension. A .dmg file is a copy of a file system and resembles a piece of removable media
such as a CD-ROM or USB drive (Levin, 2020). When opened, macOS mounts the disk as a
new partition. A callback is registered to open the new mount point, where the user is
presented with the contents of the disk. Often, developers arrange the files in a particular
manner with graphical resources that demonstrate to the user how to install the application,
which is usually to copy the application from the .dmg volume into the /Applications folder,
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represented by a symbolic link in the .dmg. When an application is added into the
/Applications folder, the action emits an event resulting in a callback function which can
establish application registrations, such as a text editor being registered as a handler for .txt
files. Disk Images have been used since classic MacOS.
Some applications require more complex installation steps; in those cases, an
application is distributed as a .pkg file. The .pkg file is an xar archive consisting of an XML
formatted PackageInfo file, a Bill of Materials (BoM) file, a compressed Payload file, and
optional pre and post install scripts and an optional script to run after reboot (Levin, 2020).
Where an application distributed as a .dmg requires the user to drag and drop the application
into the /Applications folder, running a .pkg results in the installer making an interprocess
communications call (using XPC on macOS) to a system daemon, installd, which moves the
application into the correct location (Levin, 2020). An artifact of a .pkg file is the
/Library/Receipts/InstallHistory.plist file being updated with the newly installed application.
The iPhone and its iOS operating system eventually led to Apple creating an App
Store, where users can browse, purchase, and install applications directly from Apple instead
of searching for and downloading from arbitrary locations (Apple, 2008). Initially limited to
iOS applications, there is now a Mac App Store which distributes macOS applications. The
App Store provides a benefit to the end user as applications submitted to the App Store must
abide by Apple developer guidelines as well as undergoing a review process (Apple, 2021).
Applications distributed through the App Store are encrypted and use code signing to ensure
authenticity and enforce permissions and application sandboxing (Levin, 2020). These steps
reduce the ability of malware to be installed through the App Store.
Persistence is used by both legitimate software and malware to gain execution after an
initial installation. From an attacker’s perspective, persistence is “the adversary trying to
maintain their foothold” (MITRE, 2019). Persistence on Microsoft Windows is well studied
as malware often uses one method or another to execute after a system reboot. Malware
analysts and incident responders working on the Windows platform benefit from a robust
reference in the Windows Internals series of books and the Sys Internals autoruns application
(Russinovich et al., 2012). The macOS platform also provides mechanisms for persistent
execution with independent research provided by security companies and researchers (Stokes,
2019; Wardle, 2014; Wardle, 2020). In addition to persistence vectors that are specific to the
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macOS platform, as a certified UNIX operating system, macOS can be susceptible to
persistence techniques common to other UNIX platforms such as cron (O’Leary, 2019).
Application settings are controlled via Property List (plist) files. A plist file can be one
of several formats, with the most common being an XML formatted file. The plist XML
contains keys and values much like normal XML with the exception that only the topmost key
may have attributes. A plist is commonly named in reverse DNS format, i.e.
com.apple.finder.plist. The root key of a plist file should be <plist> with the attribute
“version” specified. For plists loaded by launchd, the service which functions as the init
system on macOS, a <dict> key follows with a Program key that specifies the application to
launch. Alternatively, a key ProgramArguments may exist, which allows more complex
commands to be executed.
Analysis of the Mach-O Executable Format
The Mach-O file format is defined by Apple as part of its Darwin initiative as depicted
in Figure 2Error! Reference source not found.. Apple has produced documentation
describing the structure of a Mach-O file (Apple Inc, 2007). The specifics of the actual
implementation of the Mach-O format can be found in the header files provided by Apple. A
Mach-O file is composed of three regions: a header, load commands, and data. The header of
a Mach-O file, like the header of a PE file, contains key information about the rest of the file.
The first four bytes of the header are "magic" values that help to identify the type of file. The
Mach-O magic values are 0xfeedface for 32 bit binaries, 0xfeedfacf for 64 bit binaries, and
0xcafebabe for "universal" or "fat" binaries, which combine different instruction sets into one
executable (Apple Inc, 2008).
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Figure 2: The Mach-O file format (Apple, 2007).
Following the header are load commands which instruct the macOS loader on how to
load the program into memory as well as providing metadata about the file. The
LC_SEGMENT or LC_SEGMENT_64 command is used to specify a region of data from the
file to map into memory (Moulton, 2020). The LC_LOAD_DYLIB and LC_ID_DYLIB
commands are used to specify dynamic libraries to load (Woodruff, 2016) and will be
discussed further under the macOS Malware Analysis section. The LC_SYMTAB provides
the linker edited stab (debugging) symbol table while LC_DYSYMTAB provides the link-edit
dynamic symbol table. During the linking process, the linker populates an LC_UUID which
can be used to uniquely identify a Mach-O file.
After the load commands are various segments and sections. A segment can contain 0255 sections (Apple Inc, 2008). A segment's structure depends on whether the binary is 32 or
64 bits. In a 64-bit binary, the structure contains: the cmd (LC_SEGMENT_64), cmdsize
(including section_64 structs), the segment name, the memory address and size, the offset into
the file of the segment, the virtual memory protection in both maximum and initial values, the
number of sections, and any flags (Apple Inc, 2008). Common segments are __TEXT and
__DATA. The __TEXT segment is read-only, containing data that should be interpreted by
the processor as executable code; this segment also contains constant data (Apple Inc, 2014).
The loader can load this segment directly into memory and share that region of memory
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between processes. In contrast, the __DATA section is read-write and contains non-constant
data such as uninitialized static variables (Apple Inc, 2014). During loading, the dynamic
linker will modify structures within the __DATA section, namely the dyld segment which
will be manipulated by the loader (also called dyld, but an application may specify its own
loader). Dynamic libraries can be loaded by using the functions dlopen(), dlsym(), and
dlclose() (Apple Inc, 2012). As with dynamically loaded libraries on other systems, dylib
loading can be subject to hijacking attacks (Wardle, 2015).
Once compiled, a Mach-O application can be distributed to macOS clients as an
application bundle. The bundle is denoted by the file extension .app. A bundle consists of a
fixed filesystem structure which includes specific files and directories (Levin, 2020). The
Info.plist file is required by apps and supplies metadata on the application. The Frameworks
and Library directories contain libraries used by the application. The Resources directory
contains resources such as images. The MacOS directory (referenced by the Info.plist entry
for CFBundleExectuable) contains the actual Mach-O file that will be executed.

Mach-O Packers
This section of the chapter reviews the packing software freely available on the
Internet for Mach-O files. To support the research of the available packers, the following
actions were taken. First, the website, if any, of the packer was reviewed to understand the
claimed capabilities. Next, the packer was downloaded to a virtualized macOS instance
running macOS 11.2.3. Then, if the packer was executable, the packer was executed in order
to pack the command line utility "ls". The ls binary on macOS is a universal binary and
includes the x86_64 and arm64e architectures. The lipo command was used to extract the
x86_64 binary from the universal binary prior to packing. Once the executable was packed,
the strings were extracted and saved to a file, and entropy was visually observed using the
binvis.io tool (Cortesi, 2012). The load commands and segment strings were obtained using
jtool2.
OSX_Packer. This project, available on Github, is described as a binary packer proof
of concept (Bee, 2020). This project is distributed both as source code and a compiled binary.
Upon inspection of the code, it was determined that this project does not perform the usual
packing operations of compression and obfuscation, but instead only inserts stub code into the
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__TEXT segment. This can be confirmed by observing the resulting differences in strings
(Figure 3Error! Reference source not found.), load commands (Figure 4Error! Reference
source not found.), and entropy (Figure 5Error! Reference source not found.).

Figure 3: The difference in strings between ls and the OSX_Packer output of ls.

Figure 4: The difference in jtool2 output of ls and the OSX_Packer output of ls.
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Figure 5: The visualized entropy of ls (left) and the OSX_Packer output of ls (right)..
Cactus. Cactus is another Mach-O packer proof of concept available on Github that
targets the x86_64 architecture (Sun, 2015). This project is available only as source code. The
code was downloaded and compiled. When executed, it prints out its achieved compression
ratio. However, it does not output a packed binary, and therefore comparisons of a packed
executable and its original were not possible. The tool claims 37.20% compression against the
ls binary.
onekpaq and laturi. Onekpaq and laturi are Mach-O packers for generating 1k and 4k
intros (Anonymous, n.d.). The significance of that description required further research into
what 1k and 4k intros are. These items are small programs that include music, sound, and
graphics compressed into 1,024 or 4,096 bytes. While these packers could ostensibly be used
to pack malware, onekpaq has i386 library dependencies that were deprecated by Apple and
removed from macOS Catalina (netkas, 2019). Laturi was compiled, however, execution
failed as it only runs on macOS 10.6 to 10.10, support for which was discontinued by 2017.
Comparisons of packed and original executables was not possible.
pakr. Pakr is an in-memory packer for macOS bundle files (Carroll, 2017). The intent
of pakr appears to be to transform the bundle structure into a single binary called "stub" in
order to obfuscate the application. Pakr is distributed via Github with a note that "These steps
likely do not work at this point" (Carroll, 2017). The project's "builder" application
successfully compiled via XCode. Running the builder application against a generates a string
which indicates the number of obfuscation iterations that the application selected; that output
should feed into a file called bundle.h. The bundle.h contents should then be read in as an
"aligned file content", however, the contents of bundle.h are simply the string output of the
builder application. Further, the packed.h header contents show that the intent of the final
process is to build a 32-bit application, which has been deprecated. Comparisons of packed
and original executables was not possible.
MPRESS. MPRESS is an executable packer for several formats, including Mach-O,
that uses the LZMAT compression scheme (Matcode, 2008). The only distributed version of
MPRESS that is compiled for macOS is 1.20; this version fails to run on macOS Big Sur with
the error "malformed Mach-O". In a deviation from other tests, version 2.19 for Windows was
downloaded onto a Windows 7 system along with the ls program from the test macOS system.
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MPRESS was then executed as "mpress.exe -u ls.x86_64" and achieved a 30.8% compression
ratio. The resulting executable contained no observable strings using default parameters,
although using the Mandiant "floss" tool was able to detect strings. The strings differed
significantly from the original ls program. The output of jtool2 indicates that the binary was
transformed to have a single segment mapped, now named __MPRESS__v.2.19 and rather
than use LC_MAIN to define the entrypoint, it uses LC_UNIXTHREAD, a technique
deprecated by macOS 10.8 (Figure 6Error! Reference source not found.). The entropy of
the packed binary is considerably higher and diffused across the entire file (Figure 7Error!
Reference source not found.). The MPRESS-packed file was not executable, indicating that
the created Mach-O file format was corrupted during the packing process.
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Figure 6: The difference in jtool2 output of ls and the MPRESS output of ls.
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Figure 7: The visualized entropy of ls (left) and the MPRESS output of ls (right).
UPX. The Ultimate Packer for eXecutables (UPX) is a packer which operates on
many different executable formats, freely available, and extendable (UPX, 2020). UPX is
delivered as source code and compiled binaries via Github.com. During execution, UPX
reported a 34.43% compression ratio on the sample ls program. The strings obtained from the
packed ls program differed significantly from the original ls program. The packed version of
the ls program contains two LC_SEGMENT_64 commands, one for the __TEXT segment
and one for a newly generated __LINKEDIT segment. In PE32 applications, UPX removes
the .text section and replaces it with .UPX0; on macOS, UPX has renamed the
__TEXT.__text section to __TEXT.upxTEXT (Figure 8Error! Reference source not
found.). The visualized entropy of the packed vs original is shown in Figure 9Error!
Reference source not found.. The UPX packed program was executable and functioned as
expected.
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Figure 8: The difference in jtool2 output of ls and the UPX output of ls.
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Figure 9: The visualized entropy of ls (left) and the UPX output of ls (right).
This review of publicly available packers for Mach-O binaries has shown that only
UPX is viable. Malware authors attempting to use onekpaq, laturi, or pakr would not generate
an executable that runs on modern systems (i.e., later than macOS 10.14). The Cactus and
OSX_Packer projects do not generate packed executables at all. The MPRESS packer will
create a packed Mach-O file, however, the sample reviewed here did not execute properly and
could therefore be unreliable for malware authors as well. Perhaps due to these reasons, the
only packer practically tracked via the Yara detection tool is UPX (Avast, 2019).

macOS Malware Analysis
The academic literature of peer-reviewed journal articles on macOS malware analysis
is scant in comparison to literature on Windows malware analysis. This may be expected due
to Apple's share of the personal computer market, which as of the fourth quarter of 2020 was
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14.3 percent in the United States (Alsop, 2021). This statistic says nothing of Apple's server
market share where a statistic could not be found; however, Apple discontinued their Xserver
server product in 2011 (Friedman, 2010). While Apple does offer a software suite called
"macOS Server", it is not marketed in the same way that Microsoft Windows Server is nor
referred to as often as Linux is. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 previously, Apple's
prevalence and therefore its targeting by malicious actors has been rising. Table 1 summarizes
the search results of peer-reviewed journal and dissertation entries in the Ex Libris library
system. The true number of journal results is in fact lower as when results are reviewed, they
often pertain to malware on systems not created by Apple, such as Android, Windows, or
cloud platforms.
Search term

malware AND windows

Journal results

Dissertation results

1,343

1,920

malware AND linux

573

1,044

malware AND (macos OR apple OR osx)

383

686

Table 1: Comparison of peer-reviewed journal and dissertation search results in Ex Libris.
There are commonalities in analysis methodologies which can be applied from
research performed against Windows or Linux systems against malware developed for the
Mac. Static malware analysis includes techniques that analyze malware without giving
execution to it and includes hashing, finding strings, reverse engineering disassembly and
examining libraries loaded (Sikorski, Honig, & Ebrary, 2012). Dynamic malware analysis
involves running the malware and observing its behavior such as the Indicators of
Compromise (IOC), e.g., hashes or names of files created, domains or IP addresses
communicated with (DeCianno, 2014). An important distinction between these two categories
of analysis is that static malware analysis can be used to identify a malicious file prior to
execution, while dynamic malware analysis requires the malicious file to be executed.
Static Malware Analysis Techniques. One of the first steps in static malware
analysis is determining the file's type (Wardle, 2020). Malware can masquerade as other file
types, such as documents, to obscure the fact that it is an executable file. Malware authors
may accomplish this by changing the extension of the file or by embedding resources such as
icons in the application bundle. The file command is used to identify the file's type by

27
examining the magic values, if present, of the files provided to the command via its arguments
(Kerrisk, 2021). The output of the file command is a text string indicating the type of file. The
checks that the file command performs can be conducted manually using tools such as a hex
editor to view any magic values.
Reviewing the strings present in binaries is another static malware analysis technique.
These artifacts can give insight into the purpose of the malware if the author uses functions to
print status messages or other hardcoded values. The strings present within the binary can be
used to identify IP addresses or domains which are used for command and control (Roccia,
2020). Information stealing malware needs to know what information to look for and the
malware developer has two options: they can have the malware retrieve the list of information
to steal by beaconing to a command-and-control node (potentially revealed by strings), or
they can distribute the malware with the list of information programmed in. In the case where
the information is programmed in, strings analysis can identify that information (Bumanglag
& Wolfe, 2019). The strings of a binary can also be used to provide insight into attribution of
malware authors (Kaspersky Inc., 2021).
A malware analyst can use knowledge of the imported functions of a program to
understand what capabilities the program might have. Functions that are imported from
standard libraries have defined interfaces and may be well-documented. For example, if a
PE32 file imports the WSAStartup, Socket, bind, and recv imports can indicate that the binary
file can initialize a network connection and send data over the network (Bumanglag & Wolfe,
2019). However, a program can import the functionality of a library and never call the
imported function (Lester, 2019). Because of this limitation, additional analysis must be
performed, either disassembly and function tracing, or using dynamic analysis techniques.
The hash of a file can be used to identify it. Hashing is a one-way mathematical
algorithm that takes data as input and outputs a fixed-length string, typically of hexadecimal
digits (SentinelOne, 2019). Common hashing algorithms when applied to malware analysis
include MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 (Kendall, 2007). One goal of hashing algorithms is to
generate a unique output for each input; in practice, algorithms such as MD5 experience
collisions, a situation where two different inputs generate the same output. Tools such as
VirusTotal allow malware analysts to submit file hashes as a search query to look for files that
have been uploaded to the service. This can be a useful method of quickly determining
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whether a file is known to be malicious. However, since any change to a file results in a
different hash value, if malware is modified, such as through a packing process, searching a
system such as VirusTotal may result in incorrect results.
Dynamic Malware Analysis Techniques. Dynamic malware analysis involves
executing the malware, usually in a sandboxed environment where the malicious effects of the
software can be minimized. By executing malware, the analyst can trace the actual activities
that the malware performs, including interaction with the filesystem and network (Kendall,
2007). Filesystem access can entail reading files, such as to steal information, or writing to
files, such as to install a permanent copy of the malware. When malware utilizes persistence,
it leaves IOCs which can be used to identify its presence. On MacOS, malware may use
launchd to persist itself upon reboot by adding a plist file and registering it with the launchd
service through the command `launchctl load <plist>`. As noted previously, these plist files
will contain either a Program or ProgramArguments key. An example of a malicious plist
includes one that contains Python code (Reed, 2019). The reverse DNS notation of plist
names allows malware to use the ATT&CK tactic of defense evasion, specifically the
technique of masquerading. Reed (2019) has noted that malware may pretend to be Apple
software by naming its plist files “com.apple.<malware>.plist”. The attacker has different
directories where they can store their malicious plists depending on the level of access that
they have to a system (Bradley, 2018). With user level privileges, the attacker is limited to
/Users/$USER/Library/LaunchDaemons or LaunchAgents. With root level privileges, the
attacker may use the directories in /Library, and if System Integrity Protection is disabled,
they may use the directories in /System/Library.
During execution, malware may generate network activity as part of its actions.
Network activity can include beaconing to a command-and-control server, where the malware
can retrieve additional tasks to perform. This network traffic can be captured to search for
malicious indications such as addresses or specific actions taken (Bailey, 2020). If malware is
allowed to utilize the network during dynamic analysis, there are both rewards and risks. As a
reward, the malware may retrieve additional payloads which can be analyzed. As a risk, other
systems on the same network segment as the system running the malware could be exposed to
lateral movement techniques.
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The most intensive form of dynamic malware analysis is debugging. In this form of
analysis, a software debugger is attached to a sample of malware as it executes (Srinivas,
2019). Doing this allows the malware analyst to step through and understand the exact
functionality of the malware as it performs its actions. Dynamic malware analysis thus
provides an opportunity for a malware analyst to defeat packing. During a debugging session,
a malware analyst can set a breakpoint to pause the malware's execution at a point after the
packing stub has been executed (Ramilli, 2020). At this point of execution, the unpacked
sample will be in memory and the analyst can export its data to a file.
This section was a literature review of malware analysis techniques. Static malware
analysis includes methods of analyzing malware that do not execute the malware. Techniques
that are employed in static analysis include determining the file's type, the human-readable
strings present in the file, hash information of the file, and the functions which are imported
by the file. In contrast, dynamic malware analysis involves executing the sample to observe
the actions that the sample takes. Examples of dynamic malware analysis are observing files
created, network connections made, or debugging the sample. While many of the techniques
reviewed applied to the analysis of PE files for Windows systems, the methodology is
applicable to macOS as well (Wardle, 2020). Both static and dynamic analysis methods can
be used to obtain features of the malware that can be used in machine learning models to
classify software as malicious.

Machine Learning Assisted Packed Malware Detection
This section reviews the literature of machine learning models of packed software
detection. Each entry will be numbered with a short description of the research. If available,
the feature set of the research, dataset, machine learning algorithms, and effectiveness in
accuracy will be extracted. When accuracy is reported across multiple runs, an average of the
reported accuracies is notated. When accuracy is reported for different machine learning
algorithms, the highest value is selected. A summary table is provided at the end of this
section to highlight the most frequently used features and algorithms.
The features that can be extracted from software to aid in classification broadly falls
into the same categories of information that is used in malware analysis. The two large
categories are static and dynamic features, along with a combination of the two for hybrid
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features. Within the static features category, there are byte n-grams, opcode n-grams, strings,
and portable executable information. Byte n-grams are sequences of n-bytes from the file.
Opcode n-grams are sequences of disassembled instructions. Strings are the literal strings
stored within the executable file. Noted as "Portable Executables", this information really
pertains to any structure of the program, whether in the PE, ELF, or Mach-O format. Dynamic
features are function-based, API and system call, and information flow tracking. Functionbased refers to extracting information about how functions within the program are called,
including parameters passed to the function. API and system calls refer to imports from other
libraries, the operating system, and the parameters to those calls. Information flow extracts
features related to the actions taken by a program during execution, such as network
connections, files created, or data structures such as the Windows Registry modified (Ranveer
& Hiray, 2015).
Entry 1. (Jung, Bae, Choi, & Im, 2020): This research implemented packer
identification based on entropy and byte sequence. The entropy was calculated over PE
sections, with different packers generating different entropy scores. Byte frequency was also
used where the frequency of bytes in the range 0x00 to 0xFF were counted for each sample.
The dataset consisted of only 32-bit PE executables that were manually packed with six
different packers. They achieved accuracies up to 84.7% but encountered overfitting with
Random Forest.
FEATURE SET: Entropy sequence (std, mean, min, max) and byte frequency ratio
DATASET: PE format, 648 unpacked, 3587 packed
ML ALGORITHMS: Random Forest, Boosted Gradient
EFFECTIVENESS: 84.7% (RF)
Entry 2. (Omachi & Murakami, 2020): This research classified multilayer executables.
A multilayered executable here is malware that has first been packed with one packer and
then subsequently packed with a second packer. The researchers collected a small malware
sample set and manually packed those samples twice resulting in 550 samples, of which only
253 were usable. Symbolic Aggregate Approximation (SAX) is used to convert time-series
data to string. Leave-one-out cross-validation was employed. Of note is that this research was
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focused on discriminating between packers and not between packed and unpacked. Overall
accuracy of this method was low with a kNN k value of 1.
FEATURE SET: Average entropy of 256-byte sequences
DATASET: PE format, 253 doubly packed malware
ML ALGORITHMS: k-Nearest Neighbor
EFFECTIVENESS: 49.6%
Entry 3. (Yu, 2020): This research focused on classifying malware variants using
perceptual hashing. While not expressly focused on packed malware, several of the variants
used in the experiment were packed and successfully classified. The dataset used for this
research was supplied by other researchers who had previously curated malware samples.
Gray level co-occurrence matrix was used to create a texture feature vector from which
statistics were calculated. Those statistics were then used as a bag of words to create a
perceptual hash. The accuracy of this method was high.
FEATURE SET: Mean, variance, angular second moment, entropy, inverse difference
moment, homogeneity, contrast, and correlation in four directions.
DATASET: PE, 25 malware families with 9,339 samples
ML ALGORITHMS: Extremely Randomized Trees
EFFECTIVENESS: 97.8%
Entry 4. (Bat-Erdene, Kim, Park, & Lee, 2017): This research applied to repacked or
multi-layer packed malware. The corpus of data was acquired from six benign executables
from a Windows system, which was then packed with one of 19 initial packers and then
subsequently packed with a second of the remaining 18 packers. The researchers unpacked
the malware and used entropy as a measurement to determine if the files were completely
unpacked or required another round of unpacking. The resultant code was then input to a
Symbolic Aggregate Approximation (SAX) algorithm. Pattern extraction was performed
against SAX representation and finally fidelity similarity measurement was used for
classification.
FEATURE SET: Entropy patterns
DATASET: PE, 2,196 repacked or multi-layer packed samples
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ML ALGORITHMS: Fidelity similarity measurement
EFFECTIVENESS: 97.5%
Entry 5. (Kim, Y., Paik, J.-Y., Choi, S., & Cho, E.-S., 2019): This research examined
packed malware using binary diffing techniques. The researchers collected 15,865 samples of
PE files from Windows 7, Windows 8, and Windows 10. The researchers then manually
packed those samples. However, their paper does not detail whether every file was packed
with each packer or whether the dataset was partitioned and then each partition had a
particular packer applied. The binary diffing is applied against the 15-byte sequence found at
entry point of the file. Next, seven SVM algorithms are applied, each using a particular kernel
technique, most using radial basis function (RBF).
FEATURE SET: 15-byte binary sequences
DATASET: PE, 15,865 samples each for packed and unpacked
ML ALGORITHMS: SVM with Linear, Polynomial, Euclidean Distance, Edit
Distance, Longest Common Substring, n-gram Similarity, NH Similarity
EFFECTIVENESS: 98.4% (RBF with NH)
Entry 6. (Kim, S., Ha, J., & Lee, T., 2018). This research applied Deep Neural
Network (DNN) models to N-grams of extracted section names from packed executables.
These models classified the software amongst known packing algorithms. These models were
compared to Trendmicro Locality Sensitive Hashing the SSDeep fussy hashing algorithm.
Approximately two-thirds of the samples were used for training and one third of the samples
were used testing.
FEATURE SET: Section name N-grams
DATASET: PE, 58,277 malicious samples, 39,851 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: KNN, DNN
EFFECTIVENESS: 98.91% (DNN)
Entry 7. (Maleki, Bateni, & Rastegari, 2019). This research applied several machine
learning algorithms to packed PE applications unpacked via Quick Unpack v2.2. The feature
set focused on the sample's PE header, such as the number of sections and various flags, and
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the section tables, such as the number of APIs imported from various DLLs. These features
are then processed in a foward selection method to select the most relevant features.
FEATURE SET: PE Header and Section Table values and metadata
DATASET: PE format, 761 malware, 210 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: Decision Tree, Neural Network, ID3, Naive Bayes, SVM
EFFECTIVENESS: 98.26% (Decision Tree)
Entry 8. (Kim, Namgung, Moon, & Choi, 2020): This research used machine learning
models to evaluate the effectiveness of identifying custom-packed software as opposed to
well-known packers such as UPX. The features selected for this experiment included boolean,
integer, and float data types. Entropy of the file was used as a feature, with a value of 6.85 or
greater used as a threshold indicative of packing. The data was split 80/20 into training and
testing, respectively.
FEATURE SET: Entropy, Entry Point Section, Write attribute in code segments,
number of sections, number of imported functions
DATASET: PE, 15,324 packed, 13,483 not packed
ML ALGORITHMS: k-Nearest Neighbors, Logistic Regression, Linear Regression,
SVM, Randomized Forests, Multilayer Perceptron, Naive Bayes, Decision Tree
EFFECTIVENESS: 99.09% (Decision Tree)
Entry 9. (Wang, T.-Y., & Wu, C.-H., 2011): These researchers proposed the Packing
Detection Framework (PDF). The PDF consists of attribute extraction from a PE file,
converting nominal values to binary values, the elimination of low information gain attributes,
and attribute transformation using normalization techniques. They then employed SVM as the
machine learning algorithm along with five-fold cross validation. The PE files were
confirmed to be packed by using the PEiD application.
FEATURE SET: PE Header values, imported DLLs and APIs, the number of sections,
file size, entropy of the code section
DATASET: PE, 3,784 packed, 1,056 not packed
ML ALGORITHMS: Linear SVM, RBF kernel SVM
EFFECTIVENESS: 94.54% (RBF kernel, logarithmic and standardized transformed)
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Entry 10. (Saleh, Li, & Xu, 2018): This research combined features from static and
dynamic malware analysis. Their researched focused on PE files and relied on VirusTotal for
malware samples as well as for obtaining features from the malware. They were able to obtain
100,000 malicious and 100,000 benign samples from VirusTotal each month for five months,
resulting in 1,000,000 samples in total. Static and dynamic features were tested separately,
and then combined for a final test. The combined test produced the best results. Two machine
learning algorithms were used; they are Random Forest and Naive Bayes.
FEATURE SET: Number of imported DLLs and APIs, PE Header, whether
obfuscation is employed, file signing, actions taken (network, mutex, registry, process, file,
services), network activity
DATASET: PE, 500,000 malicious, 500,000 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: Random Forest, Naive Bayes
EFFECTIVENESS: 96.55% (averaged Random Forest performance)
Entry 11. (Walkup, Elizabeth, 2014): This research is the first of the few available
literature which examines malware on macOS. The malware sample used for this work was
relatively low, with Walkup acknowledging that sources of Mach-O malware were difficult to
obtain. Features were extracted from the structures of the Mach-O header. The executable
code of the programs themselves were not used as part of the feature set (e.g., as n-grams).
Python scripts were used to extract the features, store the features into an SQLite database,
and then to convert the feature data into Weka-format. Features were refined by using forward
search selection and information gain ranking. Over 20 machine learning algorithms were
tested, with five having over 95% under the ROC curve.
FEATURE SET: Mach-O Header, imported libraries, imported functions
DATASET: Mach-O, 420 malicious, 1,000 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: Rotation Forest, Random Forest, PART, Logistic Model Tree
(LMT), IBk
EFFECTIVENESS: 99.40% (Rotation Forest)
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Entry 12. (Pajouh, Dehghantanha, Khayami, & Choo, 2018): This research applied
machine learning to malware detection on the macOS platform. Malware samples were
downloaded from repositories such as VirusTotal and benign samples were downloaded from
the Mac App Store. These researchers wrote a Python script to parse a Mach-O file to obtain
features and use KNN imputation to estimate missing values from their extracted dataset.
While the research collected a relatively small dataset, Synthetic Minority Oversampling
Technique (SMOTE) was used to generate synthetic data to improve the model. Using
SMOTE allowed the Decision Tree model to obtain the highest accuracy at the cost of slightly
higher false alarm rate and longer training time. Without SMOTE, a 91% accuracy was
achieved with Weighted Radial Basis Function Kernels-Based Support Vector Machine.
FEATURE SET: Ncmds, sizeofcmds, noloadcmd, rebase_size, bind_size,
lazy_bind_size, export_size, nsyms, strsize, LoadDyLIB, DyLibNames, Segments,
SectionsText, SectionsData
DATASET: Mach-O, 152 malicious, 460 benign (760 and 2300, respectively, using
SMOTE)
ML ALGORITHMS: Naive Bayes, Bayesian Net, Multi-Layer Perceptron, Decision
Tree J48, Weighted RBFSVM
EFFECTIVENESS: 96.62% (Decision Tree J48 on SMOTE_5X)
Entry 13. (Singh & Bist, 2020): This research applied techniques derived from other
research that was directed towards Android malware, in addition to techniques targeted to
Mach-O. Like entry 12, these researchers applied SMOTE to generate synthetic data. Multiple
ensemble machine learning algorithms were used to classify their samples. Unfortunately, the
methodology section of this paper does not describe their dataset nor the features that they
selected for their experiments.
FEATURE SET: Not described
DATASET: Not described
ML ALGORITHMS: Decision Tree, KNN, XGBoost, Gradient Boost, Random
Forest, Extra-tree Classifier, Stacked Ensemble Classifier (STENC)
EFFECTIVENESS: 96.7% (STENC on SMOTE_6X)
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Entry 14. (Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo, 2001): This research used McAfee antivirus to label their dataset as malicious or benign. Malware samples were acquired from FTP
sites and were provided by the authors as a corpus on which to perform future research. The
dataset was biased towards malicious samples. Features were statically extracted from each
sample; this process was iterative with new features added in new rounds of testing. The
classification algorithms included signature, inductive reasoning, and machine learning. Fivefold Cross Validation was used.
FEATURE SET: Imported DLL names, imported function names, number of function
calls from each DLL, strings, byte sequences
DATASET: PE, 3,265 malicious, 1,001 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: Naive Bayes, Multi-Naive Bayes
EFFECTIVENESS: 97.11%
Entry 15. (Masud, Khan, & Thuraisingham, 2007): This research used a hybrid data
mining approach which combined n-grams with DLL function calls. The hexdump tool was
used to convert a binary program into text-based hexcodes that were stored on-disk and read
into an Adelson Velsky Landis tree to create a Binary Feature Set. In addition to binary ngrams, assembly n-grams were used to create an Assembly Feature Set. For each n-gram
dataset, an information gain algorithm was used to select the top 500 features. A Hybrid
Feature Set combines the DLL function call features with the binary n-gram features.
FEATURE SET: Binary n-gram, assembly n-gram, DLL function call n-grams
DATASET: PE, 1,920 malicious, 1,967 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: SVM
EFFECTIVENESS: 96.30%
Entry 16. (Bai, Wang, & Zou, 2014): This research applied ML techniques against PE
feature sets in three separate experiments. Malware samples were obtained from VXHeaven.
Features were selected using both filter and wrapper selection methods, resulting in 197
features. The first experiment used ten-fold Cross Validation. The second experiment
randomly divided data into training (80%) and testing sets (20%). The third experiment
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divided data chronologically into the training (before 2007) and testing sets (after 2007). The
first experiment performed the best, although the authors warn of potential overfitting.
FEATURE SET: Imported DLLs, imported functions, number of imports, PE header
values, section headers, resource directory table
DATASET: PE, 10,521 malicious, 8,592 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: Decision Tree, Random Forest, Boosted Random Forest
EFFECTIVENESS: 99.1%
Entry 17. (Li, Roundy, Gates, & Vorobeychik, 2017): This research was applied to
singleton files, which the authors define as a file which is present on exactly one computer.
The data for this research was collected through the Norton antivirus Community Watch
program, in which metadata about files are uploaded to the company and then shared with
researchers. The authors include packed executables as part of their dataset and do not try to
unpack it; therefore, their technique is able to categorize packed malware. Malicious
singletons are predicted by creating a feature set of software packages on each computer that
takes part of Community Watch. To further classify individual files, the full path, filename,
and file size are used to generate features using bag of words and term frequency. Adversarial
robustness was used as an evaluation technique.
FEATURE SET: Filename, path, size, PE header, binary section, entropy, imported
DLLs, imported functions
DATASET: PE, 200,000 malicious, 16,000,000 benign
ML ALGORITHMS: Recurrent Neural Network, Support Vector Machine
EFFECTIVENESS: 92% (SVM)
Entry 18. (Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo, 2001): This research converted the
problem of classifying packed malware to classifying system calls. The researchers obtained
system calls by executing the malware samples in the Cuckoo sandbox, which provides a
report on the behavior of samples. Features were selected using information gain.
Classification occurred via principal component initialized multi-layer neural networks.
Malware samples were downloaded from VxHeavens and then packed using various packers.
The highest accuracy was achieved using four hidden layers.
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FEATURE SET: System calls
DATASET: PE, 3,167 malicious (unpacked) and 2,083 malicious (packed), 2,894
benign (unpacked) and 1,986 benign (packed)
ML ALGORITHMS: Multi-layer neural network
EFFECTIVENESS: 95%
Entry 19. (Bhatt, Gupta, & Mittal, 2018): This research was focused on detecting
malicious iOS applications, specifically those that leaked privacy information. Active learning
techniques were used to inform the ML algorithms and reduce the reliance on labeled
datasets. Both stream-based and pool-based active learning methods were used. iOS
applications were classified as either malicious, benign, or suspicious, where a suspicious
application requests more permissions than are necessary and a malicious application shares
privacy data with a third party. However, the initial categorization of suspicious applications
was based on the application being downloaded from vShare and not from permissions
inherent to the application. The top 20 most prevalent permissions were mapped to a feature
vector with a feature for the application category (e.g., game, productivity) and then a
simulated oracle was used to identify a hidden class for the unlabeled instance.
FEATURE SET: Permissions
DATASET: Mach-O, 1,470 benign, 855 suspicious
ML ALGORITHMS: Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine, Random Tree, KNearest Neighbor
EFFECTIVENESS: 82.5% (SVM with category)
Entry 20. (Zhang, Zhang, Qin, Yin, & Wu, 2018): Zhang et al applied a neural
network methodology to packed malware classification. The researchers used the "sensitive"
system calls (Windows API calls) which are identified using information entropy theory as
opposed to using expert knowledge of what calls should be considered sensitive. The calls are
transformed into a vector of frequencies and selected based on Principal Component Analysis.
Malicious samples for this research were obtained from VxHeavens and benign samples were
obtained from their personal computers. Both sets samples were packed by the researchers
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using multiple packing algorithms. The neural network had hidden layer sizes from one to
four, with four hidden layers providing the best results.
FEATURE SET: System calls
DATASET: PE, 4,880 benign, 5,250 malicious
ML ALGORITHMS: Neural network
EFFECTIVENESS: 95.6%
Entry 21. (Kancherla, Donahue, & Mukkamala, 2016): This research applied concepts
of digital image processing to packer identification. A binary sample is converted to 8-bit 1dimensional vector and then the values were converted to an intensity value reflecting the
pixel. Next, the single dimension was converted to two-dimensions. The researchers used
Byte Plot and Markov Plot to generate two-dimensional images of this packed binary data.
From these sample sets, features are extracted using intensity (directly from the resulting
image), Wavelet (signal processing tool), and Gabor (a local band-pass filter) features. These
methods resulted in 534 features. Malware samples were obtained from Offensive Computing,
which provided already-packed samples. Packing detection was performed with SVM, and
packing classification was conducted using multi-class SVM and Random Forest.
FEATURE SET: Image signal processing
DATASET: PE, 45,000
ML ALGORITHMS: Support Vector Machine, Random Forest
EFFECTIVENESS: 93.58% detection, 81.34% classification
Entry 22. (Kim, Paik, Choi, & Cho, 2019): These researchers applied SVM with
custom distance functions to identify packers used by malware. Three binary diffing measures
were used. The first was longest common subsequence, the second was n-gram-based
Hungarian (NH) matching, and the third was n-gram similarity. Malware samples packed by
the researchers using multiple packers. Features were extracted through 15-byte sequences.
FEATURE SET: Byte sequence
DATASET: PE, 15,865
ML ALGORITHMS: Support Vector Machine
EFFECTIVENESS: 98.43% (SVM-RBF with NH)
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Entry 23. (Park, Yu, Kang, Lee, & Kwon, 2020): This research sought to classify a
packed malware by its family, which the researchers called version identification. Maicious
samples were acquired from VXHeavens and a manually created dataset. Samples were
executed in the Cuckoo sandbox, which provided both dynamic analysis features and a family
classification label. Malware families having less than 100 or more than 1000 samples were
discarded. The samples were then packed using six different packers. In addition to the
dynamic feature set generated by Cuckoo, static features were taken through DLL and API
imports. The researchers tested multiple machine learning algorithms, did not tune
hyperparameters for their models.
FEATURE SET: PE Header, dynamic actions, DLL imports, API imports
DATASET: PE, 288 unpacked, 8,640 packed
ML ALGORITHMS: Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree, Random Forest, Naive
Bayes, Gaussian, K-Nearest Neighbor
EFFECTIVENESS: 99.28% (RF)

In addition to the previously listed entries, research by Maleki, Bateni, & Rastegari
(2019) was reviewed. However, this research used machine learning to classify malware from
an unpacked sample.
These entries are summarized in the following subsection. First, the datasets are
summarized in Table 2. For each entry previously reviewed, several attributes are displayed.
The attributes include whether the research dealt with Mach-O files as well as packed files.
The sizes of the datasets are summed and split into malicious and benign sizes. Categories of
features are used to group features. These include entropy, the information available in
executable header, metadata of the file, the executable instructions, the imported libraries and
functions, and dynamic action analysis.
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Entry MachO Packed

Dataset Size

Entropy Header Metadata Instructions Imports Actions

Malicious

Benign

1

X

3587

648

X

2

X

253

0

X

9339

0

X
X

3
4

X

2196

0

5

X

58277

39851

6

15000

0

X

7

761

210

X

X

8

X

15324

13483

X

X

9

X

3784

1056

X

X

500000

500000

X

10

X

X
X

11

X

420

1000

X

12

X

760

2300

X

13

X

14

3265

1001

X

15

1920

1967

X

16

10521

8592

17

200000 16000000

18
19

X
X

5250

4880

855

1470

20

X

5250

4880

21

X

45000

0

22

X

15865

0

23

X

8928

0

Total

4

11

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
7

10

3

4

X

X

8

2

Table 2: Summary of datasets employed in the literature.

Of the 23 papers that were applicable to this research only four, or 17%, were related
to macOS. Of the four, none were directed at packed malware. One paper, Entry #13, is
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largely devoid of information in its columns due to the lack of description in the paper itself.
The mean sample sizes included 41,207 malicious samples and 753,697 benign samples.
These were heavily skewed by Entries #10 and #17. The median sample sizes were 5,250
malicious and 1,028 benign. The most prolific feature used was header information from the
executable, whether that be PE or Mach-O. The second most used feature set was the
imported libraries and functions. The third most prolific feature was entropy, which includes
entropy of the overall file as well as entropy of specific program sections.
The remainder of the features present in the research were sparsely used. The
executable instructions category includes disassembly of the program, byte code sequences,
and n-grams of both the disassembly and the bytecode. This feature was used in only three
papers. The metadata of the file, primarily represented in file size attributes, was used in only
two papers. One row, Entry #19, has no features listed and is an outlier in the feature set it
used. This research examined the permissions claimed by the program. Arguably, this feature
could fall in either of the Header or Metadata categories, and because of this uncertainty, it
was left out of the table. Only one paper used the dynamic actions performed by a program as
a feature set.
The reviewed literature is further summarized in Table 3. This table summarizes the
machine learning algorithms used in these entries. Due to the great diversity of algorithms
used within the survey, categories are again used to group like algorithms together. The NB
category includes both Naive Bayes as well as Bayesian Nets and Multiple Naive Bayes. The
SVM category includes all flavors of Support Vector Machines. The NN category includes
Neural Networks of multiple types, such as Convolutional, Recurrent, and Adversarial.
Regression includes both linear and logistic. A bolded and italicized entry within a column
indicates the machine learning category which produced the best results.
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Entry NB SVM

KNN DT NN

1

RF

GB

X

2

Regression Other

Accuracy

X

84.7

X

3

49.6
X

97.8

4
5

X
X

6

95.3
X

7 X

X

8 X

X

9

X

97.5

X

X

96.2

X

X

98.2

X

X

X

X

99.1
94.5

10 X

X

96.5

11

X

99.4

12 X

X

13

X
X

X

X

96.6
X

X

X

14 X
15

97.1
X

96.3

16
17

X
X

18
19 X

96.7

X

X

20
21

X

22

X

23 X

X

X

X

Total 7

11

6

7

X

99.1

X

92.0

X

95.0

X

82.5

X

95.6
X

93.58
98.43

8

X

X

8

2

99.28
2

2

93.52

Table 3: Summary of machine learning algorithms and accuracy in the literature review.

SVM was the most commonly used algorithm within the literature, being used in 48%
of the papers. Neural Networks and Random Forest follow as second most common with eight
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implementations. Naïve Bayes and Decision Tree tie as third most common, each with seven
uses. When used, SVM produced the highest accuracy 54% of the time. This is bested by
Decision Trees and Random Forests which produced the highest accuracy 57% and 62.5% of
the time, respectively. Random Forests place first and second for highest accuracy overall.
Random Forest and Decision Trees tie at third. The average accuracy was 93.52%. Four
papers scored below this value.

Summary
This chapter reviewed the literature related to machine learning applied to the analysis
of packed executables on macOS. First, a baseline review of applications on macOS and the
structure of Mach-O binaries was performed. An application on macOS is typically, but not
always, a bundled .app directory structure that consists of a Mach-O executable, supporting
frameworks, resources, and a property list. A Mach-O file consists of a header that contains
structural information about the file, including its supported instruction set architectures. The
Mach-O may be a fat binary consisting of two architectures combined into one file. The
Mach-O format uses load commands to instruct the loader on mapping the file into memory,
and various segments and sections of code and data.
Next, this chapter reviewed the packing software available for Mach-O files. Of the
packing software available on the Internet, only MPRESS and UPX successfully run on a
system running macOS 10.14 or later. Since MPRESS generated a non-executable file, UPX
is the only packer that can realistically be used as an attack vector for contemporaneous
versions of macOS.
Next, a survey was conducted to understand how manual analysis of Mach-O binaries
is performed. Malware analysis is broadly categorized as static or dynamic. Static analysis
involves extracting information from a malware sample without executing it. This includes
examining the program's structure as defined by its type, analyzing the functionality
demonstrated by disassembly or stated function imports, and reasoning about the strings
present in the file. Dynamic techniques execute the malware and observe the actual behaviors
as it runs, such as the network connections it makes, the files it creates, or the actual functions
and imports it calls.

45
Finally, the literature regarding packed malware analysis aided by machine learning
was surveyed. The common features used in the machine learning models were categorized,
with header information, entropy, and function imports being the most used feature sets. The
algorithms used by these models were most commonly SVM, Neural Networks, Naïve Bayes,
Decision Trees, and Random Forests. The algorithms that produced the highest accuracy were
Decision Trees and Random Forests. Of the literature that was reviewed, only 21% were
related to Mach-O files. None of the literature reviewed applied machine learning to detection
of packed Mach-O files..
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM DESIGN (RESEARCH METHODOLOGY)
This chapter presents the research methodology and system design of for an
application of machine learning to the detection of packed Mac malware. Design science is
the framework used for this research. This chapter is organized as follows: first, the chapter
will describe the design science methodology. Second, the chapter will describe the process
used to gather and analyze samples of malicious Mac software to include extraction of
features from the dataset. Finally, this chapter will present the machine learning models used
by the artifact and the methods used to tune them.
The original research questions were:
1. Can software designed for macOS be correctly identified as packed software using
a machine learning algorithm?
2. Can software designed for macOS that is packed be correctly grouped with other
samples using the same packing algorithm using a machine learning algorithm?
3. Can a machine learning model ascertain the family that malware belongs to and
thus the potential impact that it can have?
The literature review showed that there is only one viable packer, UPX. Because of
this, research question two was no longer worth pursuing. With only one packing algorithm,
there would be only one label on which to classify packed software, and testing whether a
sample was packed with UPX vice Mpress would not be possible. The result would be a
duplication of research question one. Therefore, question two was changed to: “Can a
machine learning model discriminate between Mach-O packed benignware and packed
malware?” This question has been previously explored by Aghakhani et al (2020) against PE
files, but the literature review showed that similar research has not been conducted against
Mach-O files.
The research described in this chapter was designed for use in a virtual machine
environment for storage and processing of both malware and benignware samples. The virtual
environment minimized the impact of accidental infection and provided a means to quickly
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reconstitute the environment. This virtual machine was created with 25.44GiB of memory,
eight CPUs, and 32GB of storage. The Ubuntu Linux distribution was selected as the guest
operating system for this machine. This distribution provides a robust package management
solution to manage the software required for data processing. The code and data for the
research was stored in a Git repository, which provided version control and external storage.

Design Science Methodology
According to Wieringa (2014), design science consists of two activities: "designing an
artifact that improves something for stakeholders and empirically investigating the
performance of an artifact in a context." The artifact can be any number of things, including
hardware or software, processes, or design documents. The context involves people, systems,
budgets, etc. Design science is complimentary to research in the field of information systems
(Hevner, 2007) such as machine learning and malware analysis. This research starts with a
knowledge problem: can software designed for macOS be correctly identified as packed
software using a machine learning algorithm? In order to answer that question, a design
problem must first be solved: design an artifact (machine learning model) that identifies
packed Mach-o files. To reiterate, the artifacts of this research will be:
1. A research artifact that is a machine learning model to classify packed Mach-O
binaries.
2. A research artifact that is a machine learning model to categorize like packed
Mach-O binaries.
3. Source code for the above research artifacts.
4. A dissertation describing the literature, methodology, findings, and future work.
The context in which these artifacts will be applied exists in a graph. Along the X-axis
are robust mechanisms ranging from idealized conditions to realistic conditions to conditions
of practice. Along the Y-axis is single case through samples to population (Wieringa, 2014).
This research will exist in the intersection between idealized and realistic conditions and
samples of the population. The context in which this research will be evaluated will be further
enumerated while discussing the machine learning models used by the artifacts. The context
of design science also includes stakeholders. The primary stakeholders for this project include
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the researcher and the dissertation committee. Outside stakeholders include the broader
research community as well as end users of Apple's software.
Design science does not just contribute artifacts as part of its research. As part of the
rigor cycle of design science, contributions are made to the knowledge base and it is argued
by Hevner (2007) that it is this knowledge contribution combined with the pragmatic,
solutions focused approach that makes for good design science research. Existing research
exists on analyzing malware on both Windows and macOS, and research further exists on
applying machine learning to those problems. However, the level of knowledge available for
Windows exceeds that of macOS. This research will further contribute knowledge and
experience back into the research community in detecting packed macOS software and the
applications of machine learning to macOS malware analysis.

Dataset Building Methodology
The overall methodology for building the dataset and performing machine learning
against it is depicted in Figure 10Error! Reference source not found.. First, samples of
macOS malware must be collected. As the control group of software, benignware or nonmalicious files will also be collected. Second, the collected samples will be preprocessed to
ensure that they are Mach-O files. At this stage, the proportion of packed vs non-packed
samples must be identified. If there is an insufficient ratio of packed to non-packed software
to conduct further research on, then some samples will need to be manually packed to
generate a suitable dataset. Third, features will be selected and/or engineered as applicable.
During this phase, features were created from the available malware samples. Fourth, machine
learning models were applied to selected features. The results of those models were assessed.
The features and models were tuned as necessary to obtain the most accurate and effective
models.
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Figure 10: Research methodology for machine learning.

Malware Sample Collection
Properly training a machine learning model requires having sufficient samples of data
and creating appropriate feature sets. To create a dataset of Mach-O features, one must first
obtain samples of Mach-O malware. VirusTotal is one repository of malware that provides the
ability to download malware samples (Wardle, 2021). VirusTotal was contacted to obtain
such an account and upon receiving one, it was learned that one must fill out a web form
requesting access to the VirusTotal API. Eventually, this research was given "academic API"
access which allows 20,000 API calls per day and access to a Google Drive which has
samples of malware. Unfortunately, it was learned that the academic API does not have
access to the advanced search features that Wardle (2021) referred to and therefore the
VirusTotal database could not be searched for Mach-O files. The Google Drive does have
some samples of Mach-O files, but some of their archives are empty. Ultimately, VirusTotal
provided 41 samples.
Wardle's (2021) blog also provides samples of some Mac malware and contributed
136 samples. Malware may be downloaded manually from the website, although that is a
more labor-intensive process. Wardle also provides a JSON file with details about each of the
malware samples that he curates. This JSON file includes a property "download" which
contains the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) from which the malware can be downloaded.
To automate that process, a script called objsee_download.py was developed. This script
functions as depicted in Figure 11.
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1. Open malware.json and read its contents
2. Parse the contents as a JSON object
3. For each entry in the object:
a. Create a file name by either:
i. Search for a SHA256 hash in the "virusTotal" property
ii. Obtain the last element of the "download" property
b. Check to see if the file was already downloaded
c. If necessary, download the file, save with the file name created in (3a)
Figure 11: Pseudo-code for objsee_download.py.

VirusSign.com is another website that collects malware samples and offers downloads
at different levels of service. At the free tier provided for a student, download bandwidth is
limited to 2Mbps and that is shared amongst all free users, leading to actual download speeds
much lower, with some downloads experiencing ~20kbs. Additionally, their download
mechanism does not support resuming. Due to how their archives are structured, one cannot
search but can only download a monolithic zip file. Of 1,621 files that were in the zip file that
were downloaded, 0 were Mach-O files.
Another source was VirusShare.com. Their point of contact for requesting access for
academic research was quick at responding and providing access. Their system contains more
than 37 million samples and includes Mach-O files. This dataset was searched with the term
filetype:"Mach-O.*". Due to the nature of VirusShare's website search implementation, the
results could not easily be indexed into. Therefore, each page was manually loaded and
SHA256 hashes were scraped from each page using the browser Javascript console. Those
hashes were then saved off for future downloading. VirusShare does have a daily limit on the
files which can be downloaded, but using a script allowed for the samples to be downloaded
over a period. This script, vs_download.py, is depicted in Figure 12Error! Reference source
not found..

1. Open a file containing SHA256 hashes
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2. For each hash:
a. Check if the sample has already been downloaded. If so, continue.
b. If not already downloaded:
i. Create a URL using the hash and the user's API key
ii. Download the file
iii. Sleep for 15 seconds
Figure 12: Pseudo-code for vs_download.py.

After using these utilities, a total of 1,296 malware samples were obtained.
Once malware samples are downloaded, they must be preprocessed to ensure they are
usable. As noted previously in this research, malware can take many forms, not all of which
are Mach-O binaries. The preprocessing step ensures that only Mach-O files progress on to
the next stage. If a malware sample uses the preinstall or postinstall script features of a
macOS bundle to install a malicious script but otherwise contains no Mach-O files, that
sample was marked as not suitable, and was not included in future processing steps. After
preprocessing, 978 samples were usable.
During the preprocessing phase, the samples also needed to be manually classified as
packed or not so that the feature vector can be properly labeled. If there is a large imbalance
in the number of packed vs non-packed samples, then techniques must be applied to reduce
that imbalance. One method is to manually pack software, but another technique is to use the
Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique to construct samples (Chawla, Bowyer, Hall, &
Kegelmeyer, 2002). SMOTE was considered but given that only four of the 1,296
downloaded samples were packed, it was more effective to manually pack each malware
sample.

Obtaining Benign Samples
Having packed and unpacked malware samples allowed for the first goal of the
research to proceed: discriminating between packed and unpacked binaries. To achieve the
second goal, benign samples are needed so that malware can be discriminated from nonmalware. Therefore, benign samples need to be collected as well. Based on the results of the
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literature review, benign samples are often collected and subjected to the same packing
procedures.
The research reviewed in Chapter Two demonstrated two primary methods of
obtaining benign samples. The first method is to use programs that are included as part of the
operating system’s install, as in (Kim, Y., Paik, J.-Y., Choi, S., & Cho, E.-S., 2019). The
second method is to download benign applications from Internet sources as in (Saleh, Li, &
Xu, 2018). The first method’s benefits are that benign samples need not be searched for –
because the operating system includes the samples as part of itself. However, those samples
may not include programs that contain functionality useful for differentiating between benign
and malicious samples. This can be of particular concern on Unix operating systems, where
the philosophy has been that each program should do one thing as opposed to many. Programs
that use that paradigm may not represent malware that includes functionality to accomplish a
multitude of tactics. In the second method, the advantage is that applications developed by
third parties may include multiple functionalities. The disadvantage can be the time required
to acquire samples.
Bhatt, Gupta, & Mittal (2018) took the approach of using the iOS App Store to acquire
benign samples. This was a necessity given their platform was the iPhone and its applications.
The Mac App Store provides a similar curated repository of benign applications. This
research used a combination of the two methods. First, programs from the /usr/bin directory
were included. Second, the Mac App Store and the software distribution site Softronic were
used to download benign samples. Software was chosen from multiple categories to include
business, networking, and productivity. By obtaining applications from a mix of categories,
the study ensures that a variety of application types are included. A variety of types provides a
breadth of library imports, function imports, file sizes, and strings. A total of 853 benign
samples were collected for this research.

Data Preprocessing
The next phase of this data processing pipeline was to extract features from the samples.
The macholibre Python module provides a programmatic interface for parsing Mach-O data
(Stephens, 2019). The macholibre tool was selected for its ease of integration into the Python
programming language. When parsing a file, macholibre extracts all the information from the
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Mach-O header; the file size; obtains MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes; iterates and parses
each segment; calculates the entropy of each segment; and obtains the strings from the file. In
addition to this information, a custom function was written to obtain the overall entropy of the
file. All this information is stored as a JSON object which is saved to the filesystem.
The parsing of the Mach-O files was accomplished through a Python script. The script
automates several steps in the feature extraction process. First, the script iterates the files in a
specified directory. Malware is often distributed in a password-protected zip format to prevent
triggering antivirus. The script selects Mach-O files or zip archives. The script takes as an
argument a list of passwords to use for opening the zip files and attempts each password until
the zip is extracted or all passwords are exhausted. Once all zip files have been processed, the
extracted files are added to the list of Mach-O files and macholibre is used to parse each file.
If parsed, the UPX packer is called to pack the file. The macholibre parser is applied to the
newly created packed file. This script is depicted in Figure 13.
1. Inputs: a path to search for files, a list of passwords to decrypt archives, a
temporary directory in which to extract files, a directory in which to output the
JSON files
2. Outputs: JSON files of parsed Mach-O files
3. Search the given path for files and store references to files matching the file
types Mach-O, Zip, and 7Zip
4. For each file reference in the Zip and 7Zip lists:
a. For each provided password:
i. Attempt to extract the archive contents
5. Search the temporary file path for files and store references to files matching
the file type Mach-O
6. For each file reference in the Mach-O list:
a. Parse the file using macholibre's parse() function
b. Calculate the overall entropy
c. Write the output to the JSON output directory
d. Pack the file
e. Parse the packed file using macholibre's parse() function
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f. Calculate the overall entropy
g. Write the output to the JSON output directory
Figure 13: Pseudo-code for parse_machos.py.
After the files were parsed, another script was used to use the Virus Total API. The
API was queried to obtain the “last_analysis_results”. This object contains a dictionary of
each antivirus software that analyzed the file. The results were appended to the JSON object
returned from parse_machos.py. If the file did not have analysis results, a key “VT” was set to
“Not found”. If the file was analyzed, the results from McAfee were selected to provide a
family category for the malware. McAfee was selected as a well-known antivirus, and one
that uses a simple naming convention, such as OSX/Family.strain.
The properties of the resultant JSON object are demonstrated by the sample output
depicted in Figure 14Error! Reference source not found..
{
"name": "xmrig2",
"size": 402812,
"hashes": {
"md5": "c72db1217abf3201fa525512d3974d13",
"sha1": "bcf07132f4ce676f6bffb3ea5c0182787d53e490",
"sha256":
"ede858683267c61e710e367993f5e589fcb4b4b57b09d023a67ea63084c54a05"
},
"macho": {
"cputype": "X86_64",
"subtype": "X86_ALL, X86_64_ALL, I386_ALL, or 386",
"filetype": "EXECUTE",
"nlcs": 16,
"slcs": 1976,
"flags": [
"NOUNDEFS",
"DYLDLINK",
"TWOLEVEL",
"PIE",
"HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS"
],
"lcs": [
{
"cmd": "SEGMENT_64",
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"size": 72,
"name": "__PAGEZERO",
"vmaddr": 0,
"vmsize": 4294967296,
"offset": 0,
"segsize": 0,
"maxprot": "---",
"initprot": "---",
"nsects": 0,
"entropy": 0,
"sects": [],
"flags": []
}
"symtab": [
{
"n_strx": 2,
"n_sect": 1,
"n_desc": 0,
"n_value": 4294974208,
"pext": 0,
"n_type": "SECT",
"ext": 0,
"dylib": 0,
"ref": 0
}
"strtab": [
list of strings
],
"imports": [
[
"import name",
"Library path"
]
},
"filepath": "/tmp/samples/CookieMiner/xmrig2",
"entropy": 3.1662003399571828,
"vtscan": {"McAfee-GW-Edition": {"category": "malicious", "engine_name":
"McAfee-GW-Edition", "engine_version": "v2019.1.2+3728", "result": "TrojanCoinMiner.h", "method": "blacklist", "engine_update": "20211110"}}
}

Figure 14: Example JSON object from a parsed Mach-O.
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Once the dataset has been generated, a Python script is used to parse the information
from a given file into a feature vector and then combine the feature vectors together into a
single file. While simple in concept, the following challenges were encountered. First, the
Pandas module's read_json() function is capable of reading a JSON object into a Pandas
Dataframe, but as demonstrated in Figure 14Error! Reference source not found. there are
nested objects which result in dataframe columns that contain JSON objects. Second, the
Pandas json_normalize() function can be used to extract specific metadata from the children
objects, but this requires knowing the key values of those children objects a priori. Third,
concatenation of Pandas dataframes require that the dataframes consist of the same columns.
Fourth, performing a load of the JSON object would set the column value as a string, whereas
machine learning algorithms operate on numeric data.
These challenges were solved with a Python script that programmatically retrieves the
data from the stored JSON objects, converts data as necessary, and loads the data into a
vector. The script takes a path as an argument and enumerates the files within that path. For
each file, it attempts to load a JSON object. From the Mach-O header data contained in the
JSON object, the script loads the size, entropy, number of load commands, size of the load
commands, and flags. If the filename of the JSON file contains "packed", then that value is set
to 1. Then, for each load command, additional processing occurs. Each load command that is
parsed is prepended with either "segment" or "dylib" as part of its feature name. A segment
has its vmsize, size, initprot, maxprot, nsects, and entropy properties saved. A dylib has its
cmdsize, version, and timestamp saved. Both structure types have their name saved. This
process is outlined as pseudocode in Figure 15Error! Reference source not found..
1. Inputs: a path to search for files
2. Outputs: CSV of aggregated features
3. Search the given path for files and store references for processing
4. For each file stored, perform processing steps
a. Mark files known to be malware as such
b. If the file is a parsed universal binary, split the embedded Mach-O files
c. Retrieve specific information from each file:
i. Name
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ii. Size
iii. Entropy
iv. Number of load commands
v. Size of load commands
vi. Flags
vii. Packed indicator
viii. Malware indicator
ix. Each segment
1. Name
2. Size
3. Entropy
x. Each section
xi. Each dynamic library
1. Name
2. Size
xii. Each imported function
xiii. McAfee family
5. Calculate the maximum number of columns retrieved
6. Create a Pandas dataframe with the number of columns set to the value from
step 5
7. Iterate the retrieved features, and set values in the dataframe as appropriate
Figure 15: Pseudo-code for aggregating previously parsed JSON objects.

These features align with the most common features learned in the literature review.
Header information from the binary is included through the name, size, number of load
commands, and size of the load commands. Entropy is calculated and used for the overall
binary and for each segment. The imported libraries are used, as well as the functions
imported from each library. The size, number of load commands, and size of load commands
are integer values. Entropy is a float value. The flag names, segment names, section names,
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library names, and function names are stored as boolean values. The family is a string value,
which must be transformed to a categorical label for classification purposes.

Machine Learning Methodology
With a dataset built and features extracted, the research could move into the Feature
Selection and Engineering and ML Model Classification phases. The purpose of the Feature
Selection and Engineering phase was to identify which features are meaningful to ML
applications and to retain those for use in the models. The feature extraction process resulted
in a relatively large dimension dataframe that increases processing time and could affect the
accuracy of resulting ML models. Features can be engineered to modify them, such as
through scaling or normalization. Other features may need to be combined through a
mathematical process to generate a feature that more meaningfully impacts classification. The
ML Model Classification goal is to build ML models using the previously generated feature
set, train the models on the data, and predict answers to the three research questions. An ML
model may use hyperparameters, the aspects of a model that affect how the model trains. Part
of the optimization process performed in this phase involves tuning the hyperparameters to
determine the optimal values.
Research that uses ML models has a few options with regards to implementation of
the models. A researcher may choose to implement the algorithms themselves or to use
libraries that provide the algorithms as classes or functions that can be instantiated. The
purpose of this research was not to investigate the implementations of ML algorithms nor to
contribute to the improvement of those algorithms. Therefore, the choice was made to use an
existing library rather than implement the algorithms manually. Several projects exist to
provide these frameworks, such as Scikit-Learn, TensorFlow, and PyTorch. Scikit-Learn was
chosen due to familiarity with its Python language, its wide implementation of ML
algorithms, and its community support.

Feature Selection and Engineering
The initial results of the previously mentioned feature extraction process resulted in
over 160,000 columns. Due to how the dataframe was constructed, each column was assigned
the "object" datatype. The memory requirement for storing this data was over one gigabyte.
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The large number of columns would be unsuitable for many machine learning algorithms and
at best would lead to overfitting. The virtual machine in which these experiments were
conducted had 24GB of memory available. During exploration of the data and attempts at
reducing the dimensionality of the data, out of memory errors were encountered.
One technique to address the memory constraints was specifying the type of data held
in each column. The Pandas library recorded each column as an object, while the vast
majority of the datatypes were actually Boolean in purpose. The remaining features were
strings or integers. The Pandas function convert_dtypes() was used to infer and convert the
object datatypes into the appropriate true datatype. While this method reduced the memory
requirement for the dataframe, it did not solve the dimensionality problem of the data, and the
Python kernel would routinely crash while attempting to perform functions such as
SelectKBest or Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
The next technique was to convert the "library_function" columns that stored the
unique imports into a format that would provide for less memory overhead. The approach
taken was to create a column that was named for the library and to record each import as a list
in the cell. For example, a column may be called "dylib_@rpath/libssl.1.0.0.dylib_imports"
and each cell under the column would contain an empty list ("[]") or a list of imported
function names ("['function1', 'function2']", etc). This reduced the columns from over 160,000
to 2,830. This further reduced the memory requirement to below 100MB. However, this
technique introduced further problems. Since the relevant data was now stored in a list,
functions such as PCA and Sequential Forward Selection would fail. The implementation of
these functions operates against continuous and hashable datatypes, respectively. Ultimately,
the feature set was reduced by using only the imported library name instead of both the library
names and function names. This feature set matches the features used by multiple studies.
The label columns in the dataset were matched to the research questions. For question
one, the “packed” column was used. To determine question two, a new column was created
by using a logical AND of the “packed” and “malware” columns to create a
“packed_malware” column. Question three was matched to the Virus Total family column.
The data was split into training and testing data using sklearn’s train_test_split method with a
test size of 0.20. The independent features were created by dropping the “packed,”
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“malware,” “packed_malware,” “family,” and “name” columns. For each dependent variable,
the data was set to the corresponding label column previously enumerated.
The resultant X columns numbered 2,827. This number was still too large to prevent
overfitting. To select the most appropriate features, several functions were performed. First
was sklearn’s SelectKBest. The SelectKBest function retains only the highest k scoring
features with a selectable scoring algorithm (scikit-learn developers, n.d.). This function was
run with both mutual information and chi2 tests. Figure 16 shows code to implement
SelectKBest with the top 20 features, stored in dictionary objects.

from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectKBest, mutual_info_regression, chi2, f_classif
skb_20 = {}
for count in [1,2,3]:
selector = SelectKBest(f_classif, k=20)
y = f"y{count}_train"
selector.fit(X_train, eval(y))
skb_20[y] = X_train.columns[selector.get_support()]
selector2 = SelectKBest(chi2, k=20)
skb_20_chi = {}
for count in [1,2]:
y = f"y{count}_train"
selector2.fit(X_train, eval(y))
skb_20_chi[y] = X_train.columns[selector2.get_support()]
Figure 16: Code for performing SelectKBest.

Next was Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the linear dimensionality
(scikit-learn developers, n.d.). PCA was used with a threshold of 0.95 to obtain the features
which account for 95% of the information. Since PCA is sensitive to value scaling, the
StandardScaler method was used to scale features. Figure 17Error! Reference source not
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found. shows code for implementing PCA to select the features which account for 95% of the
information variance.

from sklearn.decomposition import PCA
from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler
from sklearn.metrics import accuracy_score
pca = PCA(.95)
X_train_pca = pca.fit_transform(X_scale)
n_pcs = pca.components_.shape[0]
most_important = [np.abs(pca.components_[i]).argmax() for i in range(n_pcs)]
most_important_names = [df.columns[most_important[i]] for i in range(n_pcs)]
Figure 17: Code to implement PCA.
The SelectFromModel function was used with an ExtraTreesClassifier to select
features over a threshold determined by the impurity of features (scikit-learn developers, n.d.).
Figure 18Error! Reference source not found. shows code to implement SelectFromModel
using an ExtraTreesClassifier.

from sklearn.ensemble import ExtraTreesClassifier
from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectFromModel
clf = ExtraTreesClassifier()
sfm_best = {}
for count in [1,2,3]:
y = f"y{count}_train"
clf = clf.fit(X_train, eval(y))
clf.feature_importances_
sfm = SelectFromModel(clf, prefit=True)
X_new = sfm.transform(X_train)
X_new.shape
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sfm_best[y] = X_train.columns[sfm.get_support()]
Figure 18: Code to perform SelectFromModel.

Forward Sequential Feature Selection was used with an SVC classifier to select the 20
most important features. Sequential Feature Selection can be used in either a forward or
reverse fashion (scikit-learn developers, n.d.). When forward is used, features are iteratively
cross validated to determine its impact on training a model until the desired number of
features selected. With backward selection, the process begins with all features, and they are
iteratively removed to determine impact. Since there 2,730 features and 20 were to be
selected, forward selection was used to minimize computational time. The implementation for
this is shown in Figure 19Error! Reference source not found..

from sklearn.svm import SVC
from sklearn.feature_selection import SequentialFeatureSelector
from sklearn.model_selection import KFold
svm = SVC()
sfs = SequentialFeatureSelector(svm, n_features_to_select=20)
sfs_best = {}
for count in [1,2,3]:
y = f"y{count}_train"
sfs.fit(X_train, eval(y))
sfs_best[y] = X_train.columns[sfs.get_support()]
Figure 19: Code to implement Forward Sequential Feature Selection.

Finally, a Mutual Information Classifier was used to measure the dependency between
variables (scikit-learn developers, n.d.). This is demonstrated in Figure 20.

from sklearn.feature_selection import mutual_info_classif
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mi_best = {}
for count in [1,2,3]:
y = f"y{count}_train"
mi = mutual_info_classif(X_train, eval(y))
mi = pd.Series(mi)
mi.index = X_train.columns
mi.sort_values(ascending=False)
sel = SelectKBest(mutual_info_classif, k=20).fit(X_train, eval(y))
mi_best[y] = X_train.columns[sel.get_support()]
Figure 20: Code to implement Mutual Information Classifier

Model Selection and Hyperparameter Tuning
The literature review showed that many ML models have been applied to the problem
of malware classification. Although its performance was not often in the top tier of results,
SVM was the most commonly used algorithm. An SVM model can be instantiated using
Scikit-Learn's SVC class. The hyperparameters for SVM are C, gamma, and kernel. The RBF
kernel was most effective in the literature review and was used for this research. The C
parameter is the regularization parameter. This number must be positive, and values were
provided in powers of 10 from 0.1 to 1000. The gamma parameter controls the kernel
coefficient and values were provided in powers of 10 from 1 to 0.0001.
A Neural Network can be implemented with the MLPClassifier, which creates a
Multilayer Perceptron. The hyperparameters for MPLClassifier are solver, max_iter, alpha,
and hidden_layer_size. The solver parameter can be set to adam, lbfgs, or sgd. The sgd value
uses stochastic gradient descent for weight optimization. The adam value uses an optimized
stochastic gradient descent algorithm that is appropriate for large datasets. The lbfgs value is a
quasi-Newton optimizer appropriate for smaller datasets. With 3,502 entries, the dataset for
this research straddles the line between small and large as defined by Scikit-Learn, so lbfgs
and adam are used. The max_iter value determines number of epochs or iterations that the
solver iterates and was set from 1,000 to 2,000 in intervals of 100. The alpha parameter is the
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L2 penalty parameter and was set to values 10-1 to 10-9. The hidden_layer parameter
determines the number of hidden layers used in the network and was set to a range to 10 to
15.
The Scikit-Learn KNeighborsClassifier class is used to create KNN models. The KNN
model takes the hyperparameters of n_neighbors, weights, and metric. The n_neighbors
parameter controls the number of neighbors used for classification. A range of one to ten was
selected. The weights parameter is used for the weight function and was set to uniform and
distance. The metric parameter is the distance metric used for the tree. The minkowski,
euclidean, and manhattan metrics were used. Another parameter, p, exists which functions as
the power parameter to the minkowski parameter. The default value is 2, which causes the
minkowski metric to be equivalent to the Euclidean distance. As the metric parameter is being
directly manipulated, the p parameter was left as default.
A Random Forest model is instantiated through the RandomForestClassifier class. A
Random Forest creates multiple decision trees trained on subsamples of the data and the
results then averaged. The hyperparameters are n_estimators, max_features, max_depth, and
criterion. The n_estimators parameter determines the number of trees created as part of the
forest and was set to values 100 to 500 in 100 intervals. The max_features parameters is used
to specify the maximum number of features used at each split. This parameter was set to sqrt
and log2. The auto value uses the square root of the number of features. The log2 value uses
the base two log of the number of features. The max_depth parameter determines the
maximum depth of the tree. By default, the tree will expand until all nodes contain no
children or less than the min_samples_split value. The values four through eight were used.
The criterion parameter specifies the split quality measurement. Two values are used: gini,
and entropy. Where entropy measures the randomness of data, the gini metric measures the
frequency in which elements are mislabeled.
The final model used was the DecisionTreeClassifier. The hyperparameters for
Decision Tree closely relate to Random Forest. The hyperparameters include max_depths,
min_samples_leaf, criterion, and splitter. The max_depths and criterion parameters are used
in the same manner for Decision Trees as for Random Forest. The max_depth parameter was
set from one to 21 and criterion was set to gini and entropy. The min_samples_leaf parameter
determines the minimum number of samples that must be in a leaf to be considered as a leaf,
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otherwise it is left out. It was provided vales one, five, 10, 20, 50, and 100. The splitter
parameter is used to determine how splitting occurs at each node. Both best and random are
used. The best value uses features with the highest importance, while random selects random
features.

Model assessment
A machine learning model can be evaluated against several parameters. When
classifying a prediction, one of four outcomes can be achieved. First is a True Positive (TP),
where a prediction is correctly classified as a positive. In this research, a true positive means
correctly classifying software as packed, as packed malware, or belonging to the correct
family. Second is a False Positive (FP), an error where a prediction is considered a positive
sample when it is really a negative. Here, that means a sample is predicted as packed, packed
malware, or belongs to a particular family when it is not. Third is a True Negative (TN). This
is when a sample is correctly predicted as a negative value. In this research, a true negative
means a sample is correctly predicted as not packed, not packed malware, or does not belong
to a particular family. The fourth type is a False Negative (FN), an error where a sample is
incorrectly assessed as a negative when it is really a positive. For the purposes of this
research, that means a sample was predicted as not packed or packed malware when it is or
does not belong to a family when it does.
From the prediction outcomes, the following measurements can be obtained. First is
accuracy, a measure of the correctly classified predictions against all samples and is
'()'+

calculated by '()'+)*()*+. Optimizing for accuracy maximizes the number of correct
predictions but may include an unacceptable number of false positives. In the context of
malware detection, accuracy is important to identify malware. Next is precision. Precision
!"

measures the ratio of true positives to all positives and is calculated by '()*(. Precision may
be optimized to reduce the number of false positives and is important in the malware analysis
context to reduce alert fatigue or prevent benign software from being quarantined. Next is
'(

recall, which measures the true positives predicted to all positives and is calculated by '()*+.
Recall optimizes to avoid false negatives and would be important in situations where malware
cannot be missed. Last is the F1-Score, which calculates the accuracy by using precision and
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recall and is calculated by

" × (./0!1!2# × 3/0455
(./0!1!2#)3/0455

. The F1-Score balances precision and recall and

as such was selected as the measurement criteria for this research.
The results of a ML model can also be visualized. A confusion matrix displays TP, FP,
TN, and FN in a matrix format that can be stylized to highlight differences in the results. For
example, the cells of the matrix can be color-coded with a darker hue to symbolize a larger
value. This can visually highlight the differences in relative values of each result so that
decisions can be made with regards to model performance. The precision-recall (P-R) curve
plots the the precision and recall values along the y- and x-axis of a graph. Each axis is plotted
from zero to one. A perfect curve would be depicted along the top and right of the graph. The
precision-recall curve allows a data scientist to visualize the optimal balance of precision and
recall, which may differ depending on the application. The Receiver Operator Curve (ROC)
plots the False Positive Rate (FPR) against the x-axis and the True Positive Rate (TPR)
against the y-axis. The TPR is the same measurement as recall and may also be called
*(

sensitivity, while the FPR may also be called fall-out and is defined as *()'+. The perfect
ROC curve would be depicted along the left and top of the graph. Both the P-R and ROC
curves may be assessed programmatically by measuring the Area Under the Curve (AUC).
The AUC measures the area of the graph from zero to one which falls under the curve, with
values closer to one indicating more total coverage. A null line may be applied to represent a
random chance, with 50% of the area being under the null line; a model should be above the
null line to represent greater performance than random chance. All of these visualization
techniques were used to evaluate the performance of the models.

Summary
This chapter presented the research methodology and system design of the research.
The research questions were reviewed and modified after the literature review revealed that
one of the original questions could not be answered due to lack of variety in packers that
target the Mach-O format. This research uses the Design Science approach to build an artifact
and evaluate its performance in a context of malware analysis pipelines. The methodology for
building the dataset of the research was presented. The dataset is divided into two categories:
benign samples and malware samples. Malware samples were obtained by downloading
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samples from repositories maintained by security research groups. The malware samples were
selected based on the availability in those repositories. Benign samples were obtained by
downloading samples from freeware software repositories and the Mac App Store. Benign
samples were selected to represent a breadth of functionality and file size.
The steps to preprocess the dataset were then presented, to include unarchiving
samples. The samples needed to be processed to ensure they were Mach-O binaries. Once
processed, they were parsed to obtain Mach-O header information, entropy, and malware
family. Next, the actions that were taken to transform the data into a feature set were
described; those features were informed by the results of the literature review. The machine
learning process was described, starting with dimensionality reduction and feature selection.
The machine learning models to be used were enumerated, followed by hyperparameter
tuning. Finally, the evaluation and assessment methods were provided.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTS (CASE STUDY)
This chapter presents the results obtained as part of this research. Research artifacts
were produced as part of a design science methodology to address three research questions in
an action research case study. First, the case study is reviewed to present the generated
research artifacts, research context, and stakeholders. These artifacts were generated under a
set of assumptions forming the context in which the research was conducted. This includes the
stakeholders of this research as well as potential stakeholders of a treatment in further
application. Second, the results of the research are presented. Several artifacts were generated
along the process of building a dataset, extracting features, engineering features, selecting
features, training machine learning models, and testing the models in classification. The sum
of all artifacts is presented in a narrative of the process of artifact creation. The results of the
research context are presented as a discussion of where and when the research may be used.
The results of machine learning, to include best features and hyperparameters are presented.
Finally, there is a discussion of the overall process and results.

Case Study Review
This section presents the review of the case study. First is a review of the research
artifacts that were generated. Next, the context in which the research was conducted is
reviewed. This includes the context in which the implementation is envisioned. Third is a
discussion of the stakeholders involved as part of this research and stakeholders that may be
involved in the envisioned context.
The following research artifacts were developed as part of this research. Artifacts two
through five will be described further in the Results section. The repositories of malware and
benignware are not published due to constraints in redistribution of software. However, the
corpus of parsed results of the samples are published in the Github repository associated with
this project. The machine learning experimentation was conducted in a Jupyter notebook
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which is also shared as part of the Github repository. This format allows other researchers to
view the steps taken during research and to reproduce the experiments.
1. This document, a dissertation on the research.
2. Repository of malicious samples, a corpus of malware that targets macOS.
3. Repository of benign samples, a corpus of benignware that targets macOS.
4. parse_machos.py, a Python script to parse the malicious and benign repositories and
output the results to JSON files.
5. machoml.ipynb, a Jupyter notebook that aggregates the JSON files, builds a feature
vector, and allows for reproducible machine learning experimentation.
The context of this case study was composed of software, hardware, methods,
techniques, goals, budgets, and people. The software portion centered on packed malware on
the macOS platform but included a range of applications that function as network utilities,
productivity software, and other categories. In an idealized state, all software would include a
bill of materials and include signing information. The Mac App Store makes strides towards
that idealized state, however that platform only makes up a portion of the available software
on macOS. In realistic conditions, software is acquired through multiple channels, many of
which lack signing information. The hardware context of this research was set on a virtual
machine consisting of 25.44GiB of memory, eight CPUs, and 32GB of storage. An ideal
hardware context would include dedicated components that accelerate machine learning,
however the more realistic conditions for the research were average specifications for the
machine. The methods and techniques used in the context of this research were targeted
towards the Python language, using the existing libraries available. This included Sci-Kit
Learn, Pandas, and the Macholibre project. This context was chosen due to the author’s
familiarity with the language and the large open-source community support of those projects.
The goal context was focused on the research goals stated previously. The budget context of
this research was set to be minimal; in an ideal context for applying this research, a budget
would allow for the purchase of hardware, software, and additional workers. This budgetary
context impacted the benignware applications chosen.
Stakeholders account for the final context of this research. The stakeholders involved
were the primary investigator and the dissertation committee. In the envisioned employment
context, the stakeholders include end users of macOS and security administrators of systems
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running macOS. Both an end user and a security administrator have an interest in the security
of the systems that they are responsible for. Many end users would be represented by a proxy
stakeholder, such as a company that provides anti-malware software, whether that is Apple
itself through its Xprotect service or a third party.

Results
This section presents the results of the research. The first discussion is on the results of
the artifacts generated. This includes the characteristics of the repositories of malware and
benignware gathered and the Python files developed. The second discussion concerns the
results of the context, including the experience of developing the methods and techniques of
dataset building and feature engineering. The third discussion reviews the results of the
machine learning algorithms. This discussion will include the optimized hyperparameters,
features, and model performance.

Artifact and Context Results
The repository of malicious samples is the set of malware files that were downloaded
from the various malware repositories. Altogether, there were 3,502 samples in the dataset.
This number includes both packed and unpacked samples of both malware and benignware.
As described in Chapter Three, there were 1,296 samples from Virus Total, Objective-See,
and Virus Share. The file sizes of the malware samples had a minimum value of 9,072 bytes,
a maximum value of 68,371,834 bytes, and a mean value of 1,579,679.81 bytes. The entropy
values of the malware samples had a minimum of 0.45049, a maximum of 7.99832, and a
mean of 5.73400.
As part of the pre-processing phase of the research methodology, the filetype of the
downloaded samples was checked to validate that they were Mach-O format. After this check,
only 978 were valid Mach-O files. The remainder were of various other types, including Java
archives, shell scripts, or disk images. A limitation of this approach was not mounting disk
images and looking for Mach-O files contained within. As mentioned previously, the
repository of samples that were collected for this research are not published but may be shared
with other researchers upon request. In addition to the actual malware samples, a corpus of
JSON files describing the malware samples was produced. Of the valid Mach-O files, six
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were not able to be parsed, resulting in 972 JSON files. The parsing failed due to load
command sizes not being a multiple of eight, indicating a malformed header. A further
processing step was to pack the malware samples. Losses in samples occurred during packing
and parsing of packed files. Due to these losses, there were 901 packed JSON files. The
corpus of malware JSON files are published on Github.
The repository of benign samples is the set of benign software files that were present
on an installation of macOS or downloaded from the Mac App Store and the Softronic
website. Programs that were installed to the /usr/bin directory of macOS were included as part
of the dataset. This directory contained 1,208 files. The UPX utility was successful in packing
the files, however, macholibre was incapable of parsing the results due to misalignment in
header bytes. There were 859 programs that were downloaded from the Mac App Store and
Softronic. There were nine failures in parsing, resulting in 850 benign samples. Only 443
benign samples were successfully packed. The file sizes of the benign samples had a
minimum value of 24,064 bytes, a maximum value of 183,466,752 bytes, and a mean value of
3,991,498.61 bytes. The entropy values of the benign samples had a minimum of 1.09432, a
maximum of 7.35195, and a mean of 5.14081.
The parse_machos.py file was developed to parse Mach-O files. The contents of this
file are documented in Appendix A and on Github.com. The script takes four arguments: a
path in which to look for Mach-O files, a list of passwords to use when trying to unzip
archives, a temporary path for extracted zip file contents, and an output directory in which to
store the resulting JSON files. The initial version of the script did not use threading, which
resulted in an execution time exceeding 20 hours to parse the malicious sample repository.
Once threading was added, the execution time was reduced to under four hours. The initial
version also did not incorporate the Virus Total family lookup. By the time that this
functionality was incorporated into the script, the author's academic access to the Virus Total
API had expired. The non-academic API access is limited to four requests per minute and a
total of 500 requests per day. With 978 samples to query and a limit of four requests per
minute, the process of enriching the dataset with Virus Total detection information added 65
hours to the dataset building time. Only two of the malicious samples did not have a Virus
Total analysis result.
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The initial method and technique for aggregating the JSON files was a separate Python
file. However, the logic for performing that aggregation was instead ported to the
machoml.ipynb Jupyter Notebook. By performing these actions inside of the notebook,
experimentation with transformations of data during import could be performed more quickly.
During the import, a check is performed on the JSON file to identify whether a universal
Mach-O was parsed. If so, the JSON is further parsed to retrieve both architectures present in
the universal file. These architectures are then separately parsed as unique programs. The
parsing that is performed for each program retrieves the name, size, entropy, number of load
commands, and size of load commands. The Mach-O flags are parsed into separate values.
For the purposes of supervised classification, the filename of each parsed JSON is checked. If
the filename contains the string "packed", that is saved to set the target values during machine
learning. A similar check is performed on the "malware" attribute that was manually added
when parsing these files in the notebook. The family feature was created through Virus Total
results. In the notebook, a check is made for a valid result; if one existed, the McAfee result
was selected first, and if not available, the Microsoft result was selected. If neither McAfee
nor Microsoft had a result, or a Virus Total scan was not present, the value was set to "No
family". The load commands were retrieved from the JSON file. As noted in Chapter Three,
there were challenges with using these as features given the available resource constraints.
Ultimately, the segment names and dynamic library names were used.
The size of the dataframe used in the notebook was minimized through the previously
discussed methods. The dataframe consisted of one Float64 type, 2,828 Int64 type, one bool
type, and two string type. The memory usage of the dataframe was 85.2 MB. During machine
learning training, memory usage was monitored through JupyterLab. Peak memory usage was
just over 4.38 GB. The method used to create the target "y" values was to assign y1, y2, and
y3 according to the feature columns. These were then passed to the sklearn train_test_split()
method with a constant random_state value to reuse the X_train and X_test values.

from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
X = df.drop(['packed','name','malware','family','packed_malware'], axis=1)
y1 = df['packed']
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y1 = y1.astype('int')
X_train, X_test, y1_train, y1_test = train_test_split(X, y1, test_size = 0.2, random_state = 42)
y2 = df['packed_malware']
y2 = y2.astype('int')
X_train, X_test, y2_train, y2_test = train_test_split(X, y2, test_size = 0.2, random_state = 42)
y3 = df['family']
X_train, X_test, y3_train, y3_test = train_test_split(X, y3, test_size = 0.2, random_state = 42)
Figure 21: Code to create target "y" values
The dataset that was created had 2,832 columns and 3,502 entries. Chapter Three
discussed the techniques used to reduce the dimensionality of the data. SelectKBest was used
with both chi2 and mutual information scores. Principal Component Analysis was used to
determine the 95th percentile of variance. SelectFromModel was used with an
ExtraTreesClassifier. Sequential Forward Selection was used with an SVM classifier. Finally,
mutual information was used. Each of these techniques were applied against the binary
classification y values, and SelectFromModel was applied against both the binary
classification and multiclass problems. Overlap occurred, for example, where a feature was
present in both the y1 and y2 results. For each selection method, a set was created with the
individual y results to establish a secondary feature set for tuning. The full list of selected
features by selection method are shown in Appendix B.
The skb_20_y1, skb_20_y2, skb_20c_y1, skb_20c_y2, mi_y1, and mi_y2 feature sets
contained 20 elements. The skb_20_set contained 23 elements, the skb_20c_set contained 21
elements, and the mi_set contained 22 elements. The sfm_y1 contained 118 elements, the
sfm_y2 contained 123 elements, the sfm_y3 contained 191 elements, and the sfm_set
contained 216 elements. The pca contained 245 elements. The mi_y1 and mi_y2 contained 20
elements, and the mi_set contained 22 elements. The sfs_y1 contained 6 elements, sfs_y2
contained 3 elements, sfs_y3 contained 28 elements, and sfs_set contained 32 elements.

Machine Learning Results
The hyperparameter tuning process involved supplying each feature set to the
GridSearchCV implementation. GridSearchCV was applied against the y-values for each
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research question. For each of the MLP classifier’s y values, the PCA feature set performed
best. For the SVM classifier, the PCA set performed best for y1, the skb_20_set performed
best for y2, and the sfs_set performed best for y3. The RFC classifier had skb_20_set perform
best for y1 and the sfs_y3 feature set perform best for both y2 and y3. For the DTC classifier,
skb_20_set performed best for y1, sfm_y1 performed best for y2, and skb_20_y2 performed
best for y3. For the KNN classifier, the skb_20_set performed best for y1 and y2 and the
skb_20_y1 performed best for y3. These results are summarized in Table 4.
Y1

Y2

Y3

MLP pca

pca

pca

SVM pca

skb_20_set sfs_set

RFC skb_20_set sfs_y3

sfs_y3

DTC skb_20_set sfm_y1

skb_20_y2

KNN skb_20_set skb_20_set skb_20_y1
Table 4: The best feature set for each model by y-value.

In the subsequent sections, each model will be presented. The first paragraph will
describe the hyperparameters for each y-problem. This will include the observed time to train
each model. Then the results for each y-problem tested by the model will be presented. For
the y1 and y2 problems, the accuracy and F1-Scores are shown along with the average
precision for the PR curve and area under the curve (AUC) for ROC curve. For the y3
problem, the weighted average accuracy and F1-Scores are presented along with the correct
family classifications. A confusion matrix, PR curve, and ROC curve will be shown for the y1
and y2 problems, and a confusion matrix heat map will be shown for the y3 problem.
Multi-Layer Perception Performance
The MLP Classifier with GridSearchCV produced the following results. For the
y1_train set, the best alpha value was 1e-05, the hidden_layer_sizes value was 11, the
max_iter value was 1000, and the solver was adam. For the y2_train set, the best alpha value
was 0.0001, the hidden_layer_sizes value was 11, the max_iter was 1000, and the solver was
adam. For the y3_train set, the best alpha value was 0.01, the hidden_layer_sizes value was
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12, the max_iter value was 1000, and the solver was adam. The alpha value displayed the
most variety across the hyperparameter search, with each y-value displaying an alpha value at
least one order of magnitude in difference. The hidden_layer_size value was consistent for the
y1 and y2 values but differed by one for the y3 value. The max_iter and solver values were
consistent for all y-values. The time to complete GridSearchCV for y1 was 1:21:19.015741,
y2 was 1:12:35.199385, and for y3 was 7:19:37.310535. The total elapsed time for
GridSearchCV across all y-values, feature sets, and hyperparameters for MLP was
9:52:17.525661. These results are shown in Table 5.
alpha
y1 1e-05

hidden_layer_sizes max_iter random_state solver features
11

1000

42

adam

pca

y2 0.0001 11

1000

42

adam

pca

y3 0.01

1000

42

adam

pca

12

Table 5: Chosen hyperparameters for MLP.
The accuracy for MLPClassifier in testing against the y1 problem was 100%. The F1Score was also 100%. There were 477 true positives, zero false positives, zero false negatives,
and 224 true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure
22. The average precision for this model was 100% and the area under the curve was 1.0.
These results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 23.

Figure 22: MLPClassifier confusion matrix for y1.
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Figure 23: MLPClassifier PR and ROC curves for y1.
The accuracy for MLPClassifier in testing against the y2 problem was 94.44%. The
F1-Score was 88.88%. There were 506 true positives, 34 false positives, five false negatives,
and 156 true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure
24. The average precision for this model was 85% and the area under the curve was 0.97.
These results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 25.

Figure 24: MLPClassifier confusion matrix for y2.
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Figure 25: MLPClassifier PR and ROC curves for y2.

The accuracy for MLPClassifier in testing against the y3 problem was 73.04%. The
F1-Score was 62.01%. There were 511 results correctly classified as "No family" and one
result correctly classified as OSX/iWorm.a. There were no other families correctly classified.
These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 26.
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Figure 26: MLPClassifier confusion matrix heat map for y3.

Support Vector Machine Performance
The SVM hyperparameter search produced the following results. For the y1_train set,
the best C value was 1, the best gamma value was 0.0001, and the best kernel value was rbf.
For the y2_train set, the best C value was 100, the best gamma value was 0.0001, and the best
kernel value was rbf. For the y3_train set, the best C value was 100, the best gamma value
was 1, and the best kernel value was rbf. The C values were consistent across y2 and y3 with
a two-order of magnitude difference from y1. The gamma values for y1 and y2 were the
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same, with four-order of magnitude difference from y3. The kernel value was consistent
across all y-values. The time to complete GridSearchCV for y1 was 0:02:04.160813, y2 was
0:02:22.454162, and y3 was 8:23:47.917647. The total elapsed time for GridSearchCV across
all y-values, feature sets, and hyperparameters for SVM was 8:28:14.533518. The
hyperparameter search time for the y3 value was considerably larger than for the other values,
as 6,216 classifiers were fit due to the OneVsOneClassifier. These results are shown in Table
6.
C
y1 1

gamma kernel features
0.0001

rbf

pca

y2 100 0.0001

rbf

skb_20_set

y3 100 1

rbf

sfs_set

Table 6: Chosen hyperparameters for SVM.

The accuracy for SVC in testing against the y1 problem was 93.44%. The F1-Score
was 89.05%. There were 468 true positives, nine false positives, 37 false negatives, and 187
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 27. The
average precision for this model was 94% and the area under the curve was 0.95. These
results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 28.

Figure 27: SVC confusion matrix for y1.
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Figure 28: SVC PR and ROC curves for y1.

The accuracy for SVC in testing against the y2 problem was 95.58%. The F1-Score
was 90.10%. There were 529 true positives, 11 false positives, 20 false negatives, and 141
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 29. The
average precision for this model was 89% and the area under the curve was 0.96. These
results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 30.

Figure 29: SVC confusion matrix for y2.
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Figure 30: SVC PR and ROC curves for y2.

The accuracy for SVC in testing against the y3 problem was 76.46%. The F1-Score
was 69.07%. There were 500 results correctly classified as "No family", one result correctly
classified as OSX/AoboKeyLogger, two results correctly classified as OSX/EvilQuest.b, three
results correctly classified as OSX/Flashfake.g, one result as OSX/Genieo.i, two results as
OSX/Getshell.a, two results as OSX/Longate, one result as OSX/PhantomEvasion.a, one
result as OSX/VirRansom.a, one result as OSX/iWorm.a, two results as RDN/Generic.ao, four
results as as RDN/Generic.gby, three results as RDN/Generic.gbz, and 13 results as
RDN/Generic.osx. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 31.
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Figure 31: SVC confusion matrix heat map for y3.

K-Nearest Neighbors Performance
The KNN hyperparameter search produced the following results. For the y1_train set,
the best metric was Manhattan, the best n_neighbors value was 9, and the best weights value
was distance. For the y2_train set, the best metric was also Manhattan, the best n_neighbors
was 8, and the best weights was distance. For the y3_train set, the best metric was
Minkowski, the best n_neighbors was 9, and the best weights was distance. The binary
classification problems shared the same metric value in Manhattan, while the multiclass
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problem's metric was Minkowski. The y1 and y3 problems had the same n_neighbors value of
9, while the y3 problem had n_neighbors of 8. The weights value was consistent across all
problems. The time to complete GridSearchCV for y1 0:01:16.354455, for y2 it was
0:01:15.758326, and for y3 it was 0:01:18.267661. The total elapsed time for GridSearchCV
across all y-values, feature sets, and hyperparameters for KNN was 0:03:50.380947. These
results are shown in Table 7.
metric

n_neighbors weights

features

y1 manhattan

9

distance skb_20_set

y2 manhattan

8

distance skb_20_set

y3 minkowski 9

distance skb_20_y1

Table 7: Chosen hyperparameters for KNN.

The accuracy for KNN in testing against the y1 problem was 94.72%. The F1-Score
was 91.61%. There were 462 true positives, 15 false positives, 22 false negatives, and 202
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure
32Figure 29. The average precision for this model was 95% and the area under the curve was
0.98. These results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 33Figure 30.

Figure 32: KNN confusion matrix for y1.
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Figure 33: KNN PR and ROC curves for y1.

The accuracy for KNN in testing against the y2 problem was 94.72%. The F1-Score
was 88.54%. There were 521 true positives, 19 false positives, 18 false negatives, and 143
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 34. The
average precision for this model was 90% and the area under the curve was 0.96. These
results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 35.

Figure 34: KNN confusion matrix for y2.
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Figure 35: KNN PR and ROC curves for y2.

The accuracy for KNN in testing against the y3 problem was 71.90%. The F1-Score
was 68.58%. There were 462 results correctly classified as "No family", one result correctly
classified as OSX/Adload.c, one as OSX/AoboKeyLogger, one as OSX/Cimpli, two as
OSX/EvilQuest.b, three as OSX/Flashfake.g, one as OSX/Generic.s, one as OSX/Genieo.i,
two as OSX/Getshell.a, two as OSX/Longate, one as OSX/OpinionSpy.a, five as
OSX/ThiefQuest.a, one as OSX/Wirenet.a, two as RDN/Generic.ao, three as
RDN/Generic.gby, three as RDN/Generic.gbz, one as RDN/Generic.gci, and 12 as
RDN/Generic.osx. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown Figure 36.
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Figure 36: KNN confusion matrix heat map for y3.

Random Forest Classifier Performance
The RFC hyperparameter search produced the following results. For the y1_train set,
the best criterion was gini, the max_depth was 4, the max_features value was auto, and the
n_estimators was 100. For the y2_train set, the best criterion was also gini, the max_depth
was 8, the max_features value was log2, and the n_estimators value was 200. For the y3_train
set, the best criterion was entropy, the max_depth was 8, the max_features value was auto,
and the n_estimators value was 400. The criterion value was the same for the y1 and y2
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values, but different for the y3 values. The max_depth value was consistent for the y2 and y3
values but differed for y1. The max_features value was the same for the y1 and y3 values but
differed for y2. The n_estimators value was different for each problem set. The time to
complete GridSearchCV for y1 was 0:29:26.400182, for y2 it was 0:24:28.110119, and for y3
it was 0:38:04.753066. The total elapsed time for GridSearchCV across all y-values, feature
sets, and hyperparameters for RFC was 1:31:59.264052. These results are shown in Table 8.
criterion max_depth max_features n_estimators features
y1 gini

4

auto

100

skb_20_set

y2 entropy

8

log2

100

sfs_y3

y3 entropy

8

auto

300

sfs_y3

Table 8: Chosen hyperparameters for RFC.

The accuracy for RFC in testing against the y1 problem was 100%. The F1-Score was
also 100%. There were 477 true positives, zero false positives, zero false negatives, and 224
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 37. The
average precision for this model was 100% and the area under the curve was 1.00. These
results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 38Figure 35.

Figure 37: RFC confusion matrix for y1.
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Figure 38: RFC PR and ROC curves for y1.

The accuracy for RFC in testing against the y2 problem was 97.43%. The F1-Score
was 94.61%. There were 525 true positives, 15 false positives, three false negatives, and 158
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 39. The
average precision for this model was 99% and the area under the curve was 1.00. These
results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 40.

Figure 39: RFC confusion matrix for y2.
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Figure 40: RFC PR and ROC curves for y2.

The accuracy for RFC in testing against the y3 problem was 75.75%. The F1-Score
was 67.94%. There were 502 results correctly classified as "No family", one result correctly
classified as OSX/AoboKeyLogger, one as OSX/EvilQuest.b, three as as OSX/Flashfake.g,
two as OSX/Getshell.a, two as OSX/Longate, one as OSX/PhantomEvasion.a, two as
RDN/Generic.ao, four as RDN/Generic.gby, one as RDN/Generic.gbz, and 12 as
RDN/Generic.osx. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown Figure 41.
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Figure 41: RFC confusion matrix heat map for y3.

Decision Tree Classifier Performance
The DTC hyperparameter search produced the following results. For the y1_train set,
the best criterion was gini, the max_depth was 1, the min_samples_leaf was 1, and the splitter
was best. For the y2_train set, the best criterion was entropy, the max_depth was 18, the
min_samples_leaf was 1, and the splitter was random. For the y3_train set, the criterion was
entropy, the max_depth was 14, the min_samples_leaf was 1, and the splitter was random.
The criterion value was unique for y1 but the same for y2 and y3. The max_depth was unique
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for each problem. The min_samples_leaf was consistent across all problems. The splitter was
unique for y1 but the same for y2 and y3. The time to complete GridSearchCV for y1 was
0:03:41.879369, for y2 it was 0:07:31.038532, and for y3 it was 0:04:46.069768. The total
elapsed time for GridSearchCV across all y-values, feature sets, and hyperparameters for
DTC was 0:12:16.539674. These results are shown in Table 9.
criterion max_depth min_samples_leaf splitter

features

y1 gini

1

1

best

y2 entropy

18

1

random sfm_y1

y3 entropy

14

1

random skb_20_y2

skb_20_set

Table 9: Chosen hyperparameters for DTC.

The accuracy for DTC in testing against the y1 problem was 100%. The F1-Score was
also 100%. There were 477 true positives, zero false positives, zero false negatives, and 224
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure
42Figure 34. The average precision for this model was 100% and the area under the curve was
1.00. These results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 43Figure 35.

Figure 42: DTC confusion matrix for y1.
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Figure 43: DTC PR and ROC curves for y1.

The accuracy for DTC in testing against the y2 problem was 95.44%. The F1-Score
was 90.30%. There were 520 true positives, 20 false positives, 12 false negatives, and 149
true negatives. These results are summarized in the confusion matrix shown in Figure 44. The
average precision for this model was 88% and the area under the curve was 0.98. These
results are summarized in the curves shown in Figure 45.

Figure 44: DTC confusion matrix for y2.
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Figure 45: DTC PR and ROC curves for y2.

The accuracy for DTC in testing against the y3 problem was 72.04%. The F1-Score
was 67.84%. There were 470 results correctly classified as "No family", one result correctly
classified as OSX/Adload.c, one as OSX/Cimpli, three as OSX/Flashfake.g, one as
OSX/Genieo.i, two as OSX/Getshell.a, one as OSX/NetWeirdRC, one as
OSX/PhantomEvasion.a, one as OSX/ThiefQuest.a, one as OSX/ThiefQuest.a, one as
OSX/Yontoo.gen.a, two as RDN/Generic.ao, five as RDN/Generic.gby, three as
RDN/Generic.gbz, and 12 as RDN/Generic.osx. These results are summarized in the
confusion matrix heat map shown Figure 46.
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Figure 46: DTC confusion matrix heat map for y3.

The overall performance of these models is shown in Table 10. The accuracy, F1Score, average precision, and area under the ROC curve are shown. A "-" is used for the y3
problems where an average precision and AUC are not available.
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Model Problem Accuracy

F1-Score

AP

AUC

1.0

1.00

1.00

y2

0.9443651925820257 0.8888888888888891 0.85

0.97

y3

0.7303851640513552 0.6200911751276902 -

-

SVC y1

0.9343794579172611 0.8904761904761905 0.94

0.95

y2

0.9557774607703281 0.9009584664536742 0.89

0.96

y3

0.7646219686162625 0.6907248587192135 -

-

KNN y1

0.9472182596291013 0.9160997732426304 0.95

0.98

y2

0.9472182596291013 0.8854489164086687 0.90

0.96

y3

0.7189728958630528 0.685784620535456

-

-

1.0

1.00

1.00

y2

0.9743223965763196 0.9461077844311377 0.99

1.00

y3

0.7574893009985735 0.6793600884173422 -

-

1.0

1.00

1.00

0.88

0.98

MLP y1

RFC y1

DTC y1

1.0

1.0

1.0

y2

0.9543509272467903 0.903030303030303

y3

0.7203994293865906 0.6784015873174217 -

-

Table 10: Summarized performance results for the models.
Discussion
The process of building the dataset and feature engineering was the most timeconsuming phase of this research. Gathering malicious Mach-O samples was made difficult
due to the lack of a single source curated collection. Wardle's Objective-See collection was
the most curated but contained relatively few samples. The Virus Total collection had the
most promise, as it is perhaps the most well-known and used malware submission website
available on the Internet. However, their archives of Mach-O samples were often empty. It
was surprising that a single person, Wardle, had curated 136 samples compared to Virus
Total's 41 samples. Virus Share provided most of the samples used for this research and was
thus the most useful malware repository, but the manual effort required to search for samples
increased the dataset building time. There could be programmatic access to the API for
querying files, but if it exists, that information is not documented.
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The file sizes and entropy values of the malicious and benign samples match the
intuited proportions. The mean file size of a benign sample was almost 4MB whereas the
mean file size of a malicious sample was 1.5MB. Malware is generally optimized for size so
as not to impact the resource utilization of a victim computer, although there has been
research showing that antivirus may be evaded with a sufficiently large sample to scan.
Surprisingly, the mean file size of a packed sample was larger than that of the unpacked
sample mean at 2,925,220 to 457,394 bytes. The mean entropy of a benign sample was 5.14
and for a malicious sample it was 5.73. On a logarithmic scale the entropy is a noninsignificant difference. The difference between the mean entropy values of the packed and
unpacked samples matched intuition: the unpacked mean was 5.40 while the packed mean
was 7.38.
Access to the Virus Total API was requested too early in the research process. By the
time that the literature review was complete, the Virus Total academic API had expired. This
resulted in increased wait time to abide by API request quotas to query the detected malware
family to gather the data necessary to answer research question three. Future researchers
should request academic Virus Total API access closer to the completion of their dataset
building methodology to make use of the increased API calls.
Extracting information from a Mach-O file was made easier by the Macholibre library.
The process of converting that information to features suitable for machine learning
algorithms was made difficult due to the format. To recap, Macholibre generates a JSON
object with nested objects that contain string values. The Pandas library has functions to
import JSON objects as a dataframe, but these methods require knowing key names and that
new additions to a dataframe contain the same key names. It was not possible to know what
key names would exist, as those names were dependent on the sections and dynamic libraries
used by the individual Mach-O files. While most of these challenges were solved, the
functions imported from each dynamic library were eventually discarded and the lack of that
information for the research's feature space was accepted as a limitation. In retrospect, the
Dask project could have been used to scale memory usage more appropriately to avoid
memory exhaustion during the hyperparameter tuning process, and therefore allowing for the
incorporation of that discarded information.
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There was a total of 18 collections of features, five of which were derived through
performing set() on other feature sets. The largest collection of selected features was 245 from
the PCA method. Based on the literature review of malware analysis techniques, some
features were expected to play an important role in the classification process. Those include
number of load commands (nlcs), entropy, the presence of segments with UPX in the name,
and the file size. The nlcs feature was present in all 18 of the feature collections. The size of
load commands (slcs) was present in 17 of the 18 collections. Entropy values for the overall
file were present in 13 of the 18 feature collections. Entropy values for specific segments,
e.g., segment__DATA_entropy, were present in 16 of the 18 collections. The file size was
present in 13 of the 18 collections. Segment names that contain the string "upx" were present
in 15 of the 18 collections. The top selected segment name was
segment_segment___TEXT___text, followed by a three-way tie of
segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT, segment_segment___TEXT___cstring, and
segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info. There was only one dynamic library feature in
the top ten most selected features; dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib appeared in a nine-way tie
for sixth place having been selected in 13 of the 18 collections. The full count of each selected
feature can be found in Appendix C.
Despite the intuited importance of entropy, the overall entropy was not selected by
PCA. Interestingly, PCA performed best for each y-problem in the MLP model. PCA was also
selected as the best feature set for the SVM y1 problem. The same results are found for the
slcs feature. However, every solution incorporated at least one segment entropy value. The
size feature was not selected for PCA nor for SelectKBest in response to y1. This means that
size was not relevant for answering any question with MLP, for SVM to answer y1, nor for
KNN to answer y3. The top selected feature name was not selected for Forward Selection for
the y3 problem, which means it was not a factor for solution by RFC in answering the y2 or
y3 problems. The segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT feature was not selected by PCA, so
it was not relevant in answering any question by MLP nor by SVM in answering the y1
question.
After reviewing the features selected, their relevance in answering the y-problems, and
performance, some changes can be recommended. First, there are potential features from the
Mach-O header that were not utilized in this research, including software signature and
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notarization. Additional feature engineering could have been applied to calculate the number
of segments and dynamic libraries present in a binary. The information of the top selected
features could have been combined to create a meta collection. Given the high-performance
scores against the y1 problem, these additions would likely not have impacted the models
when testing against that problem. However, there could have been an effect in the
performance of the models against the y2 and y3 problems.
Multiple models received accuracy and F1-Scores of 1.0 for the y1 problem. These
models are Multi-layer Perceptron, Random Forest, and Decision Trees. Of those models,
Decision Trees completed training in the shortest period of time. The K-Nearest Neighbors
model trained against the y1 problem the fastest overall, but its scores were considerably
lower. The Random Forest model had an accuracy of 0.9743 and F1-Score of 0.9461 for the
y2 problem, claiming the highest scores. However, its training time was slower than KNN,
SVM, and DTC, being faster only than MLP. The Support Vector Machine model performed
the best against the y3 problem. However, none of the models had an F1-Score above 70%.
KNN again trained the fastest, followed closely by DTC and then RFC. Trailing much further
behind in training time were MLP and SVM. These results are presented in table form in
Appendices D, E, and F.

Summary
This chapter presented the results obtained as part of this research. First, the case
study's generated research artifacts, research context, and stakeholders was presented to
identify what was created, the context influencing the work, and to identify the stakeholders.
The features selected by each method were presented, along with the feature set that was
assigned to each model and y-problem during the hyperparameter tuning process. Next, the
performance of each model was reviewed, to include its scoring, best hyperparameters, and
training time. These performance metrics were visualized using confusion matrices,
Precision-Recall curves, and Receiver Operator Characteristics curves. Finally, there was a
discussion of the process of performing the research to include dataset building, feature
extraction, and machine learning performance.

99

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides the conclusion of the research conducted as part of this
dissertation. First, the results of the research are reviewed to answer the three research
questions pertaining to the application of machine learning to the classification of packed
Mach-O malware. Next, recommendations are provided based on the results of the research.
These recommendations pertain to future researchers seeking to perform similar research
using machine learning to classify malware. Recommendations are also provided for the
employment of models in more robust contexts, such as in part of a malware analysis pipeline.
Finally, future work is suggested to continue studying ways to defend computers and
information against malware threats.

Answering the Research Questions
This dissertation sought to answer three questions:
1. Can software designed for macOS be correctly identified as packed software using
a machine learning algorithm?
2. Can a machine learning model discriminate between packed benignware and
packed malware?
3. Can a machine learning model ascertain the family that malware belongs to and
thus the potential impact that it can have?
As a reminder, research question two was originally, "Can software designed for
macOS that is packed be correctly grouped with other samples using the same packing
algorithm using a machine learning algorithm?" Due to the single packer available, this
question was unanswerable in this dissertation.
The first research question can be answered with the results of the y1 problem. The y1
problem has a target variable of the “packed” feature. This feature is set to one when the
sample is packed and it is set to zero when the sample is not packed. The target variables in
this research are known and thus supervised machine learning algorithms can be used to
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classify unknown samples. The scores to the y1 problem indicate that software designed for
macOS can be correctly identified as packed software using a machine learning algorithm.
Three models achieved perfect scores of 1.0 in both accuracy and F1-Score when classifying
samples as part of the y1 problem. The Multi-layer Perception, Random Forest, and Decision
Tree models all achieved this score. The K-Nearest Neighbors scored slightly under 0.95 for
accuracy, but only 0.9161 in F1. The Support Vector Machine model performed the worst;
however, its accuracy was a still respectable 0.9344 while its F1 was 0.8905. The answer to
this question is yes.
The second research question can be answered with the results of the y2 problem. The
y2 problem has a target variable composed of a logical AND using the “packed” and
“malware” features. The “packed” feature is the same as described in the y1 problem. The
“malware” feature is set to one when the sample is malware, and it is set to zero when it is not
malware. Since a logical AND is performed, the target variable is therefore one when both the
“packed” and “malware” features are set to one, and it is set to zero when either of the source
features are set to zero. Supervised techniques could be applied to this problem as well. Based
on the scores achieved during this research, machine learning can be used to correctly classify
packed malware. The highest score for the y2 problem was achieved by a Random Forest
Classifier, with an accuracy of 0.9743 and an F1-Score of 0.9461. The Support Vector
Machine and Decision Tree classifiers achieved accuracy scores greater than 0.95 and F1
scores above 0.90. The Multi-layer Perceptron and K-Nearest Neighbor models had accuracy
scores slightly over 0.94 but F1 scores below 0.90. The answer to this question is yes.
The third research question can be answered with the results of the y3 problem. The
y3 problem has a target variable of the “family” feature. The “family” feature is set to “No
family” if the sample is not classified as part of a malware family, or to the appropriate family
provided by Virus Total. Supervised techniques could be applied to this problem by virtue of
retrieving and setting the “family” variable. Based on the results of the y3 problem, this
question cannot be adequately answered. The highest performing model was Support Vector
Machine with an accuracy of 0.7646 and an F1-Score of 0.6907. These results are better than
random chance, but there are a significant number of misclassifications. No model had an
accuracy of lower than 0.70 and no F1-Score lower than 0.62. A review of the confusion
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matrix heat maps for the models show that “No family” dispositions are often correctly
classified, but other families experience more errors. The answer to this question is no.

Recommendations
Building a dataset of malware on which to perform machine learning experiments can
be a challenging process. Malware repositories are one avenue that a researcher can use to
acquire samples. When going this route, the researcher needs to consider the format of the
malware and limitations imposed by the repository. The Windows PE format has many more
samples available which can allow the researcher to build a larger corpus of data for machine
learning. In this case, a single repository may have enough samples for the experiments.
Formats such as Mach-O or other niche platforms are rarer and thus may require that multiple
repositories be used to acquire a sufficient number of samples to perform meaningful
experiments. The limitations imposed by a repository owner can impact the timeline of
research and needs to be accounted for in planning. A limitation in API usage can slow efforts
to search for, acquire, and label data. A limitation in a repository's number of samples can
force a researcher to use multiple platforms to build the necessary dataset. An alternative
method that was considered but not employed was a honeypot. A honeypot acts as a
deliberately vulnerable system to entice attackers and can be used to collect malware (Sun,
Wang, Ren, Zhu, & Liu, 2008). When collecting benignware samples, consideration should
be given to the types of malware that are expected. The benignware samples should
incorporate functionality similar to malware to provide a more robust training set. For
example, when researching remote access tools, benignware that provides remote access
should be acquired. Similarly, when researching ransomware, benignware that has the ability
to encrypt files should be acquired. There are many websites from which to download benign
samples and they rarely have the limitations to impose on users like malware repositories do.
When using stores such as the Mac App Store, researchers should use a "burner" account
created for the sole purpose of downloading samples.
The process of building models may not go exactly as planned. Researchers should be
flexible in adjusting the techniques that they use through feature engineering, selection, and
model tuning, as planned methods for interacting with the data may not be feasible in a given
context. Some suggestions are to have alternative ways to handle data, to consider system
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scaling, and to explore data chunking. As discussed in previous chapters, there are multiple
ways to represent information for the purposes of using them as a feature. Researchers may
need to experiment with the formats that they use to find the one which works best in their
context. The system that was used for this research was limited in the hardware that was
available on which to construct a virtual machine. However, cloud-based platforms can enable
a researcher to scale their systems vertically. Alternatively, projects such as Dask may let the
researcher scale horizontally if they have multiple systems available to them. Chunking
methods, whether through Pandas or Dask, could be used to address resource constraints in
the model building process.
This research was performed with the contextual vision of being part of a malware
analysis pipeline. As a recommendation for employment, the models should be used near the
beginning phases of such a pipeline. For example, consider a pipeline that consists of the
phases: ingestion, preprocess, queue for analysis, analyze, and report. The ingestion phase
might involve uploading an executable sample into the system. The preprocessing phase
might consist of extracting information from the sample for quick decisions such as a file hash
or Yara rule application for comparison to known malware. The models developed for this
research would be useful after this step. If the sample is not known malicious, the model can
aid in determining whether and/or at what priority to queue the sample for analysis. The y2
model can be used to classify the incoming sample as packed malware. A positive result
indicates that the sample is malware and thus may require further analysis, and also indicates
that since it is packed, analysis may require more time. The analyst can use this information to
prioritize their work based on the time available and expected time to complete the analysis.

Future Work
This research used supervised techniques. Future work may want to explore the use of
unsupervised techniques to answer the research questions. In this dissertation, both
benignware and malware samples were packed as part of the dataset building methodology.
This allowed the dataset to be labeled appropriately. However, there may be artificialities
introduced through a homogenously packed dataset that may not reflect how packers are
employed in the real-world context as shown by Aghakhani et al (2020). If a researcher uses a
dataset building methodology that incorporates a honeypot, they may not be able to determine
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whether samples are packed without manual intervention. Unsupervised and semi-supervised
techniques may be useful in that scenario.
Research question three was answered negatively in this research. More research into
family classification may be warranted. The dataset of families was highly unbalanced as the
"No family" class had an order of magnitude more samples than the other classes. SMOTE
may be a method of generating class samples. There are likely other feature sets that are
useful in this classification problem that were not considered as part of this research.
Additionally, the volume of malware samples may be expanded with a long-term approach to
dataset building that captures more samples. Given the trends identified in Chapter One, it
stands to reason that as time goes on, more malware targeting macOS will be released, and
future researchers will have more samples available to them.
The original research question two was not answerable in this research. Future
researchers may want to study how packers may be differentiated on macOS using machine
learning techniques. As discussed in the previous section, Mach-O malware is likely to
continue growing. As antimalware defeats common Mach-O malware, attackers are likely to
use packers to make analysis harder. This could result in more diversity of packers to study on
the platform. Researchers may also acquire Keypress, a leaked tool from the Hacking Team
group (@osxreverser, 2016). As another approach, packing methods may be developed by the
researcher for the purpose of answering this question.

Summary
This chapter provided the concluding remarks to the research. First, the research
questions were answered. Research questions one and two were answered with yes, while
research question three was answered with no. The original research question two was
determined unanswerable in the current state of packer availability for Mach-O files. Next, the
recommendations for researchers and practitioners were provided. These recommendations
were for building a dataset, building models, and employing the models in a future malware
analysis context. Finally, ideas for future work were provided as inspiration for future
researchers.
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APPENDIX A: PARSE_MACHOS.PY CONTENTS

This appendix contains the code for the parse_machos.py file.
"""
Copyright 2021 Kimo Bumanglag <kimo.bumanglag@trojans.dsu.edu>
"""
import argparse
import py7zr
import zipfile
import magic
import os
import json
import sys
import math
import subprocess
import vt-py
from macholibre import parse
from tqdm import tqdm
from threading import Thread
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Search a filesystem for Mach-O files and parse them to JSON
objects."
)
parser.add_argument(
"--path", default=".", type=str, help="Where to look for Mach-O files."
)
parser.add_argument(
"--passwords",
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default=["infected", "virussign", "infect3d"],
nargs="+",
type=str,
help="Passwords to unzip samples.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--tmpdir",
default="/tmp/samples",
type=str,
help="Where to output extracted zip objects.",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--outdir",
default="/tmp/json_data",
type=str,
help="Where to output JSON objects.",
)
args = parser.parse_args()
if not os.path.isdir(args.tmpdir):
os.mkdir(args.tmpdir)
if not os.path.isdir(args.outdir):
os.mkdir(args.outdir)

def calculateEntropy(filename: str) -> float:
with open(filename, "rb") as f:
byteArray = f.read()
filesize = len(byteArray)
freqList = []
for b in range(256):
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ctr = 0
for byte in byteArray:
if byte == b:
ctr += 1
freqList.append(float(ctr) / filesize)
ent = 0.0
for freq in freqList:
if freq > 0:
ent = ent + freq * math.log(freq, 2)
ent = -ent
return ent

def getFiletype(filename: str) -> str:
"""
Checks whether the provided file is a Macho-O, 7-zip, or Zip.
Argument: a filename to check
Return: one of selected filetypes
"""
filetype = magic.from_file(filename)
if "Mach-O" in filetype:
return "Macho"
elif "7-zip" in filetype:
return "7zip"
elif "Zip" in filetype:
return "Zip"

def unzipFile(filename: str):
"""
Extracts zip files to the specified output directory
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Argument: a zip filename to extract
"""
try:
myzip = zipfile.ZipFile(filename)
except zipfile.BadZipFile:
pass
for password in args.passwords:
try:
myzip.extractall(path=args.tmpdir, pwd=bytes(password, "ascii"))
break
except:
print(f"Failed to extract {filename} with {password}")

def un7zipFile(filename: str):
"""
Extracts 7zip files to the specified output directory
Argument: a 7zip filename to extract
"""
try:
myzip = py7zr.SevenZipFile(filename)
except:
pass
for password in args.passwords:
try:
myzip.extractall(path=args.tmpdir, password=bytes(password, "ascii"))
break
except:
print(f"Failed to extract with {password}")
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def getFiles(path: str, file_list: list):
"""
Walk a given path and add Mach-O, Zip, or 7-Zip files to the appropriate list
Arguments: path - the directory to walk
file_list - a list of lists
"""
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(path):
for filename in files:
fullpath = os.path.join(root, filename)
if not os.access(fullpath, os.R_OK):
continue
filetype = getFiletype(fullpath)
if filetype == "Macho":
file_list["machos"].append(fullpath)
elif filetype == "Zip":
file_list["zips"].append(fullpath)
elif filetype == "7zip":
file_list["7zips"].append(fullpath)

def extractZipLists(file_list: list):
"""
Iterate through the lists containing zip files and extract them
Argument: the list of lists containing the zips and 7zips lists.
"""
for filegroup in file_list:
for filename in file_list["zips"]:
new_thread = Thread(target=unzipFile, args=(filename,))
new_thread.start()
file_list["zips"].remove(filename)
for filename in file_list["7zips"]:
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new_thread = Thread(target=un7zipFile, args=(filename,))
new_thread.start()
file_list["7zips"].remove(filename)

def pack_file(filename: str, sha256: str):
"""
Call subprocess to execute UPX and pack a valid Mach-o
Argument: The filename to pack
"""
basename = f"{sha256}.packed"
out_file = os.path.join(args.outdir, basename)
cmd = ["upx", filename, "-k", f"-o{out_file}"]
process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
fout, ferr = process.communicate()
if not ferr:
return out_file
else:
return False

def parseFile(filename: str):
"""
Iterate the list of Mach-Os and call macholibre.parse against each file
Argument: the list of lists with Mach-O files
"""
try:
print(f"[ ] Parsing {filename}")
data = parse(filename)
data["filepath"] = filename
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data["entropy"] = calculateEntropy(filename)
sha256 = data["hashes"]["sha256"]
vtresults = client.get_object(f"/files/{sha256}")
data["vtresults"] = vtresults
packed = pack_file(filename, sha256)
if packed:
basename = sha256 + ".json"
out_file = os.path.join(args.outdir, basename)
with open(out_file, "w") as f:
f.write(json.dumps(data))
datap = parse(packed)
datap["filepath"] = packed
datap["entropy"] = calculateEntropy(packed)
datap["vtresults"] = vtresults
basenamep = sha256 + ".packed.json"
out_filep = os.path.join(args.outdir, basenamep)
with open(out_filep, "w") as f:
f.write(json.dumps(datap))
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Failed to parse {filename}: {e}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
client = vt.Client("")
file_list = {}
file_list["machos"] = []
file_list["zips"] = []
file_list["7zips"] = []
getFiles(args.path, file_list)
total_files = (
len(file_list["machos"]) + len(file_list["zips"]) + len(file_list["7zips"])
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)
print("Found {0} files".format(total_files))
# extractZipLists(file_list)
getFiles(args.tmpdir, file_list)
print("Total malware: {0}".format(len(file_list["machos"])))
for filename in tqdm(file_list["machos"], bar_format="{l_bar}{bar}"):
new_thread = Thread(target=parseFile, args=(filename,))
new_thread.start()
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APPENDIX B: FEATURES
This appendix contains a table displaying the features that were selected during the
machine learning model building phase.
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Selection Set
skb_20_y1

Features
'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment___DATA', 'slcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___const',
'segment___DATA_size', 'segment___DATA_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper',
'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'entropy',
'segment_segment___DATA___data', 'flag_TWOLEVEL', 'segment___DATA_initprot'

skb_20_y2

'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment___DATA', 'slcs', 'size', 'segment___DATA_size', 'flag_DYLDLINK',
'segment___DATA_vmsize', 'segment_segment___DATA___la_symbol_ptr', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'entropy', 'segment_segment___DATA___data', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment___DATA_initprot'

skb_20_set

'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'segment___DATA_vmsize',
'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'entropy', 'segment___DATA_entropy',
'segment_segment___DATA___la_symbol_ptr', 'segment___DATA', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment___DATA_size', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib',
'slcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper',
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'segment___DATA_initprot', 'segment___DATA_nsects', 'flag_DYLDLINK',
'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'size', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment_segment___DATA___data']
'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'segment___DATA_vmsize',
'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment___DATA',
'segment_segment___TEXT___text', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
'segment___DATA_size', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'slcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment___DATA_initprot', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'flag_DYLDLINK', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'size', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment_segment___DATA___data'
skb_20c_y1

'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'segment___DATA', 'slcs', 'size', 'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'segment___DATA_size',
'flag_DYLDLINK', 'segment___DATA_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_nsects', 'segment___DATA_entropy',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
'segment_segment___TEXT___text', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib',
'segment_segment___DATA___data', 'flag_TWOLEVEL', 'segment___DATA_initprot'

skb_20c_y2

'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment___DATA', 'slcs', 'size', 'segment_segment___TEXT___const',
'segment___DATA_size', 'flag_DYLDLINK', 'segment___DATA_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper',
'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
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'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA___data', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment___DATA_initprot'
skb_20c_set

'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'segment___DATA_vmsize',
'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment___DATA',
'segment_segment___TEXT___text', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
'segment___DATA_size', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'slcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment___DATA_initprot', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'flag_DYLDLINK', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'size', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment_segment___DATA___data'

sfm_y1

'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'segment___PAGEZERO_initprot',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftDarwin.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Versions/C/Foundation',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_capture', 'segment_segment___DATA___common',
'segment_segment___DATA___cfstring', 'segment_segment___DATA___bss', 'nlcs',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation',
'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib',
'segment_segment___OBJC___class', 'segment___IMPORT_size',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_reflstr', 'dylib_@rpath/QtCore.framework/Versions/5/QtCore',
'segment___DATA', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libz.1.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/Versions/A/CoreGraphics',
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'segment_segment___DATA___program_vars', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libgcc_s.1.dylib', 'slcs',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftCore.dylib', 'size', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_imageinfo',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/StoreKit.framework/Versions/A/StoreKit',
'segment_segment___TEXT_qtmetadata', 'segment___DATA_CONST_entropy',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___mod_init_func', 'flag_WEAK_DEFINES', 'dylib_@rpath/Electron
Framework.framework/Electron Framework', 'segment_segment___TEXT___gcc_except_tab',
'segment_segment___OBJC___symbols', 'segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub1',
'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methlist',
'segment___PAGEZERO_maxprot', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___got',
'segment___PAGEZERO_size', 'segment_segment___TEXT___eh_frame', 'segment___DATA_size',
'segment___DATA_CONST_nsects', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___const',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classlist',
'dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Safari.framework/Versions/A/Safari', 'flag_DYLDLINK',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methname', 'segment___DATA_vmsize',
'segment_segment___DATA___la_symbol_ptr', 'segment_segment___DATA___dyld',
'segment___PAGEZERO', 'segment___DATA_nsects', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_selrefs',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_imageinfo', 'segment_segment___OBJC___image_info',
'segment___DATA_CONST', 'segment_segment___IMPORT___jump_table',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/Versions/A/SystemConfiguration',
'segment___DATA_CONST_maxprot', 'segment___DATA_CONST_initprot', 'segment___OBJC_entropy',
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'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_proto',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_data', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper',
'segment_segment___DATA___nl_symbol_ptr',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore',
'segment_segment___TEXT___typelink', 'flag_PIE',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Versions/A/CoreServices',
'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_classname',
'segment_segment___TEXT___ustring', 'segment___DATA_CONST_vmsize',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_ivar', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment_segment___DATA___got', 'segment___PAGEZERO_nsects',
'segment_segment___DATA___const',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libc++.1.dylib',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_types', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs',
'segment_segment___TEXT___auth_stubs', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib',
'flag_APP_EXTENSION_SAFE', 'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/IOKit.framework/Versions/A/IOKit',
'segment___OBJC_initprot', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_assocty', 'entropy',
'segment_segment___DATA___data', 'segment_segment___DATA___mod_init_func',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_protolist', 'segment_segment___TEXT___itablink',
'segment_segment___DATA___go_buildinfo', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classrefs',
'segment___PAGEZERO_entropy', 'segment___PAGEZERO_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_CONST_size',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methtype', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
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'segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_nlclslist',
'segment_segment___TEXT___gosymtab', 'flag_BINDS_TO_WEAK', 'flag_NOREEXPORTED_DYLIBS',
'segment___DATA_initprot', 'segment_segment___DATA___noptrdata',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_catlist', 'segment___IMPORT_entropy',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CFNetwork.framework/Versions/A/CFNetwork',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_fieldmd', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_const',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libsqlite3.dylib', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_builtin',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_typeref'
sfm_y2

'dylib_@loader_path/libuno_sal.dylib.3', 'flag_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION',
'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'segment___PAGEZERO_initprot',
'dylib_@loader_path/libuno_cppu.dylib.3', 'dylib_@rpath/libswiftDarwin.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Versions/C/Foundation',
'segment_segment___DATA___common', 'segment_segment___DATA___cfstring',
'segment_segment___DATA___bss', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___DATA___mod_term_func',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation',
'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'segment___DATA_maxprot',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___cfstring',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ApplicationServices.framework/Versions/A/ApplicationServices',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib', 'segment___IMPORT_size', 'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftFoundation.dylib',
'dylib_@loader_path/libcomphelper.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Cocoa.framework/Versions/A/Cocoa',
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'dylib_@rpath/QtQml.framework/Versions/5/QtQml', 'dylib_@rpath/QtCore.framework/Versions/5/QtCore',
'segment___DATA',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/Versions/A/CoreGraphics',
'segment_segment___DATA___program_vars', 'segment___OBJC_vmsize',
'segment_segment___TEXT___oslogstring', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libgcc_s.1.dylib', 'slcs',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftCore.dylib', 'dylib_@rpath/Nuance-OmniPage-CSDKRunTime.framework/Versions/A/Libraries/librecdiag.dylib', 'size',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_imageinfo', 'segment___DATA_CONST_entropy',
'flag_WEAK_DEFINES', 'dylib_@rpath/Electron Framework.framework/Electron Framework',
'segment_segment___TEXT___gcc_except_tab', 'dylib_@loader_path/libuno_cppuhelpergcc3.dylib.3',
'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methlist',
'segment___PAGEZERO_maxprot', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___got',
'segment___PAGEZERO_size', 'segment_segment___TEXT___eh_frame', 'segment___DATA_size',
'segment___DATA_CONST_nsects', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___const',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classlist', 'flag_DYLDLINK',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methname', 'segment___DATA_vmsize',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_protolist', 'segment_segment___DATA___la_symbol_ptr',
'segment_segment___DATA___dyld', 'segment___PAGEZERO', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_selrefs', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_imageinfo',
'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftCore.dylib', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libstdc++.6.dylib', 'segment___DATA_CONST',
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'segment_segment___IMPORT___jump_table',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/Versions/A/SystemConfiguration',
'segment___DATA_CONST_maxprot', 'dylib_@rpath/FREngine.framework/Versions/Darwin-x86_6411.1.4.503210/Libraries/libFineObj.dylib', 'segment___DATA_entropy', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libiconv.2.dylib',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_superrefs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_proto',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_data', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper',
'segment_segment___DATA___nl_symbol_ptr',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit', 'dylib_@rpath/libplist.3.dylib',
'flag_PIE', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_classname',
'segment_segment___TEXT___ustring', 'segment___DATA_CONST_vmsize',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_ivar', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment_segment___DATA___got', 'segment___PAGEZERO_nsects',
'segment_segment___DATA___const',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libc++.1.dylib',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_types', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'flag_APP_EXTENSION_SAFE',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/IOKit.framework/Versions/A/IOKit', 'segment___OBJC_initprot',
'entropy', 'segment_segment___DATA___data', 'segment_segment___DATA___mod_init_func',
'dylib_@rpath/libzip.5.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_protolist',
'segment_segment___TEXT___itablink', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classrefs',
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'segment___PAGEZERO_entropy', 'segment___PAGEZERO_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_CONST_size',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methtype', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_nlclslist',
'flag_BINDS_TO_WEAK', 'flag_NOREEXPORTED_DYLIBS', 'segment___DATA_initprot',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_catlist', 'segment_segment___OBJC___message_refs',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/DiskArbitration.framework/Versions/A/DiskArbitration',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CFNetwork.framework/Versions/A/CFNetwork',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_protorefs', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_const',
'dylib_@rpath/libcrypto.1.1.dylib', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_builtin',
'flag_HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_typeref'
sfm_y3

'segment_segment___OBJC___module_info',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreVideo.framework/Versions/A/CoreVideo',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AVFoundation.framework/AVFoundation',
'flag_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION', 'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreVideo.framework/CoreVideo', 'segment___PAGEZERO_initprot',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftDarwin.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Versions/C/Foundation',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libcurl.4.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_classlist',
'segment_segment___DATA___basicstring',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Carbon',
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'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_capture', 'segment_segment___DATA___common',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libicucore.A.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA___cfstring', 'segment___IMPORT',
'segment_segment___DATA___bss', 'nlcs',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ScriptingBridge.framework/Versions/A/ScriptingBridge',
'segment_segment___DATA___mod_term_func',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation',
'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'segment___DATA_maxprot',
'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libcrypto.1.0.0.dylib', 'flag_SUBSECTIONS_VIA_SYMBOLS',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___cfstring',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ApplicationServices.framework/Versions/A/ApplicationServices',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib', 'segment___OBJC', 'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libplist.2.dylib',
'segment_segment___OBJC___class', 'segment___IMPORT_size',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Cocoa.framework/Versions/A/Cocoa', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libbz2.1.0.dylib',
'segment_segment___OBJC___instance_vars', 'segment_segment___OBJC___cls_meth',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_reflstr', 'segment___DATA', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libz.1.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/Versions/A/CoreGraphics',
'segment_segment___DATA___program_vars', 'segment___OBJC_vmsize', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libgcc_s.1.dylib',
'segment___IMPORT_vmsize', 'slcs', 'segment___OBJC_nsects', 'size',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_imageinfo',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/QuartzCore',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/StoreKit.framework/Versions/A/StoreKit',
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'segment___DATA_CONST_entropy', 'segment_segment___IMPORT___pointers', 'flag_WEAK_DEFINES',
'dylib_@rpath/Electron Framework.framework/Electron Framework',
'segment_segment___TEXT___gcc_except_tab', 'segment_segment___OBJC___symbols',
'segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub1', 'segment_segment___TEXT___const',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methlist', 'segment___PAGEZERO_maxprot',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___got', 'segment___PAGEZERO_size',
'segment_segment___OBJC___class_ext', 'segment_segment___TEXT___eh_frame',
'segment___DATA_size', 'segment___DATA_CONST_nsects',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/CoreGraphics',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___const', 'segment___OBJC_maxprot',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classlist', 'flag_DYLDLINK',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methname', 'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libxml2.2.dylib',
'segment___DATA_vmsize', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_protolist',
'segment___IMPORT_initprot', 'segment_segment___DATA___la_symbol_ptr',
'dylib_@executable_path/rbframework.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA___dyld',
'segment___PAGEZERO', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libresolv.9.dylib', 'segment___OBJC_size',
'segment___DATA_nsects', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_selrefs',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_imageinfo', 'segment_segment___DATA___gcc_except_tab',
'segment_segment___TEXT___literal8', 'segment_segment___TEXT___picsymbol_stub',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation',
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'segment_segment___OBJC___cls_refs', 'segment_segment___OBJC___cat_cls_meth',
'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftCore.dylib', 'segment_segment___OBJC___image_info',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libstdc++.6.dylib', 'segment___DATA_CONST',
'segment_segment___IMPORT___jump_table',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/Versions/A/SystemConfiguration',
'segment___DATA_CONST_maxprot', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.dylib', 'segment___DATA_CONST_initprot',
'segment_segment___OBJC___property', 'segment_segment___DATA___thread_bss',
'segment___OBJC_entropy', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libncurses.5.4.dylib', 'segment___DATA_entropy',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libiconv.2.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/MobileCoreServices.framework/MobileCoreServices',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_superrefs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_proto',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_data', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper',
'segment_segment___DATA___nl_symbol_ptr',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_catlist', 'segment___IMPORT_nsects', 'flag_PIE',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Versions/A/CoreServices',
'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
'dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/Sparkle.framework/Versions/A/Sparkle',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_classname', 'segment_segment___TEXT___ustring',
'segment_segment___DATA___thread_vars', 'segment___DATA_CONST_vmsize',
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'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreData.framework/Versions/A/CoreData',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreAudio.framework/Versions/A/CoreAudio',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_ivar', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment_segment___DATA___got', 'segment_segment___TEXT___literal4',
'segment___PAGEZERO_nsects', 'segment_segment___DATA___const',
'segment_segment___OBJC___inst_meth', 'flag_NOUNDEFS',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Carbon',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.7.dylib', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libc++.1.dylib',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_types', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_msgrefs', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/ZBUIKit.framework/Versions/A/ZBUIKit', 'flag_APP_EXTENSION_SAFE',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/IOKit.framework/Versions/A/IOKit', 'segment___OBJC_initprot',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_assocty', 'segment___IMPORT_maxprot', 'entropy',
'segment_segment___DATA___data',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation',
'segment_segment___DATA___mod_init_func', 'segment_segment___OBJC___category',
'segment_segment___TEXT___gopclntab', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_protolist',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ServiceManagement.framework/Versions/A/ServiceManagement',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classrefs',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AVFoundation.framework/Versions/A/AVFoundation',
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'segment___PAGEZERO_entropy', 'segment___PAGEZERO_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_CONST_size',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methtype', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AudioToolbox.framework/Versions/A/AudioToolbox',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.8.dylib', 'segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_nlclslist', 'flag_BINDS_TO_WEAK',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/SystemConfiguration',
'flag_NOREEXPORTED_DYLIBS',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreMedia.framework/Versions/A/CoreMedia',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_catlist', 'segment_segment___OBJC___message_refs',
'segment___IMPORT_entropy',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/DiskArbitration.framework/Versions/A/DiskArbitration',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CFNetwork.framework/Versions/A/CFNetwork',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/UIKit.framework/UIKit', 'segment_segment___OBJC___meta_class',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_fieldmd', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_protorefs',
'segment_segment___OBJC___protocol', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_const',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreMedia.framework/CoreMedia', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libsqlite3.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/OpenGL.framework/Versions/A/OpenGL',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security', 'flag_HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_typeref'
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'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ServiceManagement.framework/Versions/A/ServiceManagement'
, 'dylib_@loader_path/libuno_sal.dylib.3', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'segment___OBJC',
'segment_segment___OBJC___image_info', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libncurses.5.4.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreData.framework/Versions/A/CoreData',
'segment_segment___TEXT___itablink', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_msgrefs',
'segment_segment___OBJC___message_refs', 'segment_segment___OBJC___module_info',
'flag_WEAK_DEFINES', 'segment___DATA_entropy',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreAudio.framework/Versions/A/CoreAudio',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_ivar', 'segment_segment___DATA___la_symbol_ptr',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftCore.dylib', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment_segment___DATA___go_buildinfo', 'segment_segment___DATA___got',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classrefs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___auth_stubs',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AVFoundation.framework/Versions/A/AVFoundation',
'dylib_@rpath/Electron Framework.framework/Electron Framework',
'segment_segment___TEXT___gcc_except_tab', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libiconv.2.dylib',
'segment_segment___DATA___dyld', 'dylib_@loader_path/libuno_cppuhelpergcc3.dylib.3',
'dylib_@rpath/libplist.3.dylib', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libicucore.A.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/rbframework.dylib', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libbz2.1.0.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/MobileCoreServices.framework/MobileCoreServices',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreVideo.framework/Versions/A/CoreVideo',
'segment_segment___TEXT___literal4', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'dylib_@rpath/Nuance-OmniPage-
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CSDK-RunTime.framework/Versions/A/Libraries/librecdiag.dylib', 'segment___PAGEZERO_entropy',
'segment___PAGEZERO', 'segment_segment___OBJC___instance_vars', 'segment___OBJC_nsects',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_classlist',
'dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Safari.framework/Versions/A/Safari',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_superrefs', 'flag_DYLDLINK', 'segment_segment___DATA___cfstring',
'segment_segment___OBJC___symbols', 'segment___PAGEZERO_nsects',
'segment_segment___OBJC___cls_meth', 'size', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_imageinfo',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AVFoundation.framework/AVFoundation',
'dylib_@rpath/ZBUIKit.framework/Versions/A/ZBUIKit', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_proto',
'flag_APP_EXTENSION_SAFE', 'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/IOKit.framework/Versions/A/IOKit',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_reflstr', 'segment___IMPORT_entropy',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/QuartzCore',
'segment_segment___DATA___const',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/DiskArbitration.framework/Versions/A/DiskArbitration',
'flag_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION', 'segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub1', 'segment___IMPORT',
'segment_segment___OBJC___inst_meth', 'segment_segment___DATA___bss',
'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'segment___PAGEZERO_vmsize',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CFNetwork.framework/Versions/A/CFNetwork',
'segment___IMPORT_nsects', 'dylib_@rpath/QtCore.framework/Versions/5/QtCore',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libstdc++.6.dylib', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libresolv.9.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/UIKit.framework/UIKit', 'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libplist.2.dylib',
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'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit',
'segment___DATA_CONST_size', 'segment___DATA', 'flag_PIE',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_imageinfo', 'nlcs', 'segment___DATA_CONST',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ScriptingBridge.framework/Versions/A/ScriptingBridge',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_data',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Versions/A/CoreServices',
'segment_segment___DATA___mod_term_func', 'flag_NOUNDEFS',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/StoreKit.framework/Versions/A/StoreKit',
'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation',
'segment_segment___OBJC___class', 'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methlist', 'segment___PAGEZERO_maxprot',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methname',
'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methtype', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libz.1.dylib', 'segment_segment___OBJC___meta_class', 'segment___OBJC_initprot',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/Versions/A/CoreGraphics',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___got', 'flag_TWOLEVEL', 'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libxml2.2.dylib',
'dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/Sparkle.framework/Versions/A/Sparkle',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Carbon',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AudioToolbox.framework/Versions/A/AudioToolbox',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_fieldmd', 'segment___DATA_maxprot',
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'segment_segment___IMPORT___jump_table',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security',
'segment_segment___TEXT_qtmetadata', 'segment_segment___DATA___nl_symbol_ptr',
'segment___DATA_CONST_entropy', 'segment___DATA_vmsize',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_protolist',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreVideo.framework/CoreVideo',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_protorefs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_assocty',
'segment___IMPORT_maxprot',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore', 'entropy',
'segment___PAGEZERO_size', 'segment___IMPORT_size',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.8.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA___gcc_except_tab',
'segment_segment___OBJC___protocol', 'segment___OBJC_size',
'segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub', 'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftFoundation.dylib',
'segment_segment___TEXT___typelink', 'segment_segment___OBJC___class_ext',
'segment_segment___TEXT___eh_frame', 'segment___DATA_size',
'segment_segment___DATA___program_vars', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_const',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.7.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/Versions/A/SystemConfiguration',
'segment_segment___TEXT___literal8', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_catlist',
'segment___PAGEZERO_initprot', 'dylib_@rpath/libcrypto.1.1.dylib',
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'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_classname', 'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libcrypto.1.0.0.dylib',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___mod_init_func', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libc++.1.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreMedia.framework/CoreMedia', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'dylib_@loader_path/libcomphelper.dylib', 'segment___OBJC_vmsize',
'segment_segment___TEXT___ustring', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libsqlite3.dylib',
'segment___DATA_CONST_maxprot', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_nlclslist',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_builtin', 'segment_segment___DATA___data',
'dylib_@loader_path/libuno_cppu.dylib.3', 'segment_segment___TEXT___picsymbol_stub',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftDarwin.dylib', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.dylib',
'segment_segment___DATA___thread_vars',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation',
'flag_SUBSECTIONS_VIA_SYMBOLS', 'segment___DATA_CONST_vmsize',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/OpenGL.framework/Versions/A/OpenGL',
'segment_segment___TEXT___gosymtab',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Cocoa.framework/Versions/A/Cocoa',
'segment_segment___DATA___mod_init_func', 'segment_segment___TEXT___oslogstring',
'segment_segment___OBJC___category', 'segment___DATA_CONST_nsects', 'dylib_@rpath/libzip.5.dylib',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___cfstring', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_types',
'flag_BINDS_TO_WEAK', 'dylib_@rpath/QtQml.framework/Versions/5/QtQml',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libgcc_s.1.dylib', 'segment___DATA_CONST_initprot',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation',
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'segment___IMPORT_initprot',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Versions/C/Foundation',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/SystemConfiguration',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ApplicationServices.framework/Versions/A/ApplicationServices',
'segment_segment___OBJC___property', 'segment_segment___OBJC___cls_refs',
'segment___IMPORT_vmsize', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libcurl.4.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/CoreGraphics',
'segment_segment___OBJC___cat_cls_meth',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security',
'segment_segment___DATA___thread_bss', 'flag_NOREEXPORTED_DYLIBS',
'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftCore.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_classlist',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreMedia.framework/Versions/A/CoreMedia',
'segment_segment___TEXT___gopclntab', 'slcs', 'segment_segment___DATA___basicstring',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_protolist', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___const',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib', 'segment___DATA_initprot', 'flag_HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Carbon',
'segment_segment___DATA___noptrdata', 'segment_segment___IMPORT___pointers',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_typeref', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_catlist',
'segment___OBJC_entropy', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_capture', 'segment___OBJC_maxprot',
'segment_segment___DATA___common', 'dylib_@rpath/FREngine.framework/Versions/Darwin-x86_6411.1.4.503210/Libraries/libFineObj.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_selrefs'
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'nlcs', 'dylib_@rpath/McPicker.framework/McPicker',
'dylib_@rpath/BigRational.framework/BigRational', 'dylib_@rpath/MADSP.framework/Versions/A/MADSP',
'dylib_@rpath/MADSP.framework/Versions/A/MADSP', 'dylib_@rpath/Assets.framework/Assets',
'dylib_@rpath/matrixreport.framework/Versions/A/matrixreport_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/libvorbis.0.dylib', 'segment___OBJC_vmsize',
'dylib_@rpath/CrossPromoBanner.framework/Versions/A/CrossPromoBanner',
'dylib_@rpath/ACSStorage.framework/Versions/A/ACSStorage', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_protolist',
'dylib_@rpath/UALBooking.framework/UALBooking',
'dylib_@rpath/NordReachability.framework/Versions/A/NordReachability',
'dylib_@rpath/WAFCore.framework/Versions/A/WAFCore_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/CipherWebView.framework/CipherWebView', 'dylib_@rpath/SnapKit.framework/SnapKit',
'dylib_@rpath/OutlookShadowAuth.framework/Versions/A/OutlookShadowAuth',
'dylib_@rpath/DataFoundation.framework/Versions/A/DataFoundation',
'dylib_@rpath/QtWebEngine.framework/Versions/5/QtWebEngine', 'segment___LLVM_COV_size',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MediaFramework.framework/Versions/A/MediaFramework_imports'
, 'dylib_@loader_path/libnspr4.dylib', 'dylib_@rpath/libavcodec.58.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/P5DCore.framework/Versions/A/P5DCore', 'segment_segment___TEXT___objc_protolist',
'dylib_@rpath/swift_qrcodejs.framework/Versions/A/swift_qrcodejs_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/Secrets.framework/Versions/A/Secrets', 'dylib_@rpath/TrustSwiftUI.framework/TrustSwiftUI',

148
'dylib_@rpath/nanopb.framework/nanopb', 'dylib_@rpath/RSDatabase.framework/Versions/A/RSDatabase',
'dylib_@rpath/JRSwizzle.framework/Versions/A/JRSwizzle',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/iTunesLibrary.framework/Versions/A/iTunesLibrary_imports',
'segment___DATA___nsects',
'dylib_@rpath/AgoraAIDenoiseExtension.framework/AgoraAIDenoiseExtension',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AuthenticationServices.framework/AuthenticationServices',
'dylib_@loader_path/libsmime3.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/CocoaHTTPServer.framework/Versions/A/CocoaHTTPServer_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/cmmlib.framework/Versions/A/cmmlib',
'dylib_@loader_path/../../../../../../../libavformat.58.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/AgileLibrary.framework/Versions/A/AgileLibrary',
'dylib_@rpath/AppAuth.framework/Versions/A/AppAuth',
'dylib_@executable_path/libtheoraenc.1.dylib_imports', 'segment___RESTRICT_nsects',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NotificationCenter.framework/NotificationCenter_imports',
'segment_segment___DWARF___zdebug_pubname',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQAppUtilities.framework/Versions/A/EQAppUtilities',
'dylib_@executable_path/libx265.199.dylib_imports',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/OpenAL.framework/Versions/A/OpenAL',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/libbasecore.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/MicrosoftFBA.framework/Versions/A/MicrosoftFBA', 'segment___INIT_STUB_size',
'dylib_@rpath/CBHWindowManager.framework/Versions/A/CBHWindowManager',
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'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/SkimNotes.framework/Versions/A/SkimNotes',
'dylib_@rpath/KeychainSwift.framework/Versions/A/KeychainSwift',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Kerberos.framework/Versions/A/Kerberos',
'dylib_@rpath/libpng.framework/Versions/A/libpng', 'dylib_@executable_path/libsmime3.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/Keys.framework/Keys',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/BugSplat.framework/Versions/A/BugSplat',
'segment_segment___OBJC___class_vars', 'dylib_@rpath/AgoraCore.framework/AgoraCore_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/ZMScreenshotKit.framework/Versions/A/ZMScreenshotKit_imports',
'segment_segment___TEXT___dof_mono',
'dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/Appstatico.framework/Versions/A/Appstatico',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuickTime.framework/Versions/A/QuickTime',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuickTime.framework/Versions/A/QuickTime',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuickTime.framework/Versions/A/QuickTime',
'dylib_@rpath/PermissionsKit.framework/Versions/A/PermissionsKit',
'dylib_@rpath/PXMKit.framework/Versions/A/PXMKit',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NaturalLanguage.framework/Versions/A/NaturalLanguage',
'dylib_@rpath/Electron Framework.framework/Electron Framework_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/libytdownloads.dylib', 'segment_segment___DATA_MPTweak',
'dylib_@rpath/SyncSupport.framework/Versions/A/SyncSupport', 'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libplist.2.dylib',
'dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libcrypto.1.0.0.dylib', 'dylib_@rpath/Lottie.framework/Lottie',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/AGRegex.framework/Versions/A/AGRegex',
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'dylib_@rpath/SnapKit.framework/SnapKit_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/AgoraVideoSegmentationExtension.framework/AgoraVideoSegmentationExtension',
'dylib_@rpath/SnapKit.framework/SnapKit_imports', 'segment_segment___DATA_CONST___auth_got',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/libedit.3.dylib_imports', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libffi.dylib',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libffi.dylib', 'dylib_@rpath/PreferencesUI.framework/Versions/A/PreferencesUI',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/Connection.framework/Versions/A/Connection',
'dylib_@rpath/TPInAppReceipt.framework/Versions/A/TPInAppReceipt',
'dylib_@rpath/CBHAboutWindow.framework/Versions/A/CBHAboutWindow',
'dylib_@rpath/SocketRocket.framework/Versions/A/SocketRocket',
'dylib_@rpath/andromeda.framework/Versions/A/andromeda', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libpmsample.dylib',
'dylib_@loader_path/libclucene-core.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/DiscRecordingUI.framework/Versions/A/DiscRecordingUI',
'dylib_@rpath/libcmlFramework.framework/Versions/A/libcmlFramework',
'dylib_@rpath/FarhadLibraryMac.framework/Versions/A/FarhadLibraryMac',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/NSObject_Rx.framework/Versions/A/NSObject_Rx',
'segment_segment___DATA___basicstring', 'segment_segment___DATA___basicstring',
'dylib_@rpath/QtWidgets.framework/Versions/5/QtWidgets',
'dylib_@rpath/mso99.framework/Versions/A/mso99_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/Amplitude.framework/Versions/A/Amplitude', 'dylib_@loader_path/libsfxlo.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/MAToolKit.framework/Versions/A/MAToolKit_imports',
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'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MJTApplication.framework/Versions/A/MJTApplication',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftQuartzCore.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NetworkExtension.framework/Versions/A/NetworkExtension_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/libTmiCoreX.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MJTApplication.framework/Versions/A/MJTApplication',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MASValidator.framework/Versions/A/MASValidator',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_selrefs', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_selrefs',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MASValidator.framework/Versions/A/MASValidator',
'dylib_@rpath/OkaNetwrokDiagnostic.framework/Versions/A/OkaNetwrokDiagnostic',
'dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/libicuuc.60.2.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/PDFKit.framework/Versions/A/PDFKit',
'dylib_@rpath/Ashton_171F608F396333_PackageProduct.framework/Versions/A/Ashton_171F608F396333_
PackageProduct_imports', 'dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/libicuuc.60.2.dylib',
'segment_segment___TEXT___literal4', 'dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/libicuuc.60.2.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQGangway.framework/Versions/A/EQGangway_imports',
'segment_segment___TEXT___constructor', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.8.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/ArticlesDatabase.framework/Versions/A/ArticlesDatabase_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftContacts.dylib', 'dylib_@rpath/libswiftContacts.dylib',
'dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.8.dylib', 'segment___OBJC_entropy',
'dylib_@rpath/DejalFoundation.framework/Versions/A/DejalFoundation',
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'dylib_@rpath/JTRecordSDK.framework/Versions/A/JTRecordSDK',
'dylib_@rpath/LinkKit.framework/LinkKit', 'dylib_@rpath/Hummer.framework/Versions/A/Hummer',
'dylib_@rpath/CCNStatusItem.framework/Versions/A/CCNStatusItem',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/CoreGraphics',
'dylib_@rpath/Hummer.framework/Versions/A/Hummer',
'dylib_@rpath/CalendarWidgetKit.framework/Versions/A/CalendarWidgetKit',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NotificationCenter.framework/NotificationCenter',
'dylib_@rpath/CalendarWidgetKit.framework/Versions/A/CalendarWidgetKit',
'dylib_@rpath/libswiftSecurity.dylib',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NotificationCenter.framework/NotificationCenter',
'dylib_@rpath/osfstorage2.framework/Versions/A/osfstorage2_imports', 'segment___DATA___size',
'dylib_@rpath/osfstorage2.framework/Versions/A/osfstorage2_imports',
'dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/DiagnosticExtensions.framework/Versions/A/DiagnosticExtensio
ns', 'dylib_@executable_path/libvorbisenc.2.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/FFmpegWrapper.framework/Versions/A/FFmpegWrapper_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/PACCoreKit.framework/PACCoreKit_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/libvorbisenc.2.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/NeuralLine.framework/Versions/A/NeuralLine',
'dylib_@rpath/AFEFramework.framework/Versions/A/AFEFramework',
'dylib_@rpath/NeuralLine.framework/Versions/A/NeuralLine',
'dylib_@rpath/ReactiveObjC.framework/ReactiveObjC',
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'dylib_@rpath/NeuralLine.framework/Versions/A/NeuralLine',
'dylib_@rpath/mbukernel.framework/Versions/A/mbukernel', 'segment_segment___DATA___objc_floatobj',
'dylib_@rpath/tp.framework/Versions/A/tp', 'dylib_@loader_path/libuno_salhelpergcc3.dylib.3',
'segment_segment___DATA___objc_floatobj',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/ShortcutRecorder.framework/Versions/A/ShortcutRecorder_imports',
'segment_segment___TEXT___dof_node',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/ShortcutRecorder.framework/Versions/A/ShortcutRecorder_imports',
'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftWebKit.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/NMSSH.framework/Versions/A/NMSSH',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/NMSSH.framework/Versions/A/NMSSH',
'segment___LINKEDIT_maxprot', 'segment___LINKEDIT_maxprot',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/libmqtt.dylib_imports', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.7.dylib',
'segment___LINKEDIT_maxprot', 'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftWebKit.dylib',
'dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/cdm8000101mh_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/SimpleKeychain.framework/Versions/A/SimpleKeychain_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/libssl.0.9.8.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/libssl.0.9.8.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQStore.framework/Versions/A/EQStore_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/QtWebEngineWidgets.framework/Versions/5/QtWebEngineWidgets',
'dylib_@rpath/PXMKit.framework/Versions/A/PXMKit_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/QtWebEngineWidgets.framework/Versions/5/QtWebEngineWidgets',

154
'dylib_@rpath/libjson.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/QtAVWidgets.framework/Versions/1/QtAVWidgets',
'dylib_@rpath/QtQml.framework/Versions/5/QtQml_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/MicrosoftCredui.framework/Versions/A/MicrosoftCredui_imports',
'segment_segment___LLVM_COV___llvm_covmap',
'dylib_@rpath/QtQml.framework/Versions/5/QtQml_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/UALBagTracking.framework/UALBagTracking',
'dylib_@rpath/Blockchains.framework/Blockchains_imports', 'dylib_@rpath/libidm.1.0.0.dylib',
'segment_segment___TEXT___dof_RACCompou',
'dylib_@rpath/Blockchains.framework/Blockchains_imports', 'dylib_@rpath/libusbmuxd.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/UALBagTracking.framework/UALBagTracking', 'dylib_@rpath/libusbmuxd.dylib',
'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftSceneKit.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/HandyJSON.framework/Versions/A/HandyJSON',
'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftSceneKit.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQStore.framework/Versions/A/EQStore_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/libjson.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/OgreKit.framework/Versions/A/OgreKit',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/MediaToolbox.framework/MediaToolbox_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/HandyJSON.framework/Versions/A/HandyJSON',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/MediaToolbox.framework/MediaToolbox_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/libbasecore.dylib_imports',
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'dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/CrashReporterSupport.framework/Versions/A/CrashReporterSupp
ort', 'dylib_@rpath/NSGradientView.framework/Versions/A/NSGradientView_imports',
'dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftSceneKit.dylib_imports',
'dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/CrashReporterSupport.framework/Versions/A/CrashReporterSupp
ort', 'dylib_@rpath/QtQuickWidgets.framework/Versions/5/QtQuickWidgets',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EvernoteSDK-Mac.framework/Versions/A/EvernoteSDK-Mac',
'dylib_@rpath/NSGradientView.framework/Versions/A/NSGradientView_imports',
'dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/CrashReporterSupport.framework/Versions/A/CrashReporterSupp
ort', 'dylib_@executable_path/libmozglue.dylib', 'segment_segment___OBJC___inst_meth',
'dylib_@executable_path/libmozglue.dylib', 'dylib_@executable_path/libmozglue.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/Nuance-OmniPage-CSDK-RunTime.framework/Versions/A/Libraries/libtwcutchr.dylib',
'dylib_@rpath/RAR.framework/Versions/A/RAR', 'segment_segment___TEXT___swift3_typeref',
'dylib_@rpath/RAR.framework/Versions/A/RAR', 'dylib_@executable_path/libiIAP.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@executable_path/libmozglue.dylib', 'dylib_@executable_path/libiIAP.dylib_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/CMMNotifications.framework/Versions/A/CMMNotifications',
'dylib_@executable_path/../MonoBundle/libNetDevAccs.dylib_imports',
'segment_segment___TEXT___swift3_typeref',
'dylib_@rpath/NordLogger.framework/Versions/A/NordLogger_imports',
'segment_segment___TEXT___ustring', 'dylib_@rpath/BAMCheckout.framework/BAMCheckout_imports',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/LocalAuthentication.framework/Versions/A/LocalAuthentication',
'dylib_@rpath/MindNodeOutline.framework/Versions/A/MindNodeOutline_imports',
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'dylib_@rpath/MindNodeOutline.framework/Versions/A/MindNodeOutline_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/DatabaseManager.framework/Versions/A/DatabaseManager',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/IOBluetooth.framework/Versions/A/IOBluetooth_imports',
'dylib_@rpath/Rswift.framework/Rswift', 'dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/breakpadUtilities.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/breakpadUtilities.dylib',
'dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQStoreSync.framework/Versions/A/EQStoreSync_imports',
'dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/LocalAuthentication.framework/Versions/A/LocalAuthentication',
'segment_segment___LLVM___bundle', 'dylib_@rpath/SYFlatButton.framework/Versions/A/SYFlatButton',
'segment_segment___LLVM___bundle', 'dylib_@rpath/UALFlightStatus.framework/UALFlightStatus'
mi_y1

'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment___DATA', 'slcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___const',
'segment___DATA_size', 'flag_DYLDLINK', 'segment___DATA_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper',
'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'entropy', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment___DATA_initprot'

mi_y2

'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment___DATA', 'slcs', 'size', 'segment___DATA_size', 'flag_DYLDLINK',
'segment___DATA_vmsize', 'segment___DATA_nsects', 'segment___DATA_entropy',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
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'segment_segment___TEXT___text', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'entropy',
'segment_segment___DATA___data', 'flag_TWOLEVEL', 'segment___DATA_initprot'
mi_set

'segment___DATA_maxprot', 'segment_segment___TEXT___stubs', 'segment___DATA_vmsize',
'segment_segment___TEXT___const', 'entropy', 'segment___DATA_entropy', 'segment___DATA',
'segment_segment___TEXT___text', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
'segment___DATA_size', 'dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib', 'slcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment___DATA_initprot', 'segment___DATA_nsects',
'flag_DYLDLINK', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'size', 'flag_TWOLEVEL',
'segment_segment___DATA___data'

SFS_y1

'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring', 'nlcs', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info', 'slcs'
, 'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text'

SFS_y2

'nlcs', 'slcs', 'entropy'

SFS_y3

'segment___TEXT_size', 'segment___LINKEDIT', 'segment___PAGEZERO_initprot', 'nlcs',
'segment___LINKEDIT_initprot', 'segment___LINKEDIT_vmsize', 'segment___TEXT_maxprot', 'slcs', 'size',
'segment___TEXT_vmsize',
'segment___PAGEZERO_maxprot', 'segment___PAGEZERO_size', 'segment___TEXT_nsects',
'segment___TEXT_entropy',
'segment___PAGEZERO', 'segment___LINKEDIT_entropy', 'segment___LINKEDIT_size',
'segment___TEXT', 'flag_PIE', 'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT', 'segment___LINKEDIT_nsects',
'segment___LINKEDIT_maxprot',
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'segment___PAGEZERO_nsects', 'flag_NOUNDEFS', 'entropy', 'segment___TEXT_initprot',
'segment___PAGEZERO_entropy', 'segment___PAGEZERO_vmsize'
SFS_SET

'segment___LINKEDIT_vmsize', 'segment___LINKEDIT', 'segment___TEXT_size',
'segment___LINKEDIT_size',
'segment___LINKEDIT_entropy', 'segment___LINKEDIT_maxprot',
'segment___PAGEZERO_vmsize', 'entropy',
'segment___TEXT_nsects', 'segment___PAGEZERO_size', 'segment_segment___TEXT___text',
'segment___TEXT_entropy',
'flag_PIE', 'segment___LINKEDIT_nsects', 'nlcs', 'flag_NOUNDEFS',
'segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT',
'segment___LINKEDIT_initprot', 'segment___PAGEZERO_initprot', 'slcs',
'segment___PAGEZERO_entropy',
'segment___PAGEZERO', 'segment___TEXT_vmsize', 'segment_segment___TEXT___cstring',
'segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper', 'segment___PAGEZERO_maxprot', 'segment___TEXT',
'segment___TEXT_initprot', 'segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info',
'segment___PAGEZERO_nsects', 'size',
'segment___TEXT_maxprot'
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APPENDIX C: COUNTS OF SELECTED FEATURES
This appendix contains the count of how many times each selected feature appears in a
feature set.
Feature name

Count of
occurrences
nlcs

18

slcs

17

segment_segment___TEXT___text

16

segment_segment___TEXT_upxTEXT

15

segment_segment___TEXT___cstring

15

segment_segment___TEXT___unwind_info

15

segment_segment___TEXT___stub_helper

14

segment___DATA_vmsize

13

entropy

13

segment___DATA_entropy

13

segment___DATA

13

segment___DATA_size

13

dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib

13

segment___DATA_nsects

13

size

13

flag_TWOLEVEL

13

segment___DATA_maxprot

12

segment___DATA_initprot

12

flag_DYLDLINK

12

segment_segment___DATA___data

12

segment_segment___TEXT___const

11

segment_segment___TEXT___stubs

10

segment_segment___DATA___la_symbol_ptr

6

segment___PAGEZERO_entropy

6

segment___PAGEZERO

6

segment___PAGEZERO_nsects

6

segment___PAGEZERO_vmsize

6

flag_PIE

6

segment___PAGEZERO_maxprot

6
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segment___PAGEZERO_size

6

segment___PAGEZERO_initprot

6

segment_segment___DATA___objc_selrefs

6

segment_segment___TEXT___ustring

5

segment___LINKEDIT_maxprot

5

flag_WEAK_DEFINES

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_ivar

4

segment_segment___DATA___got

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_classrefs

4

dylib_@rpath/Electron Framework.framework/Electron Framework

4

segment_segment___TEXT___gcc_except_tab

4

segment_segment___DATA___dyld

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_classlist

4

segment_segment___DATA___cfstring

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_imageinfo

4

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_proto

4

flag_APP_EXTENSION_SAFE

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/IOKit.framework/Versions/A/IOKit

4

segment_segment___DATA___const

4

segment_segment___DATA___bss

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CFNetwork.framework/Versions/A/CFNetwork

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit

4

segment___DATA_CONST_size

4

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_imageinfo

4

segment___DATA_CONST

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_data

4

flag_NOUNDEFS

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation

4

segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methlist

4

segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methname

4

segment_segment___TEXT___objc_methtype

4

segment___OBJC_initprot

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/Versions/A/CoreGraphics

4

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___got

4

segment_segment___IMPORT___jump_table

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security

4

segment_segment___DATA___nl_symbol_ptr

4
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segment___DATA_CONST_entropy

4

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_protolist

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore

4

segment___IMPORT_size

4

dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.8.dylib

4

segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub

4

segment_segment___TEXT___eh_frame

4

segment_segment___DATA___program_vars

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_const

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/Versions/A/SystemConfiguratio
n

4

segment_segment___TEXT___objc_classname

4

dylib_/usr/lib/libc++.1.dylib

4

segment___OBJC_vmsize

4

segment___DATA_CONST_maxprot

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_nlclslist

4

dylib_@rpath/libswiftDarwin.dylib

4

segment___DATA_CONST_vmsize

4

segment_segment___DATA___mod_init_func

4

segment___DATA_CONST_nsects

4

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_types

4

flag_BINDS_TO_WEAK

4

dylib_/usr/lib/libgcc_s.1.dylib

4

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Versions/C/Foundation

4

flag_NOREEXPORTED_DYLIBS

4

segment_segment___DATA___basicstring

4

segment_segment___DATA___objc_protolist

4

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___const

4

dylib_/usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib

4

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_typeref

4

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_catlist

4

segment___OBJC_entropy

4

segment_segment___DATA___common

4

dylib_@executable_path/libmozglue.dylib

4

segment_segment___OBJC___image_info

3

segment_segment___TEXT___itablink

3

segment_segment___OBJC___message_refs

3
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dylib_@rpath/libswiftCore.dylib

3

dylib_/usr/lib/libiconv.2.dylib

3

segment_segment___TEXT___literal4

3

segment_segment___DATA___objc_superrefs

3

segment_segment___OBJC___symbols

3

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_reflstr

3

segment___IMPORT_entropy

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/DiskArbitration.framework/Versions/A/DiskArbitration

3

flag_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION

3

segment_segment___TEXT___symbol_stub1

3

segment_segment___OBJC___inst_meth

3

dylib_@rpath/QtCore.framework/Versions/5/QtCore

3

dylib_/usr/lib/libstdc++.6.dylib

3

dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libplist.2.dylib

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreServices.framework/Versions/A/CoreServices

3

segment_segment___DATA___mod_term_func

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/StoreKit.framework/Versions/A/StoreKit

3

segment_segment___OBJC___class

3

dylib_/usr/lib/libz.1.dylib

3

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_fieldmd

3

segment_segment___DATA___objc_protorefs

3

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_assocty

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit

3

dylib_/usr/lib/libcrypto.0.9.7.dylib

3

dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libcrypto.1.0.0.dylib

3

dylib_/usr/lib/libsqlite3.dylib

3

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_builtin

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Cocoa.framework/Versions/A/Cocoa

3

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___cfstring

3

segment___DATA_CONST_initprot

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ApplicationServices.framework/Versions/A/ApplicationServices

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreGraphics.framework/CoreGraphics

3

dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftCore.dylib

3

flag_HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS

3

segment_segment___TEXT___swift5_capture

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuickTime.framework/Versions/A/QuickTime

3

dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/libicuuc.60.2.dylib

3
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dylib_@rpath/NeuralLine.framework/Versions/A/NeuralLine

3

dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftSceneKit.dylib_imports

3

dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/CrashReporterSupport.framework/Versions/A/CrashReport
erSupport

3

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ServiceManagement.framework/Versions/A/ServiceManagement

2

dylib_@loader_path/libuno_sal.dylib.3

2

segment___OBJC

2

dylib_/usr/lib/libncurses.5.4.dylib

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreData.framework/Versions/A/CoreData

2

segment_segment___DATA___objc_msgrefs

2

segment_segment___OBJC___module_info

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreAudio.framework/Versions/A/CoreAudio

2

segment_segment___DATA___go_buildinfo

2

segment_segment___TEXT___auth_stubs

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AVFoundation.framework/Versions/A/AVFoundation

2

dylib_@loader_path/libuno_cppuhelpergcc3.dylib.3

2

dylib_@rpath/libplist.3.dylib

2

dylib_/usr/lib/libicucore.A.dylib

2

dylib_@executable_path/rbframework.dylib

2

dylib_/usr/lib/libbz2.1.0.dylib

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/MobileCoreServices.framework/MobileCoreServices

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreVideo.framework/Versions/A/CoreVideo

2

dylib_@rpath/Nuance-OmniPage-CSDK-RunTime.framework/Versions/A/Libraries/librecdiag.dylib

2

segment_segment___OBJC___instance_vars

2

segment___OBJC_nsects

2

dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Safari.framework/Versions/A/Safari

2

segment_segment___OBJC___cls_meth

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AVFoundation.framework/AVFoundation

2

dylib_@rpath/ZBUIKit.framework/Versions/A/ZBUIKit

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/QuartzCore

2

segment___IMPORT

2

segment___IMPORT_nsects

2

dylib_/usr/lib/libresolv.9.dylib

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/UIKit.framework/UIKit

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/ScriptingBridge.framework/Versions/A/ScriptingBridge

2

segment_segment___OBJC___meta_class

2

dylib_/etc/manpath.d/libxml2.2.dylib

2
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dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/Sparkle.framework/Versions/A/Sparkle

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Carbon

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AudioToolbox.framework/Versions/A/AudioToolbox

2

segment_segment___TEXT_qtmetadata

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreVideo.framework/CoreVideo

2

segment___IMPORT_maxprot

2

segment_segment___DATA___gcc_except_tab

2

segment_segment___OBJC___protocol

2

segment___OBJC_size

2

dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftFoundation.dylib

2

segment_segment___TEXT___typelink

2

segment_segment___OBJC___class_ext

2

segment_segment___TEXT___literal8

2

segment_segment___DATA___objc_catlist

2

dylib_@rpath/libcrypto.1.1.dylib

2

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___mod_init_func

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreMedia.framework/CoreMedia

2

dylib_@loader_path/libcomphelper.dylib

2

dylib_@loader_path/libuno_cppu.dylib.3

2

segment_segment___TEXT___picsymbol_stub

2

dylib_/usr/lib/libSystem.dylib

2

segment_segment___DATA___thread_vars

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Foundation

2

flag_SUBSECTIONS_VIA_SYMBOLS

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/OpenGL.framework/Versions/A/OpenGL

2

segment_segment___TEXT___gosymtab

2

segment_segment___TEXT___oslogstring

2

segment_segment___OBJC___category

2

dylib_@rpath/libzip.5.dylib

2

dylib_@rpath/QtQml.framework/Versions/5/QtQml

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation

2

segment___IMPORT_initprot

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/SystemConfiguration.framework/SystemConfiguration

2

segment_segment___OBJC___property

2

segment_segment___OBJC___cls_refs

2

segment___IMPORT_vmsize

2

dylib_/usr/lib/libcurl.4.dylib

2
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segment_segment___OBJC___cat_cls_meth

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security

2

segment_segment___DATA___thread_bss

2

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___objc_classlist

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreMedia.framework/Versions/A/CoreMedia

2

segment_segment___TEXT___gopclntab

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Carbon

2

segment_segment___DATA___noptrdata

2

segment_segment___IMPORT___pointers

2

segment___OBJC_maxprot

2

dylib_@rpath/FREngine.framework/Versions/Darwin-x86_6411.1.4.503210/Libraries/libFineObj.dylib

2

dylib_@rpath/MADSP.framework/Versions/A/MADSP

2

dylib_@rpath/SnapKit.framework/SnapKit_imports

2

dylib_/usr/lib/libffi.dylib

2

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MJTApplication.framework/Versions/A/MJTApplication

2

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MASValidator.framework/Versions/A/MASValidator

2

dylib_@rpath/libswiftContacts.dylib

2

dylib_@rpath/Hummer.framework/Versions/A/Hummer

2

dylib_@rpath/CalendarWidgetKit.framework/Versions/A/CalendarWidgetKit

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NotificationCenter.framework/NotificationCenter

2

dylib_@rpath/osfstorage2.framework/Versions/A/osfstorage2_imports

2

dylib_@executable_path/libvorbisenc.2.dylib_imports

2

segment_segment___DATA___objc_floatobj

2

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/ShortcutRecorder.framework/Versions/A/ShortcutRecorder_i
mports

2

dylib_/usr/lib/swift/libswiftWebKit.dylib

2

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/NMSSH.framework/Versions/A/NMSSH

2

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/libssl.0.9.8.dylib_imports

2

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQStore.framework/Versions/A/EQStore_imports

2

dylib_@rpath/QtWebEngineWidgets.framework/Versions/5/QtWebEngineWidgets

2

dylib_@rpath/libjson.dylib

2

dylib_@rpath/QtQml.framework/Versions/5/QtQml_imports

2

dylib_@rpath/UALBagTracking.framework/UALBagTracking

2

dylib_@rpath/Blockchains.framework/Blockchains_imports

2

dylib_@rpath/libusbmuxd.dylib

2

dylib_@rpath/HandyJSON.framework/Versions/A/HandyJSON

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/MediaToolbox.framework/MediaToolbox_imports

2
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dylib_@rpath/NSGradientView.framework/Versions/A/NSGradientView_imports

2

dylib_@rpath/RAR.framework/Versions/A/RAR

2

segment_segment___TEXT___swift3_typeref

2

dylib_@executable_path/libiIAP.dylib_imports

2

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/LocalAuthentication.framework/Versions/A/LocalAuthentication

2

dylib_@rpath/MindNodeOutline.framework/Versions/A/MindNodeOutline_imports

2

dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/breakpadUtilities.dylib

2

segment_segment___LLVM___bundle

2

segment___LINKEDIT_vmsize

2

segment___LINKEDIT

2

segment___TEXT_size

2

segment___LINKEDIT_size

2

segment___LINKEDIT_entropy

2

segment___TEXT_nsects

2

segment___TEXT_entropy

2

segment___LINKEDIT_nsects

2

segment___LINKEDIT_initprot

2

segment___TEXT_vmsize

2

segment___TEXT

2

segment___TEXT_initprot

2

segment___TEXT_maxprot

2

dylib_@rpath/McPicker.framework/McPicker

1

dylib_@rpath/BigRational.framework/BigRational

1

dylib_@rpath/Assets.framework/Assets

1

dylib_@rpath/matrixreport.framework/Versions/A/matrixreport_imports

1

dylib_@executable_path/libvorbis.0.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/CrossPromoBanner.framework/Versions/A/CrossPromoBanner

1

dylib_@rpath/ACSStorage.framework/Versions/A/ACSStorage

1

dylib_@rpath/UALBooking.framework/UALBooking

1

dylib_@rpath/NordReachability.framework/Versions/A/NordReachability

1

dylib_@rpath/WAFCore.framework/Versions/A/WAFCore_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/CipherWebView.framework/CipherWebView

1

dylib_@rpath/SnapKit.framework/SnapKit

1

dylib_@rpath/OutlookShadowAuth.framework/Versions/A/OutlookShadowAuth

1

dylib_@rpath/DataFoundation.framework/Versions/A/DataFoundation

1

dylib_@rpath/QtWebEngine.framework/Versions/5/QtWebEngine

1

segment___LLVM_COV_size

1
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dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/MediaFramework.framework/Versions/A/MediaFramework_i
mports

1

dylib_@loader_path/libnspr4.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/libavcodec.58.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/P5DCore.framework/Versions/A/P5DCore

1

segment_segment___TEXT___objc_protolist

1

dylib_@rpath/swift_qrcodejs.framework/Versions/A/swift_qrcodejs_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/Secrets.framework/Versions/A/Secrets

1

dylib_@rpath/TrustSwiftUI.framework/TrustSwiftUI

1

dylib_@rpath/nanopb.framework/nanopb

1

dylib_@rpath/RSDatabase.framework/Versions/A/RSDatabase

1

dylib_@rpath/JRSwizzle.framework/Versions/A/JRSwizzle

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/iTunesLibrary.framework/Versions/A/iTunesLibrary_imports

1

segment___DATA___nsects

1

dylib_@rpath/AgoraAIDenoiseExtension.framework/AgoraAIDenoiseExtension

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/AuthenticationServices.framework/AuthenticationServices

1

dylib_@loader_path/libsmime3.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/CocoaHTTPServer.framework/Versions/A/CocoaHTTPServer_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/cmmlib.framework/Versions/A/cmmlib

1

dylib_@loader_path/../../../../../../../libavformat.58.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/AgileLibrary.framework/Versions/A/AgileLibrary

1

dylib_@rpath/AppAuth.framework/Versions/A/AppAuth

1

dylib_@executable_path/libtheoraenc.1.dylib_imports

1

segment___RESTRICT_nsects

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NotificationCenter.framework/NotificationCenter_imports

1

segment_segment___DWARF___zdebug_pubname

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQAppUtilities.framework/Versions/A/EQAppUtilities

1

dylib_@executable_path/libx265.199.dylib_imports

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/OpenAL.framework/Versions/A/OpenAL

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/libbasecore.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/MicrosoftFBA.framework/Versions/A/MicrosoftFBA

1

segment___INIT_STUB_size

1

dylib_@rpath/CBHWindowManager.framework/Versions/A/CBHWindowManager

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/SkimNotes.framework/Versions/A/SkimNotes

1

dylib_@rpath/KeychainSwift.framework/Versions/A/KeychainSwift

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Kerberos.framework/Versions/A/Kerberos

1

dylib_@rpath/libpng.framework/Versions/A/libpng

1
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dylib_@executable_path/libsmime3.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/Keys.framework/Keys

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/BugSplat.framework/Versions/A/BugSplat

1

segment_segment___OBJC___class_vars

1

dylib_@rpath/AgoraCore.framework/AgoraCore_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/ZMScreenshotKit.framework/Versions/A/ZMScreenshotKit_imports

1

segment_segment___TEXT___dof_mono

1

dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/Appstatico.framework/Versions/A/Appstatico

1

dylib_@rpath/PermissionsKit.framework/Versions/A/PermissionsKit

1

dylib_@rpath/PXMKit.framework/Versions/A/PXMKit

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NaturalLanguage.framework/Versions/A/NaturalLanguage

1

dylib_@rpath/Electron Framework.framework/Electron Framework_imports

1

dylib_@executable_path/libytdownloads.dylib

1

segment_segment___DATA_MPTweak

1

dylib_@rpath/SyncSupport.framework/Versions/A/SyncSupport

1

dylib_@rpath/Lottie.framework/Lottie

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/AGRegex.framework/Versions/A/AGRegex

1

dylib_@rpath/AgoraVideoSegmentationExtension.framework/AgoraVideoSegmentationExtension

1

segment_segment___DATA_CONST___auth_got

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/libedit.3.dylib_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/PreferencesUI.framework/Versions/A/PreferencesUI

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/Connection.framework/Versions/A/Connection

1

dylib_@rpath/TPInAppReceipt.framework/Versions/A/TPInAppReceipt

1

dylib_@rpath/CBHAboutWindow.framework/Versions/A/CBHAboutWindow

1

dylib_@rpath/SocketRocket.framework/Versions/A/SocketRocket

1

dylib_@rpath/andromeda.framework/Versions/A/andromeda

1

dylib_/usr/lib/libpmsample.dylib

1

dylib_@loader_path/libclucene-core.dylib

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/DiscRecordingUI.framework/Versions/A/DiscRecordingUI

1

dylib_@rpath/libcmlFramework.framework/Versions/A/libcmlFramework

1

dylib_@rpath/FarhadLibraryMac.framework/Versions/A/FarhadLibraryMac

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Versions/A/Security_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/NSObject_Rx.framework/Versions/A/NSObject_Rx

1

dylib_@rpath/QtWidgets.framework/Versions/5/QtWidgets

1

dylib_@rpath/mso99.framework/Versions/A/mso99_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/Amplitude.framework/Versions/A/Amplitude

1

dylib_@loader_path/libsfxlo.dylib

1
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dylib_@rpath/MAToolKit.framework/Versions/A/MAToolKit_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/libswiftQuartzCore.dylib

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/NetworkExtension.framework/Versions/A/NetworkExtension_im
ports

1

dylib_@rpath/libTmiCoreX.dylib

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/OkaNetwrokDiagnostic.framework/Versions/A/OkaNetwrokDiagnostic

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/PDFKit.framework/Versions/A/PDFKit

1

dylib_@rpath/Ashton_171F608F396333_PackageProduct.framework/Versions/A/Ashton_171F608F3
96333_PackageProduct_imports

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQGangway.framework/Versions/A/EQGangway_imports

1

segment_segment___TEXT___constructor

1

dylib_@rpath/ArticlesDatabase.framework/Versions/A/ArticlesDatabase_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/DejalFoundation.framework/Versions/A/DejalFoundation

1

dylib_@rpath/JTRecordSDK.framework/Versions/A/JTRecordSDK

1

dylib_@rpath/LinkKit.framework/LinkKit

1

dylib_@rpath/CCNStatusItem.framework/Versions/A/CCNStatusItem

1

dylib_@rpath/libswiftSecurity.dylib

1

segment___DATA___size

1

dylib_/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/DiagnosticExtensions.framework/Versions/A/DiagnosticE
xtensions

1

dylib_@rpath/FFmpegWrapper.framework/Versions/A/FFmpegWrapper_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/PACCoreKit.framework/PACCoreKit_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/AFEFramework.framework/Versions/A/AFEFramework

1

dylib_@rpath/ReactiveObjC.framework/ReactiveObjC

1

dylib_@rpath/mbukernel.framework/Versions/A/mbukernel

1

dylib_@rpath/tp.framework/Versions/A/tp

1

dylib_@loader_path/libuno_salhelpergcc3.dylib.3

1

segment_segment___TEXT___dof_node

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/libmqtt.dylib_imports

1

dylib_@loader_path/../Frameworks/cdm8000101mh_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/SimpleKeychain.framework/Versions/A/SimpleKeychain_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/PXMKit.framework/Versions/A/PXMKit_imports

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/QtAVWidgets.framework/Versions/1/QtAVWidgets

1

dylib_@rpath/MicrosoftCredui.framework/Versions/A/MicrosoftCredui_imports

1

segment_segment___LLVM_COV___llvm_covmap

1

dylib_@rpath/libidm.1.0.0.dylib

1

segment_segment___TEXT___dof_RACCompou

1
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dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/OgreKit.framework/Versions/A/OgreKit

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Resources/libbasecore.dylib_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/QtQuickWidgets.framework/Versions/5/QtQuickWidgets

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EvernoteSDK-Mac.framework/Versions/A/EvernoteSDKMac

1

dylib_@rpath/Nuance-OmniPage-CSDK-RunTime.framework/Versions/A/Libraries/libtwcutchr.dylib

1

dylib_@rpath/CMMNotifications.framework/Versions/A/CMMNotifications

1

dylib_@executable_path/../MonoBundle/libNetDevAccs.dylib_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/NordLogger.framework/Versions/A/NordLogger_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/BAMCheckout.framework/BAMCheckout_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/DatabaseManager.framework/Versions/A/DatabaseManager

1

dylib_/System/Library/Frameworks/IOBluetooth.framework/Versions/A/IOBluetooth_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/Rswift.framework/Rswift

1

dylib_@executable_path/../Frameworks/EQStoreSync.framework/Versions/A/EQStoreSync_imports

1

dylib_@rpath/SYFlatButton.framework/Versions/A/SYFlatButton

1

dylib_@rpath/UALFlightStatus.framework/UALFlightStatus

1
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APPENDIX D: RESEARCH QUESTION ONE MODEL
PERFORMANCE
This appendix shows the features, parameters, and performance metrics of the models
used to answer research question one.
Params

Features

Accuracy F1

AP

MLP {'alpha': 1e-05,

pca

1.0

1.0

1.00 1.00

1:21:19

SVM

pca

0.9344

0.8905 0.94 0.95

0:02:04

KNN {'metric': 'manhattan',

skb_20_set

0.9472

0.9161 0.95 0.98

0:01:16

RFC

skb_20_set

1.0

1.0

1.00 1.00

0:29:26

skb_20_set

1.0

1.0

1.00 1.00

0:03:41

DTC

'hidden_layer_sizes': 11,
'max_iter': 1000,
'random_state': 42,
'solver': 'adam'}
'C': 1, 'gamma': 0.0001, 'kerne
l': 'rbf'}
'n_neighbors': 9,
'weights': 'distance'}
{'criterion': 'gini',
'max_depth': 4,
'max_features': 'auto',
'n_estimators': 100}
{'criterion': 'gini',
'max_depth': 1,
'min_samples_leaf': 1,
'splitter': 'best'}

AUC Time
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APPENDIX E: RESEARCH QUESTION TWO MODEL
PERFORMANCE
This appendix shows the features, parameters, and performance metrics of the models
used to answer research question two.
Params

Features

Accuracy F1

MLP {'alpha': 0.0001,

pca

0.9444

0.8889 0.85 0.97

1:12:35

SVM

skb_20_set

0.9558

0.9010 0.89 0.96

0:02:22

KNN {'metric': 'manhattan',

skb_20_set

0.9472

0.8855 0.90 0.96

0:01:15

RFC

sfs_y3

0.9743

0.9461 0.99 1.00

0:24:28

0.9544

0.9030 0.88 0.98

0:07:31

DTC

'hidden_layer_sizes': 11,
'max_iter': 1000,
'random_state': 42,
'solver': 'adam'}
{'C': 100,
'gamma': 0.0001}
'n_neighbors': 8,
'weights': 'distance'}
{'criterion': 'entropy',
'max_depth': 8,
'max_features': 'log2',
'n_estimators': 100}
{'criterion': 'entropy',
'max_depth': 18,
'min_samples_leaf': 1,
'splitter': 'random'}

sfm_y1

AP

AUC Time
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APPENDIX F: RESEARCH QUESTION THREE MODEL
PERFORMANCE
This appendix shows the features, parameters, and performance metrics of the models
used to answer research question three.
Params

Features

Accuracy F1

MLP {'alpha': 0.01,

pca

0.7304

0.6201 7:19:37

SVM

sfs_set

0.7646

0.6907 8:23:47

skb_20_set

0.7190

0.6858 0:01:18

sfs_y3

0.7575

0.6794 0:38:04

skb_20_y2

0.7204

0.6784 0:04:46

KNN
RFC

DTC

'hidden_layer_sizes': 12,
'max_iter': 1000,
'random_state': 42,
'solver': 'adam'}
{'estimator__C': 100,
'estimator__gamma': 1,
'estimator__kernel': 'rbf'}
{'metric': 'manhattan',
'n_neighbors': 9,
'weights': 'distance'}
{'criterion': 'entropy',
'max_depth': 8,
'max_features': 'auto',
'n_estimators': 300}
'criterion': 'entropy',
'max_depth': 14,
'min_samples_leaf': 1,
'splitter': 'random'}

Time

